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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGY AND PLATFORMS
Yi Liu
Pinar Yildirim
Z. John Zhang

This dissertation investigates how technology in different marketing-related use cases may
affect consumer behavior, and how firms should respond. In particular, we study two important types of platforms in marketing – social media platforms such as Facebook and
shopping platforms such as Amazon Marketplace. For social media platforms, this dissertation focuses on a recent, hotly-debated topic – content moderation. We build a gametheoretical model to study how economic incentives will shape a social media platform’s
content moderation strategy, as well as how a platform’s technology strategy will interact
with the way in which it moderates its user-generated content. We find that a social media
platform’s optimal content moderation strategy depends on its revenue model: a platform
under advertising is more likely to moderate its content than one under subscription, but
does so less aggressively compared to the latter when it moderates content. We also show
that a platform under advertising does not necessarily benefit from a better technology for
content moderation, but one under subscription does, which means that platforms under
different revenue models can have different incentives to improve their content moderation technology. For shopping platforms, we investigate whether retailers should adopt
technology-enabled shopping (TES) platforms, such as Amazon’s Alexa, as a new distribution channel. We combine game-theoretical analysis and experiments that show consumer
reactions to different shopping technology. We find that consumers with stronger brand
preferences are less likely to benefit from decision support (DS) technology, whereas ordering convenience (OC) technology benefits all consumers at a similar level. Such differences in
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consumer reactions to different technology induces vastly different distribution and pricing
strategies in retail markets: the heterogeneous consumer valuation of the DS technology
results in a monopolistic retailer adoption and generates Pareto improvements, but OC
technology results in competitive retailer adoption and generates a prisoner-dilemma type
outcome. Furthermore, we also find that a technology provider may choose not to offer the
best possible OC technology to mitigate downstream retailer competition.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Technology has reshaped the way in which consumers interact with companies. A significant
impact of technology is that it allows for a significant number of platform-based businesses,
where multiple players including consumers, retailers, and platform providers are involved.
According to a Harvard Business Review article, among the six most valuable companies in
the world, five are platform-based (Cusumano et al., 2019). In this dissertation, we study
two important types of platforms in marketing – social media platforms such as Facebook
and Twitter, as well as shopping platforms such as Amazon Marketplace and Taobao at
Alibaba. We investigate how technology in the two different types of platforms and different
use cases may affect consumer behavior, and how firms should respond.
Specifically, Chapter 2 studies how social media platforms should moderate their usergenerated content, which is a hotly-discussed topic today, as well as how such content
moderation strategy interacts with a platform’s technology strategy. In this chapter, we first
develop a theoretical model to study the economic incentives for a social media platform to
moderate user-generated content. We show that a self-interested platform can use content
moderation as an effective marketing tool to expand its installed user base, to increase
the utility of its users, and to achieve its positioning as a moderate or extreme content
platform. For the purpose of maximizing its own profit, a platform will balance pruning
some extreme content, thus losing some users, with gaining new users because of more
moderate content on the platform. This balancing act will play out differently depending
on whether users will have to pay to join (subscription vs. advertising revenue models)
and on whether the technology for content moderation is perfect. We show that when
conducting content moderation optimally, a platform under advertising is more likely to
moderate its content than one under subscription, but does it less aggressively compared
to the latter when it does. This is because a platform under advertising is more concerned
about expanding its user base, while a platform under subscription is also concerned with
users’ willingness-to-pay. We also show a platform’s optimal content moderation strategy
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depends on its technical sophistication. Because of imperfect technology, a platform may
optimally throw away the moderate content more than the extreme content. Therefore, one
cannot judge how extreme a platform is by just looking at its content moderation strategy.
Furthermore, we show that a platform under advertising does not necessarily benefit from
a better technology for content moderation, but one under subscription does, as the latter
can always internalize the benefits of a better technology. This means that platforms under
different revenue models can have different incentives to improve their content moderation
technology. Finally, we draw managerial and policy implications from our insights.
Chapter 3 focuses more on shopping platforms which are enabled by new advances in technology that change the way consumers search and shop for products. This chapter studies
whether a retailer should embrace a new technology-enabled shopping platform such as
Amazon’s Alexa or Google Home and enter this new distribution channel. We study when
competing retailers choose to adopt such platforms that integrate technology-enabled shopping (TES) devices as a new channel, and the resulting price discrimination across its
channels. We break the functionalities of the TES devices into two: (1) adding convenience to ordering procedure (OC) and (2) providing support for decision-making (DS). Via
a series of experiments, we first document that stronger brand preferences are negatively
correlated with the willingness to use a TES device that offers DS functionality. However,
there is no association with brand preferences and desire to use a TES device when it offers
OC functionality. We then build an analytical model integrating the findings from these
experiments, and then derive the equilibrium channel and pricing strategies for two competing retailers. Our findings show that the functionality of TES devices results in vastly
different distribution and pricing strategies in retail markets. In particular, consumers’
heterogeneous valuation of the DS functionality results in a monopolistic adoption of TES
devices by the retailers in equilibrium, and generates Pareto improvements for both. In
contrast, when the TES devices offer OC functionality, in equilibrium, retailers adopt TES
channels competitively, resulting in a prisoner’s outcome. In the extensions, studying a
third-party technology developer’s decision to invest in OC and DS technologies, we show
2

that the contrast between the channel strategies under the OC and the DS functionalities
also impact the incentives to develop TES. We show that in some cases, in an effort to
mitigate downstream retailer competition, the provider may prefer not to offer the best
possible OC technology to consumers. These findings shed light on the future adoption and
the functionalities of shopping technologies offered by retailers.

3

CHAPTER 2 : Implications of Revenue Models and Technology for Content
Moderation Strategies
2.1. Introduction
A significant challenge that online social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter face
today is acting as the custodians of the Internet while at the same time being the center of
self-expression and user-generated content (Gillespie, 2018). Social media platforms allow
millions of users with diverse views to post their opinions on issues day-to-day, some of
which are deemed offensive, harmful, or “extreme1 ,” by a majority of users. Users demand,
on the one hand, to freely express their views on ongoing political, social, and economic
issues on social media platforms without intervention and without being told their views
are “inappropriate.” On the other hand, they abhor the content that they themselves view
as inappropriate, sensitive, harmful, or extreme. So platforms, in one form or another,
moderate content to protect individual users and their interests, by removing posts they
deem extreme. In fact, some executives at Facebook view content moderation as “the
most important thing they do” (Lomas, 2017). In 2019, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg
declared that they would be allocating 5% of the firm revenues, $3.7 billion, on content
moderation, an amount greater than Twitter’s entire annual revenue (Roettgers, 2019). In
this chapter, we take a theoretical look at how a self-interested platform can do “the most
important thing.”
Content moderation is no simple feat. Zuckerberg (2020) states that “platforms like Facebook have to make trade-offs ... between free expression and safety” and that there is rarely
a clear “right” answer. According to a Morningconsult.com survey2 , consumers vary on their
tolerance to potentially harmful content. Of those surveyed, 80% wish to see hate speech
such as posts using slurs against a racial, religious or gender group removed, 73% wish to
1

Through the rest of the chapter, we will refer to such content as “extreme content.”
Source: https://morningconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/190859 crosstabs CONTENT M
ODERATION Adults v4 JB-1.pdf. The survey also states that 56% of adults think that edited or distorted
images of public officials and celebrities should be removed by social media sites. The same number is 69%
for “Misleading health information,” 32% for “Fad diets, such as detoxes.”
2
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see videos depicting violent crimes removed, and only 66% wish to see depictions of sexual
acts removed. This user heterogeneity adds complexity to content moderation, but it also
gives a social media platform the cover and leeway to conduct content moderation to achieve
its own profit objective. This is because the balance between self-expression and safety in
the context of user heterogeneity can justify any strict or lax content moderation strategy
motivated by a platform’s profit. In this study, we incorporate the user heterogeneity and
derive a platform’s optimal content moderation strategy.
The practice in the real world has shown that platforms have wide latitude in pruning
different kinds of content that has frequently incited partisan bickering. In this chapter, we
shall avoid any partisan content and focus on the content that mostly transcends partisan
politics such as hate speech, sexual or adult content, graphic violence, illegal activities,
harassment, bullying, threats, etc. These are the content that users by and large agree
to be harmful and extreme, albeit they may have a varying degree of sensitivity to them,
as we have noted earlier. These are also the content on which a vast majority of social
media platforms have sworn to moderate, although their policy coverage may differ and
enforcement may vary. Since the basic product offered by social media platforms is usergenerated content, removal of some of this content simultaneously changes the design of
the product offered to other users, and endogenously determines which users may enjoy the
content enough to stay on the social media as well. Put differently, content moderation
for a social media platform is a decision that simultaneously determines the content offered
and the platform’s positioning as a moderate or extreme content platform. It is a decision
that combines “product” and “promotion” in one. In this chapter, we will investigate how
a platform makes that decision.
Content moderation is also a decision that attracts extensive public scrutiny and regulatory
attention. How exactly content moderation should be implemented is an issue that is of high
priority to policymakers, academics, and industry pundits (Jhaver et al., 2018; Schomer,
2019; Feiner, 2020), and there is a heated debate ongoing on the topic. Given the importance
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of content moderation to the public, it is important to understand that there can be many
different worthy objectives related to the well-being of the society in conducting content
moderation, such as racial harmony, national security, crime prevention, gender equality,
etc. In this chapter, we approach this big and complex topic from the ground up, focusing
on how a self-interested platform may conduct content moderation, and take a first step
toward understanding the economic foundations of a platform’s desire to moderate content
and to invest in content moderation technology. We study three key questions that are at the
heart of marketing and management for social media platforms. First, how do self-interested
social media platforms moderate content given their revenue model? More specifically, does
the revenue source (advertising vs. subscription) matter in their motivation and strategy to
conduct content moderation? Second, does a platform with a given revenue model always
prefer a better technology for content moderation, so that they have sufficient incentives
to pursue the best technology on their own? Finally, how does a free-market content
moderation compare to the social optimum? The answers to these questions are important
not only to understand a platform’s behaviors with regard to content moderation, but also
to identify the rationale for any regulatory intervention or non-intervention.
In this chapter, we develop a theoretical model to address all these questions. In our
model, a platform allows users to post and share content with others, and earns revenue
either through advertising or subscription fees. Users enjoy the ability to express their
opinions, and read others’ content, from which they may or may not obtain positive utility
depending on their own preferences and also on how extreme the content on the platform is.
A platform moderates online content to maximize its revenue. This model setup allows us
to study content moderation as a marketing tool and explore its strategy and public policy
implications.
The analysis of our model shows that content moderation by a platform is primarily motivated by users’ preferences for posting vs. reading content on the platform. A platform
conducts content moderation only if users care more about reading others’ content than
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posting their own. As a marketing tool, content moderation can perform two functions for
a platform: expand its user base and increase users’ willingness-to-pay. The user base is
expanded through pruning extreme users to get more users of moderate opinions. Content
moderation can also increase users’ willingness-to-pay by reducing their reading disutility
from extreme content. This result establishes content moderation as an effective product
design and positioning tool.
When applying this tool, a platform’s optimal content moderation strategy will depend
on its revenue model and also its technological sophistication. When a platform chooses
optimally not to conduct content moderation, the platform under advertising will field less
extreme content than a platform under subscription, all else being equal. This is because
users on the advertising-based platform need not pay to join and hence the platform attracts
more moderate users, while a subscription-based platform screens them out with a fee.
When a platform optimally conducts content moderation, its content would be less extreme
under subscription than under advertising. This is because under subscription, the platform
controls the fee that marginal users pay to join and content moderation combined with a
lower fee becomes a more effective tool to expand its user base. Furthermore, because of
imperfect technology, the optimal content moderation strategy may call for a platform to
prune the moderate content more than the extreme content on the platform and vice versa
depending on the revenue model. This analysis thus suggests that the content moderation
strategy for a platform, given its standard on what is extreme or not, may not be as
straightforward as removing the extreme content while keeping all the moderate content.
Technology plays an important role in content moderation also in a different way. When
criticized for insufficient effort at content moderation, social media executives frequently
blame imperfect technology and promise to remedy the inadequacy through technology improvement (Dave, 2020; Gershgorn, 2020; Gagliordi, 2020). Interestingly, our analysis shows
that for a self-interested social media platform, technological improvement does not always
lead to more content moderation or to less extreme content on the platform. In addition, a
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platform under advertising may not even benefit from a better technology because a better
technology may reduce its user base. In other words, a social media platform under advertising may not have the incentive to perfect its technology for content moderation. This
result demonstrates that content moderation on online platforms is not merely an outcome
of their technological capabilities, but economic incentives. This result thus casts some
doubts on whether social media platforms will always remedy the technological deficiencies
on their own.
The regulatory concerns are even deeper when one compares the content moderation strategy for a self-interested platform with that for a social planner. We show that a social
planner will use content moderation to prune the users whose net utility contribution to the
society is negative. In addition, the social planner always pursues perfect technology if the
cost of developing technology is not an issue. In contrast, a self-interested platform under
either advertising or subscription is always more likely to conduct content moderation than
a social planner, and when conducting content moderation, a platform under advertising
(subscription) will be less (more) strict than a social planner. Only a platform under subscription will have an interest aligned with a social planner in perfecting the technology for
content moderation. These conclusions thus demonstrate that there is room for government
regulations and when they are warranted, they need to be differentiated with regard to the
revenue model a platform adopts.
Studies in the past on user-generated content (UGC), social media, and firm strategy have
taken a number of different directions. Many studies have looked into the dynamics of
and the motivations for user-generated content (e.g., Toubia and Stephen, 2013; Daugherty
et al., 2008; Sun et al., 2017; Iyer and Katona, 2016; Ahn et al., 2016; Bazarova and Choi,
2014; Buechel and Berger, 2015). A number of empirical and theoretical studies have also
investigated how firms can glean information from UGC and use it strategically to perform
their marketing functions (e.g., Ghose et al., 2012; Timoshenko and Hauser, 2019; Iyengar
et al., 2011; Tirunillai and Tellis, 2012; Goh et al., 2013; Godes and Mayzlin, 2004). As
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the UGC provides a different dimension for firms’ offerings, a number of theoretical papers
have derived the optimal differentiation strategy for competing firms (e.g., Yildirim et al.,
2013; Zhang and Sarvary, 2015). However, these studies do not address hate content or the
issue of content moderation.
To the extent that content moderation is carried out with artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, our research is also related to the growing stream of literature on the implications
of applying AI algorithms. A number of papers have studied the application in fintech (Wei
et al., 2015), hiring (Cowgill and Tucker, 2020; Lee, 2018), online dating (Abeliuk et al.,
2019), and advertising (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2019). Our study differs from these papers
in that we theoretically explore the strategic implications of using AI algorithms in content
moderation and also the incentives for platforms to perfect their technology.
Content moderation is a hotly debated issue in political science, communications, and economics, and many of the discussions involve free speech, censorship, and the merits or demerits of content moderation (e.g., Gillespie, 2018; Myers West, 2018; Gorwa et al., 2020).
In a complementary theoretical paper, Madio and Quinn (2020) study content moderation
as a tool to attract content-sensitive advertisers and as a way to manage its advertising
price. The content moderation we study focuses on the interactions between a platform
and users and it differs from theirs in three ways. First, the user content subject to content
moderation in our model is the one that all users do not like, to a varying degree. In their
case, it is the content that some users like and some do not, and overall users’ demand
for the platform actually goes up with more such content. Second, content moderation
in this chapter is motivated by a platform’s effort to please and attract users, while their
content moderation is motivated solely by attracting advertisers. Third, we examine how a
platform’s content moderation strategy interacts with technology and whether a platform
under different revenue models has sufficient incentive to perfect its technology, and they
do not.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we develop our theoretical
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model and discuss a platform’s content moderation strategies with perfect technology. In
Section 2.3, we discuss how imperfect technology can affect content moderation and what
incentives a platform faces in developing a better technology. Section 2.4 explores the policy
implications of our model. Finally, in Section 2.5, we conclude.

2.2. Model
Consider a social media platform, with users of mass of 1, where they post their opinions
and read those from others. We assume that all those posts can be evaluated on a vertical scale between 0 and 1 in terms of how extreme or offensive they are. We let a user
located at x be the one who expresses opinions with extremeness index x ∈ [0, 1]. Here, the
vertical scale captures the fact that users agree, to a varying degree, whether a particular
content is more or less extreme as measured by the index. In other words, we are modeling
“vertical differentiation” in user preferences with regard to content, rather than “horizontal differentiation,” where partisan users do not agree on the extremeness of a particular
issue. We believe that such a vertical differentiation model is better suited for issues such
as graphic violence, hate speech, bullying and threats, sexual harassment, etc., on which
content moderation mostly takes place. In our conclusion section, we will discuss how a
horizontal differentiation model can be relevant for future research on content moderation.
Users are heterogeneous with respect to how extreme their expressed opinions typically
are. To capture this heterogeneity, we assume that users are distributed uniformly over
the index range, i.e., x ∼ U [0, 1]. We make this assumption for analytical simplicity and
clarity. However, the effect of an alternative distribution will become quite clear once we
understand this model with a uniform distribution. When a user posts content, as the
literature has shown (e.g., Bazarova and Choi, 2014; Buechel and Berger, 2015), she gains a
utility of u(x) from sharing her opinions on the platform. This utility differs amongst users.
The literature in consumer psychology shows that individuals with more extreme opinions
are also more vocal in expressing their opinions (Miller and Morrison, 2009; Yildirim et al.,
2013; Mathew et al., 2019). Based on this finding, we model the utility from posting content

10

on social media as u(x) = αx, where α ≥ 0, such that a user with a higher extremeness
index gains more utility from posting. Here a larger α implies a greater difference in posting
utilities between any two users.3
A user on the platform also derives utility from reading content posted by others. Past
research has suggested that a user always appreciates her own content or like-minded content
(e.g., Garimella et al., 2018; Cinelli et al., 2021). In the context of our model, this means that
a user located at x reading something also located at x derives the highest reading utility,
which we denote as v. However, past research has offered little direct guidance in terms of
how a user may react to content more vs less extreme than her own in a vertical context.
The studies on extremeness aversion both for product choice in marketing (Simonson and
Tversky, 1992; Neumann et al., 2016) and also for candidate choice in politics (Hall and
Thompson, 2018; Mebane Jr and Waismel-Manor, 2005) all suggest that people have the
tendency to favor more moderate choices and avoid more extreme alternatives. Absent of
any study directly on social media content, extremeness aversion is a reasonable and good
assumption we adopt for this chapter. Specifically, in our context, extremeness aversion
means that a user at x tends to feel uncomfortable about content more extreme than x,
but she may tolerate content less extreme than x. The simplest possible way to model this
asymmetry is to assume that a user at any x is troubled by the content more extreme than
x, but not at all affected by more moderate content.4 Algebraically, a user at x will find
a post with extremeness index x̃ > x objectionable and her utility will be reduced by x̃
per post with the same index. In other words, all posts more extreme than her own will
reduce her reading utility. Then, the utility for a user at x from reading the posts in the
3

In our model, the posting utility depends only on a user’s extremeness index or αx. Alternatively, the
posting utility can also depend on the size of the user base on the platform X, or αx + βX. Our conclusions
are not affected with this extended model if β is not too large. When β is too large, multiple equilibria occur,
depending on users’ expectation of the platform’s user base. However, in all equilibria, content moderation
is less likely to happen when β is sufficiently large because the positive network effect will dominate any
user expansion effect from content moderation. Detailed analysis is available upon request.
4
It is conceivable that a user may be bothered by both more extreme and less extreme content than her
own, or she may be more interested in content even more extreme than her own. Future research can explore
those alternative models. Ultimately, which model is more reasonable should be judged by the insights they
generate and also by future empirical research findings.
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extremeness index range of [0, x] where x > x is given by v −

Rx
x

exposed to all content on the platform. We further assume v <

x̃dx̃. We assume a user is
1
2

to ensure that the least

extreme users (x = 0) have a negative utility if she is exposed to all the content on the
platform without moderation.5
The platform can moderate the user-generated content. Due to the large volume of UGC,
it typically relies on artificial intelligence (AI) and natural language processing algorithms
to identify and remove intended content. We start in our benchmark model with the
assumption of a perfect content moderation technology such that a platform can get rid of
any content with perfect accuracy. This means that a platform can eliminate any subset of
content in the regions denoted by {xi , δi } where i = 1, 2, ..., n. Here, xi denotes the location
and δi denotes the width of the region associated with xi to be eliminated such that we
have 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, xi + δi < xi+1 and xn + δn ≤ 1, as illustrated in Figure 1. We show in
Appendix on page 71, the platform will optimally choose a threshold strategy y ∈ [0, 1] such
that any content with extremeness index x > y is eliminated while any content with x ≤ y
is kept. Therefore, from this point on, our analysis focuses only on the optimal threshold
strategy. Later in our analysis (Section 2.3), we will also look into imperfect technologies
where the platform cannot perfectly moderate the intended content but can only remove
any content x > y and preserve any content x ≤ y with a higher than random probability.
This imperfect technology nests our benchmark model as a special case.
If the platform engages in content moderation and deletes a user’s content because it is
deemed offensive, then the user experiences a psychological cost c when she could not post
or her post cannot be seen by others. This cost captures how people treasure freedom
5

This formulation assumes that a user puts 100% weight on the absolute extremeness index in evaluating
the disutility from a more extreme content. Alternatively, we can model the user as putting a γ% weight on
the difference between the extremeness index of a more extreme content and that of her own and (1 − γ)%
Rx
Rx
weight on the absolute extremeness index as in our model, or v − γ x (x̃ − x)dx̃ − (1 − γ) x x̃dx̃ = v −
Rx
(x̃ − γx)dx̃. We can show that even though the complexity in analysis has increased significantly, as
x
long as γ < 1, our analysis based on the simpler model with γ = 0 will not qualitatively change, and when
γ = 1, no content moderation will take place. This is because at γ = 1, the effect of content moderation in
expanding the user base disappears as content moderation does not increase enough reading utility to draw
more users to the platform. The complete analysis is available upon request.
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Figure 1: Platform’s Content Moderation Strategy
δ1

x1

0

δ2

δn

x2

xn
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of expression. Then, the total cost borne by a user at location x who is pruned by the
platform is actually c + αx (the psychological cost plus the opportunity cost), indicating
that if a user cares more about posting the content than others, then she would be more
upset if her post is pruned. Throughout the model, we shall maintain the assumption c > v
to ensure that users subject to content moderation with certainty will not participate in
the platform. Without loss of generality, we set c ≤ α + 2v. This assumption is sufficient
to guarantee that a user can still participate in the platform facing uncertain prospects of
content moderation, as we will see in Section 2.3.
The anticipated utility of a user from participating in a social media platform U (x) is the
sum of utilities from both reading and posting content. A user participates in the platform
if U (x) ≥ 0. Mathematically, U (x) is given by

U (x) =


Z


αx
+v −
x̃dx̃ if x ≤ y,


|{z}

x̃∈X̂ ,x<x̃≤y

posting utility |
{z
}
reading utility









−c
|{z}

posting utility

+

v
|{z}

(2.1)

if x > y.

reading utility

where X̂ is the expected set of participants on the platform.
Depending on whether a platform uses advertising or subscription as its revenue model, it
may earn revenues from advertisers or from users through subscription fees. We focus on
these two revenue models to investigate a platform’s content moderation strategy because
they provide distinctly different economic incentives for a platform. In the case of advertising, the platform’s incentive is to maximize its user base. Under subscription, maximizing
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its user base will not maximize its profitability. The platform in this case needs to focus on
the high willingness-to-pay users and strike a balance between the subscription fee and its
user base. Then, how does the difference in economic incentives shape a platform’s content
moderation strategy? We shall address this question now.
Specifically, with an advertising model, the platform charges the advertisers for each user.
This means that the total advertising revenue is proportional to the number of users on the
platform, i.e.,
π A = ζX A ,
where X A is the user base of the platform, and ζ is the advertising value of each user, or
ARPU (average revenue per user).6 In some cases, the advertising rate may increase with
the number of users on a platform so that we have ζ = ζ0 + ζ1 X A . We can easily show that
this modification in advertising rate will not change our results.7 We can also show that
our results are robust to an advertising rate that depends on the average extremeness index
on a platform (x̂): ζ = ζ(x̂) = ζ ′ − ωx̂, as long as ω is sufficiently small.8
If the platform earns revenue from subscription instead, it sets a subscription fee p to its
users. Its entire revenues will come from paying users instead of advertisers. Denote the
number of users who choose to use the platform when it charges p as X S (p). Then the
platform’s revenue is
π S = pX S (p).
In our model, the subscription fee is endogenously determined by the platform whereas the
per-user advertising fee (ζ) is determined by a competitive market and is exogenous to our
6

Here we have abstracted away from the nuisance factor associated with advertising. If we were to
introduce this cost for users, we can simply add a negative reading utility for all users due to advertising,
which effectively is to add a negative constant to v in our model. This addition does not change our results
in a substantive way. If more moderate users suffer more from advertising, our results also are not affected
because that nuisance factor can be absorbed by the parameter α in our model.
7
With the constant rate, the platform chooses its content moderation threshold y to optimize π A = ζX A .
With ζ = ζ0 + ζ1 X A , the platform now maximizes (ζ0 + ζ1 X A )X A . The solution to both optimization
problems is identical. As this chapter focuses on content moderation, we choose the simpler model.
8
The analysis is available upon request.
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model.9
By juxtaposing these two revenue models, we can examine the incentives a platform faces
in content moderation in each of the revenue models. Moreover, we can also examine
how the ability of a platform to conduct content moderation may influence the choice of its
revenue model. Admittedly, a platform’s choice of revenue model may not depend primarily
on its ability to conduct content moderation. However, given the importance of content
moderation and the public nature of this activity, it is important to investigate how the
ability to conduct content moderation can affect how best a platform can take advantage
of a revenue model.10 The timeline of the game is as follows:
1. If the platform uses advertising, it takes the advertising fee (ζ) as given; if it uses
subscription, it sets the subscription fee (p) for all users.
2. The platform determines its content moderation strategy (y).
3. Users observe the platform’s content moderation strategy and decide whether to stay
on the platform, and those who stay on post content. Users read the content remaining
on the platform after moderation, and obtain utility from posting and reading.
In the following section, we analyze the platform’s content moderation strategy separately
for both advertising-based and subscription-based revenue models. Then, we will discuss
how content moderation can in turn affect a platform’s preference for revenue models.
2.2.1. Advertising-Supported Social Media Platforms
We start the analysis by considering the case for an ad-supported platform. Let the users
who actually participate in the platform be X . X̂ , as introduced above in Equation (2.1),
is a user’s expected set of participants on the platform. Each user will decide whether
9
As a standard practice, advertising fees on major social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter are
not set by the platforms, but determined through auctions.
10
In choosing a revenue model, business executives are clearly mindful of their ability to conduct content
moderation. See https://techcrunch.com/2020/12/22/substack-explains-its-hands-off-approach-t
o-content-moderation/.
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to participate in the social media platform based on her utility U (x) and we derive the
equilibrium where X = X̂ (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Easley et al., 2010).
We start by characterizing the equilibrium configuration for users for any given content
moderation policy y. The following lemma summarizes our analysis.
Lemma 1. For any y ∈ [0, 1], there exists xA (y) ∈ [0, y] such that in equilibrium, the set of
people who participate in the platform X is a continuum on [xA (y), y]. Furthermore, U (x)
is increasing in x on [xA (y), y].
Figure 2: Illustration of the Platform’s User Base (Advertising)

0

y

xA (y)

1

The proof of Lemma 1 is on p. 85 in Appendix A.2. This lemma is illustrated in Figure
2 and the platform’s user base is given by the shaded area. Based on Lemma 1, we know
that in equilibrium, for any x ∈ [xA (y), y], the utility of a user with extremeness index x
from participating on the platform can be expressed as:
Z
U (x) = αx + v −

y

x̃dx̃.

(2.2)

x

Based on the utility function, we can solve for xA (y) by setting U (xA (y)) to zero, for any
given level of content moderation y. The solution is given below:

A

x (y) =

Here, when y ≥

√


p


−α + α2 + y 2 − 2v

if y ≥



0

if y <

√
√

2v,
(2.3)
2v.

2v, we have a regime of a more lax content moderation. In this case,

more content moderation will decrease xA (y), or draw more users of less extreme views to
the platform. This is the case where moderating extreme views may help the platform to
√
expand its market. When y < 2v we have a regime of a more strict content moderation.
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In this case, xA (y) is bounded at zero and more content moderation will simply reduce the
platform’s customer base.
Thus, the revenue of a platform under advertising is given by

π A = ζ(y − xA (y)),

(2.4)

and the platform chooses the optimal level of content moderation, y A∗ , to maximize its
revenue π A . The following proposition summarizes the optimal content moderation strategy
of a platform under advertising.
Proposition 1. (Advertising model and content moderation) A platform with advertising as its revenue model does not always have incentives to conduct content moderation.
√
It will conduct content moderation y A∗ = 2v if and only if the posting utility in the market
√
is sufficiently small relative to the maximum reading utility, or α < αA ≡ 2v. The opti√
mal revenue is given by π A∗ = ζ 2v. Otherwise, the platform does not moderate content
√
(y A∗ = 1) and its optimal revenue is given by π A∗ = ζ(1 + α − α2 + 1 − 2v).
The proof of Proposition 1 is on page 85 in Appendix A.2. Proposition 1 suggests that
content moderation is a tool for the platform to achieve its revenue objectives. When
a platform uses advertising as its revenue model, it needs to maximize its user base to
maximize its advertising revenues. Content moderation can help the platform to maximize
its user base if cutting extreme content and pruning extreme users expand the user base
amongst the less extreme users. We can see this more clearly by comparing the marginal
gain and marginal loss in market size associated with content moderation.
Note that at any given y, the platform will always want to do more content moderation dy if
doing so can draw more users dxA to the platform, or algebraically dxA > dy. This implies
that if

dxA
dy

> 1, the platform will do content moderation to expand its customer base. It is
√
A
√ y
simple to show that dx
and it is larger than 1 if and only if α < 2v ≡ αA ,
dy =
2
2
y +α −2v

which is the condition given in Proposition 1.
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To probe deeper, content moderation can expand the platform’s customer base fundamentally because moderating extreme views and hence pruning extreme users on a platform
can attract more users with less extreme opinions by increasing their reading utility. To
see this, if a platform wants to expand its customer base beyond xA to the left by ∆x, the
new users have a lower posting utility by α∆x. These new users will only participate in
the platform if their reading utility is increased by α∆x. The platform can increase the
reading utility for the marginal user only by further content moderation by the amount of
∆y. The amount of reading utility increase by ∆y is given by the expression ∆y √

αy
.
y 2 +α2 −2v

Thus, the amount of ∆y needed to increase the marginal user’s reading utility by α∆x,
√
∆x y 2 +α2 −2v
denoted as ∆ỹ, is given by ∆ỹ =
. This expression decreases with a higher
y
v, or at a higher v a smaller change in content moderation is required to deliver the same
amount of reading utility to the marginal users. This explains why at the optimal content
√
moderation y A∗ = 2v, the platform does less content moderation when v is large. This
also explains why a platform would not do any content moderation if v is too small (the
√
threshold αA ≡ 2v is too small): too much content moderation to deliver too little reading
utility. As a platform’s objective is to maximize its customer base, it will do more content
moderation as long as ∆ỹ < ∆x, which also gives us the condition in Proposition 1.
Through this analysis, we can see that Proposition 1 reveals an interesting insight about
content moderation across different platforms. Under the advertising revenue model, whenever users care sufficiently more about reading utility than posting utility, the platform is
motivated to moderate content. Otherwise, it is not. This proposition suggests a testable
hypothesis: if users on a social media platform care more about posting than reading, then
we will see little content moderation, and if they care more about reading than posting,
then we will see more content moderation. However, our proposition does not rule out the
possibility that if α is very large so that extreme users are vocal, the platform actually
wants to moderate the content. This is because as α increases, the reading utility v may
also increase with it.

18

2.2.2. Subscription-Supported Social Media Platforms
When the revenue source is subscription fees, the platform determines a content moderation
strategy (y) as in the case of advertising model, and also sets a subscription fee (p) for all
users. Then, a user at x will participate in the platform if her net utility U (x) − p > 0.
Similar to the advertising case, a platform’s customer base is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Illustration of the Platform’s User Base (Subscription)
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The marginal user xS (y, p), which is dependent also on p now, is given by

S

x (y, p) =


p


−α + α2 + y 2 − 2(v − p)

if y ≥



0

p
if y < 2(v − p).

p
2(v − p),
(2.5)

The platform maximizes its subscription revenue π S by setting its content moderation
strategy y, and subscription fee p, and the revenue is given by

π S = p(y − xS (y, p)).

(2.6)

The following proposition summarizes the optimal strategy for the platform under a subscription revenue model.
Proposition 2. (Subscription model and content moderation) Under the subscription model, there exists αS ∈ (0, αA ), such that the platform will conduct content moderation
if α < αS . The optimal content moderation strategy, equilibrium subscription fee, and the
q
2v
∗
S∗ = ( 2v ) 32 . Otherresulting revenue are given respectively by y S∗ = 2v
3 , p = 3 , and π
3
wise, if α ≥ αS , the platform does not moderate content (y S∗ = 1). The platform’s optimal
h
i
p
price and profit are given by p∗ = p∗1 ≡ 19 (1+α) 2(2 − 3v + 2α2 + α)−2(1−3v +α2 −α) ,
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and π S∗ = p∗1 (1 + α −

p

α2 + 1 − 2(v − p∗1 )).

The proof of Proposition 2 is on pp. 86-89 in Appendix A.2. By analyzing Proposition 2,
we can develop insights about what motivates a platform under subscription to do more or
less content moderation, how content moderation affects its pricing, and finally how content
differs under advertising vs subscription revenue models because of a platform’s effort in
content moderation.
By comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we see that a platform under advertising is more likely
to do content moderation (αA > αS ). This seems to be consistent with casual observations.
Facebook and Twitter are two prominent examples of advertising-based platforms, and they
both actively moderate content. Even though a platform under subscription is less likely
to moderate its content, when it does, it will moderate content more aggressively than
q
√
S∗
A∗ =
what it would under advertising (y = 2v
2v). The platform is less likely to
3 < y
engage in content moderation because the subscription fee screens out less extreme users on
the platform, and the remaining users are more extreme, getting less disutility from other
more extreme users. For that reason, moderating extreme content adds less utility to the
marginal users under subscription than to those under advertising. In other words, content
moderation is less effective in attracting marginal users when the subscription model is used
or

∂xS
∂y

<

∂xA
∂y ,

all else being equal. This explains why content moderation is more sparingly

used under subscription.
The reason why a platform under subscription may behave more aggressively once it decides
to do content moderation is related to the role of pricing. Under subscription, a platform
can use pricing to internalize its decision on the extent of content moderation, which is not
possible under advertising. To see this clearly, we can derive how the optimal price for the
platform may change with its content moderation decision, and the expression in a general
form is given by
S

2 S

∗∂ x
1 − ∂x
∂p∗
∂y − p ∂p∂y
=
.
S
∗ ∂ 2 xS
∂y
2 ∂x
+
p
2
∂p
∂y
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The denominator of this expression is positive guaranteed by the second-order condition.
Therefore, content moderation will lead to a lower price by the platform if the numerator is
positive, which is the case if content moderation adds little utility to the marginal users (a
small

∂xS
∂y ),

or content moderation increases price sensitivity on the part of marginal users

∂ 2 xS

(a large | ∂p∂y |). Thus, price can help the platform to expand its user base more effectively
in conjunction with content moderation so that it wants to do it more aggressively. If the
numerator is negative, which is the case if marginal users are very responsive to content
moderation but their price sensitivity does not change much with content moderation,
the platform will increase its price with content moderation. This is the case where the
platform internalizes content moderation efforts by charging a higher subscription fee. Given
our modeling assumptions, price is used to enhance the user expansion effect of content
moderation.11
The conclusions that a platform under advertising is more likely to conduct content moderation and that when conducting content moderation, a platform under subscription does
more aggressively can both be tested with suitable data. To provide some prima facie evidence, we have collected data on 103 social media platforms based on the “101+ Social
Media Sites You Need to Know in 2021” composed by Influencer Marketing Hub.12 As
shown in Appendix A.5, we collect the texts of their content moderation policy and also
information about their revenue models. In addition, we hire independent graders from
Mechanical Turk to read and code the texts of content moderation policy for each platform.
Our analysis shows that out of all the social media platforms in our analysis, only two platforms do not conduct content moderation and they both adopt subscription as their major
revenue model. Our regression analysis further shows that the platforms with advertising
as their revenue model tend to have a less restrictive content moderation policy than those
11
In our model, users’ disutility from reading extreme content comes from all users with higher extremeness
indices. This assumption, although more realistic, reduces the response of marginal users to a platform’s
content moderation. If we were to let a user’s disutility only come from the most extreme content on
the platform, we would enhance this response greatly so that the platform will want to raise its price to
internalize any content moderation.
12
https://influencermarketinghub.com/social-media-sites/.
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with subscription (see Appendix A.5 for details). While not being conclusive, these findings
are consistent with the conclusions coming out of our theoretical analysis, providing some
preliminary external validity for our modeling efforts.
The first two propositions also allow us to shed light on whether content tends to be more or
less extreme on a platform with subscription vs advertising model as a result of conducting
content moderation. Our analysis shows that whenever a platform under subscription does
not moderate content, it has more extreme content and appeals to more extreme users than
a platform under advertising. However, when a platform under subscription does conduct
content moderation, it fields less extreme content and caters to less extreme users than
a platform under advertising. This is because subscription fee serves to screen out less
extreme users when a platform does not moderate content, and when it does, as discussed
previously, it uses content moderation more aggressively and charges a lower subscription
fee to draw moderate users to the platform. This analysis offers a testable hypothesis that
platforms under subscription tend to have the most extreme or the least extreme content.
2.2.3. Content Moderation and Revenue Models
The previous two sections show that a platform’s revenue model will influence its content
moderation strategy. In this section, we push that line of inquiry one step further to see
how the ability to conduct content moderation can affect how best a platform can take
advantage of a revenue model. We will do so by examining when a platform may choose
subscription over advertising with and without content moderation.
When content moderation is allowed, a platform will choose advertising over subscription
if and only if π A∗ is larger (smaller) than π S∗ . This comparison will define a ζ such that
a platform will choose advertising if and only if ζ > ζ. Here ζ is the minimum advertising
value per user needed for a platform to embrace advertising model. Thus, a larger ζ will
make it less likely for a platform to choose advertising. Similarly, when content moderation
is not allowed, we can define a ζ̂ such that the platform will choose advertising if and only
if ζ > ζ̂. By comparing ζ and ζ̂, we can isolate how optimal content moderation can alter a
22

platform’s preference for advertising vs subscription model. We will make the comparison
for all α < αA . For any α ≥ αA , we have the trivial case where content moderation makes no
difference in the choice of revenue model because no content moderation will be conducted
regardless of this choice, even if content moderation is allowed. The following proposition
summarizes the findings.

Proposition 3. (Content moderation and revenue model choice) Relative to the
case of no content moderation, a platform conducting optimal content moderation is more
likely to choose subscription over advertising (ζ > ζ̂) if the maximum posting utility is
sufficiently small, i.e., α < α1 . Otherwise, i.e., α1 < α < αA , optimal content moderation
increases the likelihood of a platform choosing advertising (ζ < ζ̂).
Figure 4: Revenue Model Choice and Content Moderation

The proof of Proposition 3 is on pp. 89-91 in Appendix A.2. Proposition 3 is illustrated
in Figure 4. For α < α1 , we see ζ > ζ̂ in Figure 4, implying that it takes a higher
advertising rate per user for a platform to choose advertising over subscription model when
content moderation is introduced. For α > α1 , we have ζ < ζ̂, which implies that a
platform is willing to embrace advertising model at a lower advertising rate when content
moderation is allowed. This proposition suggests an intriguing insight that at a low α, it
requires advertisers to pay a higher advertising rate to switch a platform from subscription
to advertising model when content moderation is allowed. Equivalently, at a low α, content
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moderation makes it more likely for a platform to adopt the subscription model at a given
advertising rate.
Intuitively, content moderation helps a platform under subscription more than that under
advertising because without content moderation, marginal users are more sensitive to any
change in maximum posting utility (α) under subscription than advertising, and hence a
platform under subscription suffers more in profitability with any reduction in α. Content
moderation neutralizes that effect to deliver more profit gain to a platform under subscription.
Proposition 3 suggests a testable hypothesis that in the environment where social media
platforms are free to conduct content moderation vs one where platforms are constrained
for one reason or another, we shall see more platforms choosing to adopt a subscription
model over an advertising model if users care more about reading than posting. Otherwise,
we would expect social media to use advertising model more. The variation in the extent
of content moderation across Europe, US, and China may provide a good testing ground
for this hypothesis.
It is important to note that our analysis on the content moderation strategy and revenue
models is based on the assumption that users know the content moderation policy of the
platform. This assumption captures the fact that most platforms do indeed try to publicize
their content moderation policies. However, if users were to have imperfect knowledge about
a platform’s content moderation strategy and form their expectations about it, we can show
that there will be a set of equilibria where users form their expectations independently,
the platform sets its own strategies given those expectations, and users’ expectations are
confirmed in the respective equilibria.13 The analysis suggests that the equilibrium we have
derived is in the set of rational expectations equilibria, and it is the equilibrium that yields
the maximum revenue for the platform.
13

Detailed analysis is available upon request.
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2.3. Content Moderation and Technology
The analysis in the previous section delivers the key insights into the incentives a platform
faces under advertising or subscription in using content moderation and also the impact of
content moderation on how best a platform can take advantage of a revenue model. These
insights are delivered under the assumption of perfect technology for content moderation.
In this section, we shall expand our analysis and explore a platform’s content moderation
strategy under imperfect technology.
In reality, an accurate technology for content moderation is still many years into the future
(Singh, 2020). As Mark Zuckerberg commented, “over a five-to-ten-year period we will have
AI tools that can get into some of the linguistic nuances of different types of content to be
more accurate, to be flagging things to our systems, but today we’re just not there on that...
There’s a higher error rate than I’m happy with” (Gershgorn, 2020). In a well-publicized
example, in the days leading up to 4th of July, 2018, Facebook’s algorithm for “hate speech
detection” flagged down and removed a post of the Declaration of Independence because
of paragraphs 27-31, which include the phrase “merciless Indian savages” (Sandler, 2018).
The existence of imperfect technology raises a number of questions about the practice and
management of content moderation.
First, if technology has a “higher error rate” than a platform is “happy with,” how should
a platform employ the technology given the choice of its revenue model? In this regard, a
related question is whether a platform has the incentive to embrace an inaccurate technology
to do content moderation? Second, how can a platform best manage its content moderation
to achieve its profit objectives? Given that a platform’s primary objective is to maximize
its profit, could content moderation with imperfect technology lead to a higher extremeness
index for the platform? Finally, if today’s technology is “just not there,” and there is “a
higher error rate,” what kind of a platform has the most incentives to improve it or not
to improve it? In this section, we address all those questions by extending our model to
incorporate imperfect technology for content moderation.
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When a platform uses imperfect technology, it can err in two ways. On the one hand, it
may not be able to prune the extreme content a platform wants to eliminate completely
so that part of the extreme content remains on the platform. On the other hand, it may
accidentally prune the content it wants to preserve. To capture both types of errors and
also to nest our main model as a special case, we specify the content moderation technology
qk (x|y) as the probability that a content generated by a user with extremeness index x is
removed by the platform when it intends to prune all x > y given its technology accuracy
k. Specifically, we have:
qk (x|y) =




1 − k
2

if x ≤ y;



1 + k
2

if x > y.

(2.7)

More generally, we can specify the same probabilities for the content intended to be pruned
and the content not intended to be pruned for any arbitrary content moderation strategies
in the same way as in the perfect technology case. As we have shown in Appendix A.1 on
page 75, the threshold strategy specified in Equation (2.7) dominates any other arbitrary
content moderation strategies. Therefore, we focus on this threshold strategy hereafter.
The imperfect technology in Equation (2.7) prunes any content x > y with probability
1
2

+ k, where k ∈ [0, 21 ]. It also accidentally deletes any content x < y with probability

1
2

− k.

In other words, the technology allows a platform to prune extreme content with a higher
probability than it deletes moderate content accidentally. When k = 21 , we go back to our
main model where extreme content is cut with perfect accuracy. When k = 0, all content
on the platform is cut with equal probability and we have a random technology at work.
Thus, a higher k indicates a more accurate technology.14 We also focus our analysis on
α < αS such that at k =

1
2

a platform always chooses to do content moderation regardless

of whether it is under advertising or subscription models. Then, with this assumption,
14
If we were to introduce a secondary feature that the technology works more precisely as the
content
is far more extreme or far less extreme, the technology can be specified as qk (x|y) =

min max 12 + k(x − y), 0 , 1 , where k ∈ [0, ∞). This model of technology is analytically intractable.
However, we can numerically show that our conclusions about a platform’s incentives to choose technology
under our simpler model does not qualitatively change. This analysis is available upon request.
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whenever a platform does not want to do content moderation, it will be due to imperfect
technology. We maintain all other assumptions in the previous section. Our analysis will
unfold by first looking at content moderation in advertising, then in subscription, and finally
the incentives a platform faces in advancing its content moderation technology.
2.3.1. Content Moderation with Imperfect Technology
Due to imperfect technology, when a platform tries to prune all content x > y, the content
by users with extremeness index x will be eliminated with probability qk (x|y) and it remains
on the platform with probability 1−qk (x|y), as defined in equation (2.7). Therefore, a user’s

expected utility from posting is given by αx 1 − qk (x|y) − cqk (x|y) and her utility from
reading is correspondingly adjusted by the probability. We can write the total utility for a
user at x as
Z



U (x) = αx 1 − qk (x|y) − cqk (x|y) + v −
{z
}
|
|
posting utility


x̃ 1 − qk (x̃|y) dx̃,
x̃∈X̂ ,x̃>x
{z
}

(2.8)

reading utility

which is a generalization of equation (2.1).
Figure 5: User Base of an Ad-supported Platform with Imperfect Content Moderation
technology
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As we show in Appendix A.3.1, whenever a platform conducts content moderation, the
users on the platform fall into one of the two configurations illustrated in Figure 5. In
Figure 5a, content moderation creates two disjoint segments of users. The appearance of
these two disjoint segments is due to imperfect technology. This is because for all users
subject to content moderation, it is the more moderate users that suffer the most disutility
both from reading extreme content and also from their content being possibly removed.
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Their utility can be low enough so that they may leave the platform. In Figure 5b, we have
a contiguous user segment, all dependent on the extent of content moderation y. In this
A
figure, the variables xA
2,k and x1,k (y) are respectively given as:

xA
2,k

=

q


 α2 + 1 +

2c(1+2k)−4v
1−2k



1
where k =

α+2v−c
2(α+c) ,

−α<1

if k ≤ k;
(2.9)
if k > k,

and

r
A 2



 α2 + max 0, y 2 + min{2αy, (1−2k)(2c+1−(x2,k ) )−4v } − α
1+2k
xA
1,k (y) =

q

 α2 + max 0, y 2 + min{2αy, (1−2k)(2c+1−y2 )−4v } − α
1+2k

if y < xA
2,k ;
if y ≥ xA
2,k ,
(2.10)

where xA
1,k (y) is the location for the marginal users on the platform whose content is not
A
intended to be removed and xA
2,k is for those whose content is intended. Furthermore, x2,k

is increasing in k and xA
1,k (y) is decreasing in k.
Interestingly, if the technology is not sufficiently good (k < k), then we have xA
2,k < 1, which
means the most extreme users in [xA
2,k , 1] will stay on the platform regardless of how the
platform conducts its content moderation, as extreme users always derive the highest utility
from the platform. In other words, inaccurate technology can no longer screen out the most
extreme users, a fact about imperfect technology that a platform under advertising can
benefit from, as we will see soon.
Similar to the advertising case, when a platform adopts subscription, we can show in Appendix A.3.2 that we have similarly well-defined user configurations as in Figure 5. As
in Section 2.2.2, the platform once again chooses its moderation strategy and subscription
price. We refer readers to Appendix A.3.2 for detailed analysis of this case.
A social media platform at any given point in time typically sets a clear standard about
what is extreme and what is not extreme, or what is allowed and what is not allowed on
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the platform. In addition, users on the platform also know and are frequently reminded of
the standard the platform uses. However, even though the standard is clear, with imperfect
technology, it is no longer the case that a platform can remove what it deems extreme with
perfect accuracy. This means that the content removed from the platform includes those
intended as well as unintended. We will refer to the content that the platform intends
to remove based on its own standard as the “extreme” content, and the content that the
platform does not intend to remove as the “moderate” content. Depending on the technology
it uses (for a given k), the platform may prune the extreme content more than the moderate
content and vice versa. Thus, the first question to ask is: to maximize its profit, should a
platform always prune the extreme content more than the moderate content? From a user’s
perspective, we can ask the second question: when a platform prunes the moderate content
more than the extreme content, does the platform always have a high average extremeness
index?15 In other words, could users conclude based on what is thrown out from a platform
whether the platform is on average more or less extreme? This question should also be
of interest to regulators, policymakers, and consumer advocacy groups.16 Our analysis
provides answers to both questions. The following proposition summarizes a platform’s
optimal content moderation strategy with imperfect technology.
Proposition 4. (Content moderation with imperfect technology) For both advertising and subscription, a platform will conduct content moderation only if technology is
sufficiently accurate. When conducting content moderation, the platform may prune the
moderate content more than the extreme content, but the average extremeness index on the
platform may be lower than when it prunes the extreme content more or does not prune any
content.
R

15

x(1−q(x))dx

The average extremeness index on the platform can be calculated as x̂ = RX (1−q(x))dx , where the
X
numerator is the weighted sum of the location index (weighted by the probability of not being removed),
which represents the “total” extremeness of all remaining content, and the denominator is the expected
number of posts remaining after content moderation.
16
For instance, the EU does pay attention to the content pruned from a platform, and regularly publishes
Evaluation of the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online (see https://ec.europa.eu
/info/sites/default/files/codeofconduct 2020 factsheet 12.pdf).
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The proof of Proposition 4 can be found on pp. 91-94 in Appendix A.2 (part of the proof is
based on exhaustive numerical analyses). Proposition 4 first suggests that a platform needs a
sufficiently accurate technology to start content moderation. Secondly, when the technology
is sufficiently good, the optimal content moderation strategy may call for a platform to
prune the moderate content more than the extreme content. This is because a sufficiently
accurate technology already deters extreme users from participating in the platform but
encourages more moderate users based on the platform’s standard to participate, so there
is less extreme content on the platform in the first place. Finally, whether a platform prunes
extreme content more than the moderate content is not a good yardstick to judge whether
a platform is extreme or moderate. This means that a user looking to join a platform may
not find a moderate outlet even if the outlet is pruning a lot of extreme content. This may
be because there are many extreme users on the platform in the first place.
However, the case where pruning the moderate content may lead to a low extremeness
index deserves a closer look. The optimal content moderation strategy calls for pruning the
moderate content more than the extreme content when there is little extreme content on
the platform in the first place. Then the question is, why prune moderate content if there
is little extreme content on the platform? The reason is strategic. With a blunt instrument
or imperfect technology, pruning the moderate content is the collateral damage to pruning
the extreme content, or the price a platform pays to reduce extreme content. Thus, it may
be necessary for a platform to prune only the moderate content in order to deter extreme
users from ever getting onto the platform.
Proposition 4 suggests two managerial as well as policy insights about content moderation.
First, no one should be alarmed about a platform pruning moderate content or not eliminating extreme content, and it is part of a platform’s optimal strategy when technology is
imperfect. For this reason, we may see more social media executives blaming technology.
Second, the content moderation strategy by a platform and the diligence with which it is
pruning the extreme content may not tell the full story about how extreme the content may
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be on the platform. To tell the full story, one will have to also consider the technology used
and the preferences of the user base.
2.3.2. Content Moderation and Incentive for Technology Improvement
As the technology improves, a platform’s strategy in content moderation will also change.
In this regard, our model of imperfect technology allows us to shed light on two related
questions. First, will a platform impose a more strict standard for content moderation
when technology improves? Second, as the content moderation strategy of a platform also
affects its profitability, does a platform actually have an incentive to improve the technology?
The following two propositions suggest some nuanced answers to these two questions.
Proposition 5. (Better technology and less content moderation) When technology
is sufficiently accurate (a sufficiently large k), a platform under either advertising or subscription will adopt a more relaxed standard for content moderation as the technology further
improves. As a result, the average extremeness index increases.
The proof of Proposition 5 is on p. 94 in Appendix A.2 (part of the proof is based on
exhaustive numerical analyses). Intuitively, as the technology improves, the platform can
prune extreme content more accurately to keep moderate marginal users happy so that
it does not need to prune as much. In addition, by pruning the extreme content less, the
platform can increase its customer base to increase its profit when it is under advertising, and
keep more of its high willingness-to-pay users on the platform when it is under subscription.
Proposition 6. (Incentive for imperfect content moderation technology) Under
advertising, the platform may choose imperfect technology even if there is no cost involved
in improving the technology when the cost to users subject to pruning (c) is small. Under
subscription, the platform always chooses a perfect technology.
The proof of Proposition 6 is on p. 96 in Appendix A.2 (part of the proof is based on
exhaustive numerical analyses), and the proposition is illustrated in Figure 6. A platform
under advertising may not want to develop a perfect technology because its primary ob31

Figure 6: Platform Profit and Technology Accuracy (v = 0.25, α = 0.2, c = 0.3)

(a) Advertising (ζ = 0.1)

(b) Subscription

jective is to maximize its customer base. When c is small, a less accurate technology will
increase the number of extreme users more than it reduces the number of moderate users,
thus increasing the installed customer base for the platform. This is because a less accurate technology offers more benefits to extreme users than the loss it imposes on moderate
users when technology is accurate in the first place. However, too much extreme content
on the platform will alienate moderate users. This effect becomes increasingly dominant
when technology is at lower accuracy (smaller k). This explains why in Figure 6a we have
an inverted U-shaped relationship between accuracy and platform profit under advertising.
When c is sufficiently large, the segment of moderate users is also sufficiently large relative
to the segment of extreme users because the cost carries more weight for the extreme users
as they have a higher probability of being pruned. In this case, a less accurate technology
can still increase the segment of extreme users but it will impose unintended damage on the
relatively large segment of moderate users. Therefore, the most effective way to increase the
installed customer base is not to increase extreme users but to retain and expand moderate
users by reducing the likelihood of unintended pruning, which is to increase the accuracy
(k). This is why when c is sufficiently large, even a platform under advertising will be
motivated to pursue the perfect technology.
In the case of subscription, however, maximizing a platform’s customer base can no longer
maximize the platform’s profit as the platform has the subscription fee as the second in-
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strument. With this second instrument, the platform can fully internalize the benefit of
technology improvement. This is evident from the fact that both the platform’s customer
base and the optimal fee increase with technology improvement. Therefore, costs aside, the
platform always has the incentive to pursue the perfect technology.
Propositions 5 and 6 offer two rather surprising perspectives on content moderation and
technology. First, as content moderation technology becomes more accurate, one should not
expect that a profit-maximizing platform will always do more content moderation and curate
more moderate content. Second, a number of executives of large social media platforms,
including those of Facebook and Twitter (Dave, 2020; Gershgorn, 2020), often complain
about the limits of technology in content detection. However, our analysis also suggests
an intriguing possibility that a platform under advertising may not have the incentive to
pursue a more accurate technology in the first place.
These two perspectives suggest to a manager that conducting content moderation is not as
simple as just reducing the extremeness index. In the pursuit of a better technology, the
optimal strategy calls for a manager to relax the criteria for pruning and to increase the
average index. Moreover, the cost to users subject to pruning is an important parameter
to watch. When that cost is low, imperfect technology is conducive to attracting a large
installed customer base to the platform. When it is large, technology improvement is always
a winning strategy.
One testable hypothesis from Propositions 5 and 6 is that when conducting content moderation, all else being equal, we will expect to observe that platforms under subscription have
a better technology for content moderation than those under advertising.

2.4. Content Moderation and Policy Implications
Content moderation is a hotly debated issue that has many policy implications. Many
questions are raised in this context. For instance, do platforms have sufficient incentives to
conduct content moderation on their own relative to what is optimal for users? When they
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do conduct moderation, are they doing too much or too little? Is the technology that is
optimal for platforms also optimal for users? We can address all these questions with our
model by investigating how a social planner with user interest at heart will conduct content
moderation to maximize user welfare. Our answers can then inform the ongoing debate on
whether and how much the government should get involved in regulating online content if
it wants to advance users’ interests and how the regulatory effort may need to be nuanced
with regard to platforms of different revenue models.
To conduct our analysis, we note that the objective of a social planner in content moderation
is to maximize user welfare, which is the sum of the utilities for all users for the platform,
and the expression of the user welfare, denoted as W (y), when technology is perfect is given
by
Z

y



Z
αx + v −

W (y) =
xP (y)

y


x̃dx̃ dx,

(2.11)

x

where xP (y) is the marginal user who is indifferent between participating in the platform
and not.17 As we show in the proof of Proposition 7, the social planner will conduct
content moderation if and only if α < αP , where at αP the social planner is indifferent
between conducting content moderation and not. When the social planner does conduct
content moderation (α < αP ), the optimal content moderation strategy is given by y P ∗ =
√
1
2
2 (α + α + 4v). By comparing what the social planner does with what a platform under
advertising or subscription does, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. (Social planner’s content moderation strategy) All else being equal,
a social planner is less likely to conduct content moderation than a platform under either
advertising or subscription (αP < αS < αA ). When it does, it adopts a more relaxed
standard for content moderation than a platform under subscription, but a more strict one
than a platform under advertising (y S∗ < y P ∗ < y A∗ ).
The proof of Proposition 7 is on p. 97 in Appendix A.2. This proposition suggests three
17

It is important to note that this user welfare function is the same as the social welfare function in the
case of subscription because of the payment a platform receives is a transfer payment from users.
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insights about the content moderation strategy in a decentralized market. First, left to
market forces, a platform with the profit motivation has even more incentives to engage
in content moderation than a social planner with user welfare as its objective. This is
because content moderation is less effective at increasing user welfare than at increasing
a platform’s profitability. Extreme users contribute positively to the user welfare so that
the social planner will be more inclusive. Second, more incentives for a platform do not
mean right incentives. To maximize the user welfare, the social planner only prunes users
with a negative utility contribution to the society.18 A user’s utility contribution to the
society includes her posting utility, reading utility, and the total negative utility her post
imposes on other more moderate users. A platform under advertising will keep users with
negative utility contribution, all for the purpose of maximizing its installed customer base.
A platform under subscription will prune users even with positive utility contribution to
increase the willingness-to-pay of other users. Third, because of the different incentives
that platforms with different revenue models have in content moderation and also because
of the severity with which different platforms are motivated to prune content for their own
profitability, any regulatory measures may need to account for the difference in platforms’
revenue models. In other words, sweeping regulations for all social media platforms for the
purpose of advancing users’ interests regardless of their revenue models could be ill-advised.
Indeed, revenue models also provide different incentives for a platform to perfect its technology. A natural question arises: what technology a social planner would prefer for content
moderation, perfect or imperfect? The following proposition addresses this question.
Proposition 8. (Social planner’s technology preference)

When a social planner

conducts content moderation, it always prefers a better technology (higher accuracy k) such
that, cost aside, it always pursues the perfect technology (k = 12 ).
The proof of Proposition 8 is on p. 100 in Appendix A.2 based on exhaustive numerical analyses. Comparing Proposition 8 with Proposition 6, we see that a platform under
18

This is checked in Appendix on page 100.
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advertising does not always have the right incentives to perfect its technology, unless c is
sufficiently large. However, a platform under subscription does have the right incentive to
develop the technology for content moderation, although the technology is not applied in a
way that is maximizing user welfare, as discussed in Proposition 7.

2.5. Conclusion
Content moderation on social media platforms is an important issue that has attracted
increasing attention in the past few years from practitioners, scholars, social activists, policy
makers, and regulators alike. At a high level, the issue concerns the freedom of expression,
political discourse, personal liberty, civil society, and government regulations. At a more
basic level, it is a platform’s marketing decisions, like any other product or service company
would do, on what revenue models to use, what content to allow or what “product” to
design, and what kind of users to attract or to discourage, all for the purpose of achieving
its highest revenues. In addressing this complex issue, it is quite understandable that
experts with different objectives offer different perspectives as to whether platforms should
do self regulation themselves, or a government intervention is needed to regulate social media
content. In this chapter, we take a first step to unpack this complex issue and investigate
how a self-interested social media platform may conduct content moderation, how its content
moderation strategy may hinge on its revenue model and technology, and what incentives
a platform with advertising or subscription as its primary revenue model may have in
perfecting content moderation technology. This investigation not only offers normative
insights about how a self-interested platform will or will not do content moderation, but
also sheds light on whether government interventions are needed and if they are, what those
interventions may entail.
Our analysis shows that a self-interested platform does not need to care about any social
cause to actively engage in content moderation. It can use content moderation as a tool to
perform two marketing functions: to expand its user base and to increase the willingness-topay of the users on its platform. These dual functions are rooted in the nature of social media
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where users gain utility from posting and reading user-generated content on a platform,
but they are also sensitive to content more extreme than what they prefer. For a social
planner who cares about user welfare, content moderation is a tool to eliminate users who
make negative utility contributions to society. In this regard, we show that self-interested
platforms are more likely to use the dual functions and conduct content moderation than a
social planner. In other words, platforms are more eager than a social planner to conduct
content moderation motivated by their own self-interest.
Because a self-interested platform conducts content moderation for profit, the economics
dictate that its strategy will depend on its revenue model and hence the resulting content
on the platform, as measured by the extremeness index, will also depend on the same. We
show that in the absence of any content moderation, all else being equal, a platform under
subscription revenues will field more extreme content than a platform under advertising.
However, when content moderation is conducted, a platform under subscription revenues
will curate more moderate content than one under advertising. Interestingly, the social
planner will conduct content moderation to achieve a body of content that is more extreme
than under subscription, but more moderate than under advertising.
For most social platforms, technology for content moderation is imperfect as many executives have readily admitted (Dave, 2020; Gershgorn, 2020). Our analysis shows that a
platform’s strategy in content moderation critically depends on the technology it uses. A
platform may choose not to do any content moderation at all if its technology is not sufficiently accurate. When it is, a platform may conduct content moderation in an unexpected
way. Under imperfect technology, a platform may throw away the moderate content more
than the extreme content as part of its optimal strategy. We show that when this happens,
it does not necessarily result in a more extreme platform. Conversely, when a platform
prunes the extreme content more than the moderate content, we do not necessarily have
a more moderate platform. In other words, one cannot judge how extreme a platform is
by looking at its content moderation strategy. This insight is especially germane to policy
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makers when they try to reduce hate content on a platform by focusing on the removal of
hate content upon user complaints, such as what is currently practiced in the EU (Reynders,
2020).
It is common for social media executives to blame imperfect technology for some lapses in
content moderation, and those blames are well-placed, as our analysis shows. However, our
analysis also sheds some light on whether a self-interested platform actually has incentives
to perfect its content moderation technology. A platform under advertising may not pursue
the perfect technology, even if doing so is costless. We further show that a platform under
subscription will pursue the perfect technology, as does a social planner. Overall, our
analysis shows that self-interested platforms are motivated to do content moderation, but
their strategy diverges from a social planner’s. In this sense, there can be grounds for
government interventions. We show that such interventions can only be effective if they are
differentiated and nuanced according to revenue models and technology levels that different
platforms are adopting.
Content moderation as a research topic is a target-rich area. We hope our research kindles
some interest in this important and timely subject. Future research can take a number
of directions. First, in our model, we assume a uniform distribution for users over the
extremeness index. This enables us to conduct our analysis with clarity and gains a good
intuition about what content moderation strategy helps a platform to do. In reality, it is
conceivable that users who hold extreme views are probably in the minority. We venture
to suggest, based on our analysis, that the platform should be more willing to prune more
extreme content since there were fewer users to prune. Future research can extend our
analysis to different distributions, such as a normal distribution. Second, our model is
based on a vertical differentiation model, which applies to many different kinds of content
that are currently subject to moderation. Future research can extend this analysis to
perhaps a combination of vertical and horizontal models. Such a model can be suitable
for political issues where partisans agree within the group but disagree between groups.
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These are the types of issues that our model does not address. Third, as a first study on
content moderation strategies, we have abstracted away from the possibility of strategic
users. These are the users who may engage in self-censorship and who may change the
content they post because of a platform’s content moderation strategy. We believe that
such a strategic behavior can reduce the cost of content moderation for the platform and
may encourage more content moderation. Fourth, in our model, we identify the difference
between what a social planner will do with content moderation and what a self-interested
platform will do, thus probing into the rationale for and approach toward any regulatory
interventions. Future research can develop concrete regulatory measures that can induce
platforms under advertising or subscription to conduct content moderation in alignment
with a social planner. Lastly, many of our theoretical insights are empirically testable.
Future research can put them to a test with suitable data.
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CHAPTER 3 : Consumer Preferences and Firm Technology Choice
3.1. Introduction
Past few years witnessed a quiet revolution in the number of technology-enabled shopping
(TES) platforms—devices19 that offer interactive technologies consumers use to shop—
introduced to the market. By the end of 2019, for instance, an estimated 111.8 million
people in the U.S.—nearly one third of the population—owned a voice-assisted device, such
as Amazon’s Alexa or Google Home (Petrock, 2019). Up to one third of those who own a
smart device use it to shop for goods in Europe (Kinsella, 2018) where the sales through
these devices reached $2.1 billion in 2018 (Thakker, 2019). In the U.S. too, the use of TES
platforms is growing, with tripled year-on-year growth between 2017 and 2018 for Amazon’s
Alexa (Toplin, 2018). Consumer spending on Alexa mostly ranges between $25 and $199 per
item (Edison Research, 2018) and common categories of shopping intention include groceries
(45% of individuals), clothing (46%), and specialty products such as books or pet supplies
(49%) (Capgemini, 2018). These devices and new purchasing options are duly noticed by
retail executives, too. As a VP of e-commerce, digital marketing, and innovation at Lands’
End commented, “Given the explosive growth in voice search and equally explosive growth
in shipments for Echo devices, it is the time to start to test and lean into this emerging
channel” (Berthene, 2017). In this chapter, we take a first rigorous look at a firm’s strategic
entry decision on this emerging channel.
TES platforms come with skills designed primarily to help consumers obtain product information and make purchase decisions. Using Amazon’s Alexa as an example, “MySomm” is
a skill which suggests the most suitable wine for its users, and “Kit” is a skill which gives
product recommendations based on users’ queries such as “what is a good coffee maker”
(Trotter, 2017). We refer to this category of skills as decision support (DS functionality).
There are also skills that primarily facilitate a purchase by making ordering experience
more convenient and pleasurable. For example, the skill “Ask Peapod” allows users to
19

In this chapter, we use “TES platforms” and “TES devices” interchangeably.
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order groceries by voice (Thakker, 2019), “Grubhub Alexa” makes it possible for users to
enjoy the convenience of hands-free reordering20 . We refer to these skills as a device for
order convenience (OC functionality). This distinction between DS and OC functionalities
for new retail technologies is grounded in the literature (Burke, 2002; Bucklin et al., 1998).
Based on our classification, out of the top shopping skills which have been rated by at
least 10 users, 38% are primarily for DS, 50% for OC, and the rest for both DS and OC.
In this chapter, we will investigate and show that consumers’ preferences for the device
functionalities are actually related to their brand preferences.
As the use of TES platforms in retailing is in early stages, much of their vast potential
is still unfolding. And as competing retailers begin to reach their customers through TES
platforms, marketing scholars and practitioners begin to focus on the importance of branding
in this new environment. Meyersohn (2018) suggests, for instance, in this new environment,
brand names will become more important because consumers may interact with the devices
ordering a brand by name to purchase items. What is even more important is to build
trust between consumers and new technologies, as pointed out by Dawar (2018). As we
shall discuss shortly, issues related to the interactions between consumers and devices and
buying behaviors in a technology-assisted environment are timely research areas.
In this chapter, we contribute to the emerging literature on TES devices by theoretically
investigating the equilibrium channel structure and adoption of devices as a strategic choice
by competing retailers and technology providers. Our research focuses on a set of questions
that naturally arise as the use of TES platforms grows. First, when should competing
retailers embrace TES platforms, how does the adoption strategy vary by the functionalities
offered by the device? Should retailers chase after consumers or secure the first mover
advantage in the new channel, as some executives suggest (Berthene, 2017)? Of course,
a firm’s decision to integrate shopping technologies should depend on how the consumers
may embrace the technology. This brings up a second research question. What kinds of
20

See Grubhub’s official webpage https://www.grubhub.com/alexa.

41

consumers prefer which kinds of TES devices? The answers to this question will shed light
on the incentive environment in which retailers and technology providers would make their
decisions. This brings up the third question. What incentives do competing retailers face in
embracing a TES device of a certain functionality? Given retailers’ strategic incentives, the
technology provider also plays a role in shaping the channel structure. In this context, we
can ask the final question: what incentives do technology providers face? This last question,
in fact, brings forth a cluster of other questions. Would a technology provider favor DS or
OC functionality? For a functionality it chooses to provide, does it have an incentive to
make the functionality as good as feasible and make the technology broadly available to all
the competing retailers? In a nutshell, can we trust the free market to provide the socially
optimal retail technology? In this chapter, we will develop a comprehensive analytical model
to provide some preliminary answers to all these questions.
Our research starts with the empirical documentation that consumers’ technology preferences are related to their brand preferences. A consumer with a strong or weak preference
for a brand may prefer a TES platform of OC or DS functionality. By incorporating this
preference structure into our game-theoretical modelling, it will become clear that competing retailers may or may not want to embrace the TES device of a certain functionality
depending on which customers favor the new channel, how much the competing retailers
benefit from the price discrimination enabled by the new channel, and whether TES devices
discourage competitive entry. The strategic interactions amongst downstream competing
retailers will obviously affect their profitability, which in turn will affect how profitably a
technology provider can sell access to a technology-enabled channel and which functionality
it has the most incentive to develop.
This research strategy enabled us to generate a number of new insights into a new, evolving
phenomenon where prospective insights are otherwise unavailable. We first show through
experiments that consumers with weaker brand preferences derive higher positive utility
from a TES device’s DS functionality, whereas the OC functionality provides a homogenous
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and positive utility, independent of brand preferences. This preference structure implies
that, in a channel with OC benefits, competitive entry of retailers will take place even
though it results in a prisoner’s dilemma outcome. In contrast, competitive entry will not
occur in a channel with DS benefits, but unilateral entry by a retailer can happen and profit
for both retailers. Given these outcomes facing the retailers, the technology provider, for
its own profitability, prefers a TES device with the DS functionality over one with the OC
functionality. When both the DS and the OC functionalities can be incorporated into a
TES device, the technology provider has an incentive to provide the socially optimal level
of the DS functionality, but under-provides the OC functionality, even when the cost of
offering the technology is zero.
This chapter contributes to the growing literature in interactions with technology (Kleinberg
et al., 2017) and implications of technology on firm strategy (Srinivasan et al., 2002; Ram
and Sheth, 1989; Sriram et al., 2010). We contribute to the former by investigating the two
dimensions cited by Burke (2002) in the context of technology adoption. We investigate this
relationship from a unique perspective by extending it to the strength of brand preference
and the desire to use a technology. We contribute to the latter literature by investigating
the implications of consumer attitudes towards technology for price discrimination and for
technology choices.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We start by providing a summary of
the relevant literature in Section 3.2. Then we describe the experimental setting and the
findings from them in Section 3.3.1. Next, in Sections 3.3.2-3.3.3 we develop a theoretical
model and Section 3.4 discusses extensions. Finally, in Section 3.5, we conclude.

3.2. Relevant Literature
With the development of new technologies and their wide adoption in everyday life, researchers have been increasingly more interested in the interaction between customers and
these new, advanced technologies. In the last few years, the literature in marketing, operations, computer science, and psychology offer mixed findings about the reactions of
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consumers to technologies and algorithmic judgments or recommendations. Scholars argue
that technology can enhance consumer decision-making, as algorithms aggregate data and
information across multiple individuals to reduce the error in decision-making (e.g., Soll and
Larrick, 2009; Surowiecki, 2004). However, the findings about how consumers respond to
them diverge. A series of studies argue that consumers appreciate and trust algorithms (e.g.,
Logg et al., 2019), studying examples such as predicting one’s weight or a song’s popularity
ranking. Another series argue that consumers exhibit algorithm aversion. For example, individuals feel less comfortable when making decisions based on machine recommendations
after they see algorithms err (Dietvorst et al., 2016, 2015). In medical decision-making domain, consumer resistance to using algorithms has been documented (Chen, 2009; Longoni
et al., 2019; Dzindolet et al., 2002). Prior work also shows that people trust algorithms
less if they themselves are experts in the decision task (Logg et al., 2019; Castelo et al.,
2019). Recruiters, for instance, trust their judgment more than they trust the algorithmic
recommendations (Highhouse, 2008).
While there is no universal explanation for why individuals show aversion to using algorithms, seeing new technologies as a threat to humankind (George, 2014; Ferrari et al.,
2016; Conniff, 2011), in-group bias (Brewer, 1979), skepticism about the results provided
by algorithms (Highhouse, 2008; Yeomans et al., 2019), and the cost of learning to use these
new technologies (e.g., Mick and Fournier, 1998; Goodman, 1988) are among explanations.
Existing studies show that consumers would rather rely on their friends than algorithms
for product recommendations (Sinha et al., 2001; Önkal et al., 2009). This is because people not only care about the content of recommendations, but also want to understand the
recommendation process (Yeomans et al., 2019). Mick and Fournier (1998) point out that
new technologies do not by default save time for individuals, but may in fact result in some
loss or waste of time due to having to learn about the new technology and whether it fits
one’s needs (Goodman, 1988).
The literature, to our knowledge, has not yet provided insights about consumers’ desire to
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integrate algorithms in their shopping and product search process. We contribute to the literature by documenting how consumer brand preferences influence technology appreciation
or resistance, and by exploring the strategic implications for channel entry and pricing.
Our study also contributes to the literature on sales channels and price discrimination,
two extensively studied areas in marketing and economics. In marketing, seminal papers
on channel management typically focus on channel coordination (Gerstner and Hess, 1995;
Choi, 1991; Lal, 1990), vertical integration (Jeuland and Shugan, 2008; Lee and Staelin,
1997), channel design and management (Moorthy, 1988; Coughlan and Wernerfelt, 1989).
In this context, typical examinations focused on the models and pricing strategies which
maximize downstream member, upstream member, or industry profits. Despite the richness
of this literature (A Google Scholar search of “channels, marketing” yields 1.7 million journal
articles), there has been little recent examinations that are at the intersection of technology
and their impact on the channel structure.
The essential question we study is the channel strategy when consumers have heterogeneous
preferences to use shopping technologies and these preferences correlate with their brand
preferences. We show that the preferences for brands also influence consumers’ tendency to
embrace TES, and hence firms’ channel entry decision. In our study, the preference for a
channel depends on the preference for the brands, and thus firms can use this information
to price discriminate across channels (Bergemann et al., 2015). Price discrimination as
a function of channel preference has been a cornerstone in economics (Gerstner et al.,
1994; Cavallo, 2017) and marketing research (Zettelmeyer, 2000; Besanko et al., 2003; Liu
and Zhang, 2006). However, there is, to our knowledge, no research demonstrating that
consumers’ technology attitude can be a tool for price discrimination, and we also fill this
gap in the literature.

3.3. Model
Firm decisions depend on consumer choice, and consumer choice depends on consumer preferences for brands and technology. The interaction of these two kinds of preferences may
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provide different incentives for a firm to embrace or not embrace a particular shopping
technology. Consumer brand and technology preferences can be related to each other positively, negatively, or may not be related. Past literature has not, to our knowledge, shed
light on this relationship of growing importance. Thus, while in our theoretical exercise we
can explore all possible permutations of this relationship, our analysis will be much more
relevant if we have a more concrete understanding of this relationship to motivate our modeling assumptions. To ground our analysis in realistic assumptions, we first investigate this
relationship experimentally and pin it down with accuracy.
3.3.1. Brand and Technology Preferences: Experimental Evidence
Past research has indicated that users vary in their response to algorithms and thus to
technology-enabled devices that use them (Dietvorst et al., 2016; Logg et al., 2019). While
some consumers see a benefit from TES devices, others see little benefit and even purposefully refrain from using them. Burke (2002) proposes two relevant dimensions of benefits
from shopping technologies that people seek when they buy utilitarian goods: (1) detailed
product information that assists consumers in product selection, and (2) a fast and convenient shopping experience. We shall refer to the former as decision support (abbreviated as
“DS”) and the latter as ordering convenience (abbreviated as “OC”). A TES platform in
our model will be characterized by either DS or OC, or both functions.
As Burke (2002) points out, “it is not the technology per se, but how it is used to create
value for customers that will determine its success.” Of course, different customers may
use different technologies differently, and hence derive different values from them. To the
extent that consumers with different brand preferences may use a technology differently, it
is rather expected that their brand and technology preferences may be related.
Past research has shown some plausible evidence that value from DS functionality is negatively correlated with the strength of one’s brand preference. Consumers who hold a
strong preference towards a brand should also be more familiar with its products (Coupey
et al., 1998; Wright, 1975), so they tend to search less when considering existing alterna46

tives (Johnson and Russo, 1984; Bettman and Park, 1980). They are therefore less likely
to benefit from DS function and may even consider it a nuisance. Moreover, there is no
evidence, as far as we know, about any heterogeneity in brand preferences and OC benefits.
We test these negative and no correlation hypotheses in the two studies described below.
The scripts for the experiments are in Appendix B.
Study 1
In Study 1, we recruited 251 subjects on Amazon’s MTurk. The study used a withinsubject design. The survey was advertised as a 5-minute survey about shopping preferences.
Participation in the MTurk Survey was restricted to respondents located within the U.S. and
over 18 years old. The median respondent took about 3.2 minutes to complete the survey.
The payment scheme was on par with other MTurk surveys (Bottan and Perez-Truglia,
2020). Participants received a fixed fee of $0.50 for participation.
Each subject was first asked to indicate his/her preference between two headphone brands
(Sony/Bose/no preference) as well as how strong the preference was if there was any. We
coded the responses “strongly preferring Sony (or Bose),” “weakly preferring Sony (or
Bose),” and “no preference,” as 2, 1, and 0, respectively, as a subject’s brand preference
strength. Each subject was then introduced a shopping device with either functionality DS
or OC, which described the device either “aims to provide shopping support by, for example,
providing product information, and telling you how well a certain product fits you” (DS)
or “aims to provide convenient ordering experience by, for example, enabling voice interactions, ‘one-click’ ordering, and quick payment” (OC). They were then asked, compared
to buying a headphone in stores, how much more or less benefit shopping for it via the
described device would give them (a 5-point scale was used). Finally, they were asked to
describe in a few words why they thought the shopping device would provide less or more
benefit than buying in store. The whole procedure repeated for the other functionality. In
other words, this is a within-subject design where subjects saw both DS and OC and the
order was randomized.
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There was a multiple-choice question for attention check after each functionality of the
device was introduced. Among all the 251 subjects, 234 of them passed the attention check,
whose answer will be considered for further analysis. We regress subjects’ perceived benefit
from the device on their brand preference strength, for conditions DS and OC separately.
Table 1 describes the regression results. The results show that a consumer with a weaker
brand preference gets a higher benefit from using a DS compared to one with a stronger
brand preference, and the effect is marginally significant. As a contrast, only an insignificant
positive relationship between consumers’ brand preference strength and benefit from using
an OC device has been found.
Table 1: Regression Results for Study 1
Dependent variable:
Benefit from DS

Benefit from OC

(1)

(2)

Brand Preference Strength

−0.146∗
(0.082)

0.101
(0.085)

Constant

3.412∗∗∗
(0.105)

3.256∗∗∗
(0.109)

234
0.013
0.009
1.039
3.167∗

234
0.006
0.002
1.079
1.399

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 232)
F Statistic (df = 1; 232)

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:
Study 2

In Study 2, we abstract away from a specific product category to see if the results in Study
1 are generalizable. We recruited 1,028 subjects on Amazon’s MTurk. The study used
a 2 × 2 design (technology-enabled shopping device functionality: ordering convenience
(OC)/decision support (DS) × product preference: strong/weak). The experiment ran between March 31 to April 2, 2021. The survey was advertised as a 5-minute survey about
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shopping preferences. Participation in the MTurk Survey was restricted to respondents located within the U.S. and over 18 years old. The median respondent took about 3 minutes to
complete the survey. Towards the end of the survey, we introduced an attention check, similar to the one used in Bottan and Perez-Truglia (2017). A total of 97% of the respondents
passed the attention check. After removing those who failed the attention check, we ended
up with 994 subjects. The payment scheme was on par with other MTurk surveys (Bottan
and Perez-Truglia, 2020). Participants received a fixed fee of $0.50 for participation.
Participants were told that they were about to buy a product, and there were only two
brands, A and B, in the market. They were then randomly assigned to a condition indicating
their preference for product A over B, where a following statement indicated that they had
a “strong preference for Brand A over Brand B” or that they had a “weak preference for
Brand A over Brand B.” These two conditions roughly capture the location of a consumer
on half of the Hotelling line.
Each subject was then randomly assigned to a second condition of device functionality, DS
or OC. Based on the pre-test in Study 1 where we asked subjects why they think a shopping
device with DS or OC provides less or more benefit than buying in store, we identified the
major 3-4 weaknesses and strengths mentioned for both DS and OC from Study 1. A
participant under DS or OC would be taken to a page where they would observe both the
pros and cons of using the device. They were then asked, compared to buying Brand A in
store, how much benefit shopping for Brand A via the described device would give them.
Participants indicated on a sliding scale ranging from -5 to +5 indicating how much the
device benefited them.
In Figure 7, we present the consumer preference for shopping with the device, relative to
shopping in store under OC and DS treatments. In particular, the experiment shows that,
while there were no statistical differences between the panelists assigned to the strong/weak
brand preference conditions under the OC treatment, those under the DS treatment showed
a significant difference. In particular, panelists assigned to the strong/weak preference

49

condition said they found DS skills more valuable, and had a higher preference to shop with
a technology-assisted device.
Figure 7: Experimental Results for Study 2

Table 2 reports the results from a regression from the following specification:

Benefit from Device (DS or OC) = β0 + β1 1(Brand Preference = “Strong”) + ϵ.

(3.1)

Columns (1)-(2) in the table report the benefit a consumer assigned to the strong brand
preference condition shows towards DS and OC skills, respectively, relative to the preference
for going to the store. The coefficient for strong brand preference over weak is -0.483 and
is significant and negative for DS, and that for OC is positive and insignificant.
In sum, the two studies strongly support the hypothesis that consumers with a strong
brand preference derive a significantly less utility from using DS compared to those who
have a weak preference. It also fails to reject the null hypothesis that consumer brand
preferences and their preferences for OC technology are not correlated, such that consumers
with different brand preferences on average benefit from using OC. These two experimental
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Table 2: Regression Results for Study 2
Dependent variable:
Benefit from DS

Benefit from OC

(1)

(2)

Brand preference = “strong”

−0.483∗∗
(0.206)

0.022
(0.192)

Constant

0.807∗∗∗
(0.149)

0.669∗∗∗
(0.132)

494
0.011
0.009
2.287 (df = 492)
5.491∗∗ (df = 1; 492)

500
0.00003
−0.002
2.140 (df = 498)
0.014 (df = 1; 498)

Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

∗ p<0.1; ∗∗ p<0.05; ∗∗∗ p<0.01

Note:

results will inform our assumptions as we build a game-theoretic model next.
3.3.2. Strategic Implications of Brand and Technology Preferences
To model brand preferences, we use a Hotelling model with consumers of mass 1 uniformly
distributed on the line [0, 1]. Two competing brands are located at the ends of this line,
Brand A at 0 and Brand B at 1. A customer located at x ∈ [0, 1] incurs a transportation
cost of tx if shopping from Brand A and t(1 − x) if shopping from Brand B, where t is the
unit transportation cost. In our framework, the distance to a brand indicates the strength
of the customer’s preference for the brand and the closer a customer is to a brand’s location,
the stronger is her preference. A consumer at x gains a utility of V −pA −tx if she purchases
Brand A’s product and V − pB − t(1 − x), if she purchases Brand B’s product, where pj is
the price of Brand j’s product, j ∈ {A, B} and V is the reservation value which is assumed
to be sufficiently larger than t such that the market is always covered.
Each brand sells its products in a traditional channel. A traditional channel, in our context,
is a channel which does not integrate new technology with DS or OC benefits that we study,

51

such as a brick and mortar store. When a brand embraces a shopping technology, we assume
that the brand has a new interface with the customers such that it essentially constitutes
a new channel. For instance, in-home shopping devices such as Alexa and Google Home,
or e-commerce applications that have DS or OC functions act as a separate sales channel
for a brand. The brands make decisions about whether to offer their product through the
technology channel or not, and set the price for their products for each channel. We use the
superscripts 0 and 1 to refer to the traditional and the technology channel, respectively, and
p0j represents the price of brand j’s product in the traditional channel and p1j represents the
price of brand j’s product in the technology channel, where j ∈ {A, B}. Let a proportion
α ∈ [0, 1] of customers have access to the technology channel, and only they have a choice
to shop in this channel.21
Our experimental results show that consumers’ brand preferences correlate with their technology preferences, depending on the main technology function (DS or OC). To incorporate
these findings in the context of the Hotelling model, we assume that a customer located at
x gains the added (negative or positive) utility of ∆(x) when shopping in the technology
channel. This added utility depends, as the experiment shows, on the functionality of the
technology, which we will elaborate shortly.
In particular, a consumer located at x can potentially have four (2 × 2) shopping choices,
consisting of buying the product of Brand A or B through the traditional channel or through
the technology channel. Table 3 provides the general payoff function for each choice, denoted
respectively by VA0 (x), VA1 (x), VB0 (x), and VB1 (x).
Table 3: Payoffs from Shopping in the Technology vs. Traditional Channel
Brand
Channel
Traditional channel
Technology channel

Brand A
0
VA (x) ≡ V − tx − p0A
1
VA (x) ≡ V − tx − p1A + ∆(x)

21

Brand B
≡ V − t(1 − x) − p0B
1
VB (x) ≡ V − t(1 − x) − p1B + ∆(x)
VB0 (x)

This difference in access to the technology channel may be due to owning a device that allows shopping
for products or not, or the geographical coverage of the market by the technology channel.
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The timeline of the game is as follows. A technology provider develops a technology channel
of a certain functionality and makes it available to competing retailers. Then, brands
simultaneously decide whether or not to adopt the technology channel. After observing
the competing brand’s channel adoption decision, they simultaneously set prices in each
channel they sell in. Then the consumers decide which brand’s product to purchase and in
which channel to purchase it. We adopt subgame perfection as the solution concept and
solve the game using backward induction. To keep our analysis tractable, we assume that
the unit transportation cost is high enough, or t > 21 .22
We bring in the following notations in the equilibrium analysis we discuss next. Superscript
(T, T ) represents the case when both brands only sell through their traditional channel.
When the technology offers DS functionality, superscript (DS, DS) indicates both brands
adopting the technology channel with DS, and (DS, T ) indicates the case when Brand
A adopts the technology channel with DS function while Brand B does not. When the
technology provides OC, we use superscripts (OC, OC) and (OC, T ) in a similar manner to
represent the strategic adoption decision of firms.
3.3.3. Model Analysis
Our analysis will unfold in two steps. We will first analyze the technology provision and the
associated firm decisions for pricing and distribution when the technology’s functionality
is exclusively DS or exclusively OC. Then, in Section ??, we extend our analysis to the
technology that has both functionalities. This two-step approach will allow us to isolate
and highlight the mechanism through which the functionality of the shopping technology
can have competitive implications for a retailer.
Regardless of what functionality is available in the market, in the second stage of the game,
there are three possible types of equilibrium: (1) both firms adopt the technology channel,
(2) one brand adopts the technology channel and the other sells only in the traditional
22

As it will become clear shortly, this assumption essentially rules out the case of t < ∆, where an
equilibrium may not exist.
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channel, and (3) both brands only sell in the traditional channel. In case (3), we have the
(T,T )

familiar equilibrium results as our benchmark where the prices of the brands are pA
(T,T )

pB

(T,T )

= t and their profits are πA

(T,T )

= πB

=

= 2t . For the other two cases, the outcome

will depend on whether the technology has DS or OC functionality.
Technology with DS Functionality
A DS technology focuses on aiding consumers in product selection. Our experiment shows
that consumers with a weak preference for a brand are the ones deriving the highest value
from shopping with the DS technology. To implement this finding in the context of the
Hotelling model, we specify the added utility from the DS technology as:
1
∆DS (x) = ξ − τ |x − |,
2

(3.2)

where ξ is a constant indicating the highest additional benefit a consumer can gain from
shopping in a technology channel featuring DS. A higher ξ implies a higher positive benefit
from using the technology on average and hence a better DS functionality. Here, τ is a
scaling factor, and without loss of generality, we assume τ = 1 to simplify our expressions.
This function captures well the empirical findings from our experiments in that, first, consumers with weaker brand preferences—those located closer to the midpoint

1
2 —gain

an

increasing benefit from using the technology channel; second, ξ ∈ (0, τ2 ) allows consumers
with strong brand preferences to possibly experience disutility from shopping in the technology channel. This possibility can arise from the fact that DS technology carries with it
some disadvantages to consumers, as the experiment has unveiled. Figure 8 illustrates the
shape of the ∆DS (·) function under this construction.
Recall that the game starts by a third-party technology provider first choosing a DS technology with level ξ and an adoption fee f DS , where we have ξ ∈ [0, ξ] and f DS is a flat
fee. Here ξ ≤

1
2

is the highest feasible ξ at a given point in time that defines the frontier

of technology. Then, given the choice of ξ and f DS , competing brands decide whether or
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Figure 8: The Additional Value from Technology Channel that Features DS
∆
∆DS (x) = ξ − |x − 12 |

ξ

0

1
2

1 x

not to adopt the DS shopping technology as a new channel.23 Finally, the brands set their
prices in their respective channels. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium
of the game.
Proposition 9. (Equilibrium with DS Functionality) With DS functionality, only one
brand adopts the technology. The technology provider always offers the highest possible level
of technology (ξ ∗ = ξ), and collects a fee of

f DS∗ =

t(3 − 2αξ + 6t)2
α(2ξ(1 − α + t) + 3t)(6ξ(1 − α + t) + t)
t
+
− .
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t)
24(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)
2

The proof for Proposition 9 is in Appendix A on page 116. In equilibrium, the prices24 are
0,(DS,T )
pA
1,(DS,T )

pA

0,(DS,T )

pB



α t(9 − 2ξ) + 2(1 − α)(3 − ξ) 
=t 1 +
,
6(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)
ξ
t
−
,
2 4(1 − α + t)

α(3 − 2ξ) 
=t 1 +
,
3(1 − α + 2t)
0,(DS,T )

=pA

+

and the equilibrium profits are
(DS,T )

πB

=

t(3 − 2αξ + 6t)2
,
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t)

23

To avoid some unnecessary technical complexity, we assume here and hereafter that Brand A is always
the adopter if there is only a sole adopter, as it is the more tech-savvy retailer.
24
Recall that the superscript 0 (1) refers to the traditional (technology) channel.
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(DS,T )

πA

(DS,T )

= πB

+

α(2ξ(1 − α + t) + 3t)(6ξ(1 − α + t) + t)
− f DS∗ .
24(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)

The surprising result from Proposition 9 is that only one brand adopts the DS technology
in equilibrium, even though the brands are symmetric in every way. Is this asymmetry in
technology adoption induced by the technology provider, or because of strategic competition?
To address this question, we note that the technology provider can indeed charge a high
fee so that only one brand can ever afford to adopt the technology. However, we can easily
show that this is not the case. To see this, we note that even if f is set as zero such that
both brands can freely adopt the technology and at any given ξ, the asymmetry in adopting
the technology remains (See Appendix A on page 122). This implies that there is something
inherent with the DS technology that incentivizes the exclusive adoption.
Figure 9: The Equilibrium Market Configuration when Technology provides DS Function
α

A1
A0

1−α

B0

0

1
2

1

In Figure 9 we illustrate the equilibrium market segmentation when Brand A adopts the
DS technology, where “A0 ”, “A1 ”, and “B 0 ” denote the consumers who buy Brand A from
the traditional channel and from the technology channel, and Brand B from the traditional
channel, respectively. Note that under DS, it is the consumers with weaker brand preferences
who are attracted to this channel. When both brands adopt the technology channel, they
compete over the customers with the weakest brand preferences and cannot capture any
added benefit of DS from them. However, if only one brand entered the technology segment,
the adopting brand can take advantage of the added utility from the DS functions for the
consumers with weak brand preferences and increase its price in the technology channel
for them. Indeed, the price of the adopting brand in the new channel can even be higher
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than that in the traditional channel when ξ is larger than

t
25
2(1−α+t) .

In addition, as these

weak preference customers move to the new channel, the adopting brand can set its price
in the traditional channel higher than that of the non-adopting brand (Brand B), as it
sells to customers of stronger brand preferences in this channel.26 The higher prices by
the adopter due to channel differentiation, in turn, also benefits the non-adopter (B), i.e.,
(DS,T )

πB

(DS,DS) 27
.

> πB

This “differentiation-enhancing” effect is “washed out” if both brands

adopt the technology channel.
In this equilibrium, the fee that the technology provider can charge Brand A is the maximum
profit that the provider can take away from the brand while still letting the brand make
sufficient profit so as not to deviate. As Brand A benefits more from a better technology,
the provider can charge a higher fee and hence internalize the incentive to provide the best
technology possible.
Technology with OC Functionality
Next, we turn our attention to the technology that offers ordering convenience (OC) to
demonstrate the sharp contrast in the equilibrium market configuration and prices under OC
relative to the DS case. Recall that the experimental results show that, in contrast to the DS
function, a technology featuring OC provides homogenous benefits to consumers regardless
of their brand preferences. In the context of the Hotelling model, we can incorporate this
benefit by adding a constant utility to all consumers who shop in the OC channel as follows:

∆OC (x) ≡ η,
25
26

1,(DS,T )

Based on pA

0,(DS,T )

− pA

0,(DS,T )

0,(DS,T )

=

ξ
t
− 4(1−α+t)
> 0 iff ξ
2
αt(2ξ(1−α+t)+3t)
> 0.
6(1−α+t)(1−α+2t)

>

(3.3)
t
.
2(1−α+t)

Based on pA
− pB
=
Some consumers are choosing between A’s new channel with VA1 = V − tx − p1A + ξ − (x − 21 ) and B’s
traditional channel with VB0 = V − t(1 − x) − p0B (see the “vertical line” between A1 and B 0 in Figure
27

∂(V 0 −V 1 )

9). Note that | B∂x A | = 2t + 1 > 2t, which means that we add another layer of differentiation between
brands by leveraging the heterogeneity in channel preferences. The more differentiated the brands are, the
higher prices both of them can charge their consumers.
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where 0 < η ≤ η. Figure 10 illustrates ∆OC (·). Similar to the analysis under the DS case,
we let the technology frontier be η ≤

1
2,

so that the technology provider can choose η ∈

[0, η]. The provider also charges a fee f OC for adopting the OC technology. Proposition 10
describes the equilibrium for the OC technology.
Figure 10: The Added Utility from Shopping in the Technology Channel that Features OC
∆
∆OC (x) ≡ η

η
1
2

1 x

0

Proposition 10. (Equilibrium with OC Functionality) With OC functionality, both
brands adopt the technology. The technology provider always offers the highest possible level
of technology (η ∗ = η), and collects a fee of

f OC∗ =

αη 
αη 
1−
.
3
6t

The proof for Proposition 10 is in Appendix A on page 124. In this equilibrium, prices are
0,(OC,OC)

pA

0,(OC,OC)

= pB

1,(OC,OC)

= pA

1,(OC,OC)

= pB

= t,

and equilibrium profits are
(OC,OC)

πA

(OC,OC)

= πB

=

t
− f OC∗ .
2

This suggests that due to the competition, the brands actually do not benefit at all from
adopting the technology. One can see this from the fact that neither the prices nor the
profits are higher relative to those in the benchmark case without TES benefits. Figure
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11 depicts the equilibrium market segmentation if the technology provides OC function,
where “j 0 ” and “j 1 ” in the figure denote the consumer segments who buy Brand j from
the traditional channel and from the technology channel, respectively, j = A, B.
Figure 11: The Equilibrium Market Segmentation (OC Case)
α

A1

B1

1−α

A0

B0
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1
2

1

Similar to DS technology, Proposition 10 suggests that the provider of the OC technology has
the incentive to push the technology to the frontier. Moreover, Proposition 10 suggests that
with OC benefits, competitive adoption is the norm, in contrast to the exclusive adoption
that we saw with the DS technology.
By comparing Proposition 10 to Proposition 9, we can derive three key insights about the
provision and adoption of DS and OC shopping technologies. First, as a technology that
provides uniform benefit to all consumers in the market, OC is embraced by all competing
retailers. This is because the nature of the technology is such that non-adoption will put
a brand in considerable disadvantage in competition with its rival. In contrast, the DS
technology provides more benefits to consumers with weaker brand preferences. As such,
the adoption of DS by a brand can mitigate competition and benefit the rival, too. This
nature of the DS technology discourages competitive adoption. Put differently, we can
expect devices that offer OC to enjoy a faster and wider adoption among retailers relative
to those that offer DS benefits. This insight may explain why fewer retailers engage in
sophisticated recommendation tools and resort to none or generic DS tools.
Second, the exclusive adoption of DS actually delivers the Pareto improvement for all players
in the market, compared to the case when the technology channel was not available. The
adopting brand is never worse off, the rival brand is better off, and the technology provider is
better off relative to the case where no one adopts DS. In contrast, the competitive adoption
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of the OC technology leads to a prisoners’ dilemma outcome for the competing brands since
adopting OC is just a defensive strategy that cannot generate additional benefit for the
brands, while the technology provider is better off.
Third, Propositions 9 and 10 suggest that when a technology features one of DS or OC
benefits, the technology provider will always develop and offer the most-advanced technology
feasible. This is because the provider can always internalize the benefit of a technology by
charging a fee equal to the added benefit to a brand from adopting the technology. We will
see that when a technology provider offers both functionalities, this may not always be the
case and the provider has an incentive to leave its technology less than perfect.
Choice of Technology Provider: DS or OC?
An interesting question at this point is how the technology provider may engage its resources
to develop the functionality that benefits all consumers (OC) or the functionality that is
valued more by consumers with weak brand preferences (DS), if those resources are limited.
We can answer this question by comparing the profit the provider can obtain from providing
the maximum DS (ξ = 12 ) vs the maximum OC (η = 12 ) benefit. The following proposition
summarizes this analysis, as illustrated in Figure 12.
Proposition 11. (Choice of Technology Provider: DS or OC?) When the penetration
rate of a TES shopping platform (α) is sufficiently large or when the consumers’ brand
preferences (t) are sufficiently heterogeneous, the technology provider will choose DS over
OC, if it must choose one functionality to develop. For sufficiently small penetration rate
and sufficiently small brand preferences, it chooses OC instead.
We can see that even though the third party sells to only one of the two brands when it
offers DS (due to the asymmetry in adoption), it may earn a higher profit relative to when
it sells to both brands under OC functionality, when α and t are not very small. The narrow
profit margins that the brands have under the OC functionality restricts the profits of the
third party as well. To probe deeper, DS function induces an asymmetric adoption, so
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Figure 12: Technology Provider’s Choice of DS vs OC

consumers with weak preferences are “locked in” by the added utility, and thus the brand
can charge a high price on the new channel to these customers with weak preferences. OC
function, on the other hand, benefits all consumers so both brands will competitively adopt
it and thus compete “out” the benefit. In particular, when the penetration rate of the TES
shopping platform (α) is large enough, we find that DS function starts to provide higher
profit to the technology provider compared to OC function. Proposition 11 thus suggests
that a shopping platform may start with OC function and move to offering DS. When both
OC and DS are offered on a shopping platform, users may rationally choose to use either
or both functions, a case we analyze next.
In summary, our analysis in this section has provided a powerful insight into how technology
can interact with strategic players in the marketplace to shape brand choices and evolution,
as well as the market structure. Our insight is fundamentally driven by the following
economics. A new channel provides a new opportunity for price discrimination, and the
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profitability of such an opportunity will depend on the intensity of price competition in the
new channel. This intensity is mediated by the functionality of the new channel. Because
DS functionality is preferred by brand-indifferent customers, whereas the OC function is
valued similarly by consumers independent of their brand preference, a brand’s adoption
of a technology channel based on DS functionality can benefit the rival brand such that a
competitive entry is prevented. In comparison, the OC functionality will help the adopting
brand at the expense of the rival brand, such that the rival brand is motivated to enter
by the adopting brand’s advantage and its own brand’s disadvantage. This competitive
dynamics shed light on the fact that the OC function is more widely adopted by competing
brands relative to DS, especially at a nascent stage of a shopping platform.

3.4. Coexisting DS and OC Functionalities
Until now, we purposefully presented our analysis focusing on OC or DS benefits alone to
highlight the sharp contrast in the equilibrium outcomes depending on the functionality
offered by the shopping technology. Naturally, in practice, these benefits can be offered in
conjunction, especially as a retail platform matures. Since only a subset of users derives
positive utility from both functionalities, a user may optimally take advantage of one functionality, while opting out of the other. The choice of technological benefits, in turn, will
affect a brand’s incentives to embrace the technology channel and a platform’s incentives
to develop a shopping technology. In this section, we extend our model to investigate the
equilibrium strategies when a technology channel can offer OC and DS benefits, simultaneously.
When a channel offers both DS and OC functions, a user shopping in this technology channel
may choose to use DS only, OC only, or both DS and OC. A consumer will choose to use
these functions in a way to maximize her utility. Formally, when shopping in the technology
channel, a consumer located at x will receive an additional utility given by:

∆DS+OC (x) = max{∆DS (x), ∆OC (x), ∆DS (x) + ∆OC (x)}.
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(3.4)

Using the formulas for ∆DS (x) and ∆OC (x) as in Equations (3.2) and (3.3), one can derive
the expression for ∆DS+OC (x) as:

∆DS+OC (x) =




η + ξ − | 1 − x| if
2


η

1
2

−ξ ≤x≤

1
2

+ ξ,
(3.5)

otherwise.

In Figure 13, we depict how ∆DS+OC varies with consumer location x.
Figure 13: The Added Value of Shopping in the Technology Channel Featuring both DS
and OC
∆
∆DS+OC (x)
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Given the technology provider’s choice of η ≤ η and ξ ≤ ξ, as well as the adoption fee
f DS+OC , each brand will independently decide whether to subscribe to the technology
channel as before. Here, it is possible that there is no equilibrium in the subgame where
ˆ
ˆ
only one brand adopts the technology if ξ is too small (ξ < ξ(η)),
where ξ(η)
is a function
of η. To avoid such complexity, we first limit our attention to the case under the restriction
ˆ
that ξ ≥ ξ(η),
and then discuss the possible outcomes when we remove this restriction.
The following proposition summarizes the optimal choice of technology by the provider
as well as the equilibrium strategies for the competing brands, under the restriction that
ˆ
ξ ≥ ξ(η).
Proposition 12. (Technology with Combined OC and DS Functions: Restricted)
ˆ
When ξ ≥ ξ(η),
a third-party technology provider offering a combination of DS and OC
functionalities always pushes the technology to the frontier such that ξ ∗ = ξ and η ∗ = η. In
equilibrium, only one brand adopts the technology channel.
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When the technology frontier of DS is sufficiently high, the equilibrium result is similar
to that of the DS-only case: only one of the two brands adopts the technology channel,
but the non-adopting brand also benefits from this specialization in the marketplace. The
third-party technology provider can obtain revenue from only one of the two brands, and it
sets fees such that it extracts the brand’s gains from adoption (i.e., the increase in its profits
due to offering the technology channel). This fee increases in both η and ξ. As a result, the
technology provider offers the highest possible DS and OC functionalities, pushing η and ξ
to their frontier.
ˆ
Next, we consider relaxing the restriction that ξ ≥ ξ(η).
In particular, we focus on the case
ˆ
when the technology frontier (η and ξ) does not meet the restriction, i.e., when ξ < ξ(η).
We will see that, in this case, the technology provider may want not to push the technology
to its frontier, which is stated in the following proposition.28
Proposition 13. (Technology with Combined OC and DS Functions: General
ˆ
the third-party technology provider offering a combination of DS and
Case) When ξ < ξ(η),
OC functionalities may not always push the technology to its frontier. In particular, a lower
OC functionality can generate higher profits compared to the best possible OC technology.
This proposition provides an interesting finding: a technology provider may maximize its
profit by strategically curbing the benefits of a functionality at a level below the frontier—
even when offering a better technology and higher benefits is feasible and costless. This is a
striking finding, as it explains why users sometimes state that there is room for improvement
in convenience technologies offered by retailers (Perez, 2017). Quality of the retail technologies available to consumers is not merely an outcome of technological advancements, but
also an outcome of incentive-driven competition in the marketplace and purposeful interactions amongst retailers as well as the third party technology developer. The developer
28
In the analysis here, we assume no costs for improvements in technology for a third party. If we assume
a nonzero cost, trivially, the provider may choose not to push the technology to the frontier. We make this
assumption in order to highlight the finding that, even in the absence of costs of developing a technology,
there are cases when the technology provider will not offer the best possible technology in order to curb
retail competition.
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is in the position to induce competitive or monopolistic use of its technology. When DS
function is limited, the provider may stand to benefit from a monopolistic adoption of its
technology, which it can do by under-providing its OC functionality. In other words, the
profit motives can drive the technology provider not to pursue the best technology.

3.5. Conclusion
The technology with which consumers search and order products today is significantly
different from that of yesterday’s. Advances in data analytics and artificial intelligence
technologies provide a substitute for the physical legwork of searching and shopping for
goods. Not surprisingly, an increasing number of devices integrate technology that assists
in decision support and ordering convenience. Amazon’s Dash button automatically reorders the product for a consumer, Amazon’s Alexa allows consumers to receive product
recommendations from Amazon. Google’s Home Assistant offers similar functionalities.
This chapter, to our knowledge, is the first study to test consumer attitudes towards using
technology-enabled shopping (TES) devices conditional on their brand preference strength,
and to use the underlying relationship to build a model of distribution and pricing strategy.
By doing so, we theoretically explore the competitive implications of the new retailing
technology and show how strategic interactions in the marketplace can shape the choice
and implementation of the new technology.
Our experimental findings show that the acceptance of in-home shopping devices depends
on the functionality that the device offers and a consumer’s preference strength for the
brand. It is essential for managers to consider the primary functionality of the device to
understand who stands to benefit more from it. Based on earlier research (Burke, 2002),
we investigate two distinct functionalities: ordering convenience (OC) and decision support
(DS). When devices offer mainly ordering convenience or when products are ordered by consumers primarily using this function (similar to the dash buttons), all consumers are more
likely to use these devices. When devices mainly assist in decision-making, consumers with
opposite traits, those with less-established brand preferences, have a stronger preference
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towards using these devices relative to shopping in-store. The experiment we ran uncovers
these preference structures.
Using the empirical findings from this experiment, we then build a theoretical model to
provide insights for marketing managers on how to sell and how to price products across
these devices and traditional channels. This analysis yields a series of important findings:
1. The market structure, prices, and the profits of firms will look very different conditional on the functions the TES platform offers.
2. TES platforms facilitate price discrimination.

TES platforms can facilitate

price discrimination since consumers’ acceptance of the technology is correlated with
their brand preference strength and the device functionality. Consumers self-select
into the channel that yields a higher utility for them, and firms can enhance profits
due to better segmentation.
3. TES platforms with OC function results in a prisoners’ dilemma outcome
for competing brands.

When the primary function of the devices is OC, both

brands adopt the technology channel. However, such adoption is only a defensive
strategy, which makes the competing brands even worse off than the case when the
new technology channel was not available at all.
4. TES platforms with DS function supports channel differentiation and price
discrimination.

When the function of the device is DS, only one brand adopts

the technology channel and the other does not. The consumers with less established
brand preferences are more likely to adopt the new channel, thus managers should
anticipate a price competition over the new channel. To mitigate competition, brands
choose to differentiate in distribution channels. The traditional channel is utilized by
the consumers with stronger brand preferences. The brand charges higher prices to
these consumers relative to when it did not adopt the new channel.
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5. Brand-loyal consumers may face higher prices, even when they do not use
the TES channel.

Consumers who are more brand-loyal are likely to face higher

prices when TES platforms are adopted by firms. Consumers with weaker preferences
may face lower or unchanged prices.
6. User aversion to technology may not be a bad thing from the perspective
of firms.

It may, on the surface, seem like elevating the benefits from shopping

with TES platforms for all consumers is likely to benefit firms. In fact, this is true
in a monopoly, as the firm can charge a higher price to consumers. In a duopoly,
however, elevating the utility to everyone can make firms worse off as it eliminates price
discrimination ability and therefore enhances price competition. Put differently, the
impact of technology is less predictable under competition and a higher heterogeneity
in consumer benefits from technology is more conducive to firm profits.
7. Technology providers may refrain from a perfect technology. A perfect technology may not be preferred from the perspective of the technology provider. A
provider prefers to limit the OC functionality to induce only one of the competing
brands to adopt its technology to increase its own profit.
Our study offers, for the first time to our knowledge, an analysis of the TES devices using
a combination of experimental and theoretical methods. While we think that the topic
and the undertaking are important, our research is not without limits. In our analysis, we
focus on the key benefits of technology defined by Burke (2002). There may be additional
factors and benefits which are not considered in our research for reasons of keeping the
research focused. Future research may want to focus on some of these additional benefits,
for instance, the entertainment value of shopping or privacy as a consideration. Moreover, in
our research we treat the device and channel interchangeably, and there may be additional
agents in the market which are intermediaries that enable selling or offer the technology. We
intentionally limit the number of players, but researchers who read this study (and make it
this far) may find it valuable to think about the additional strategic considerations these
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intermediaries add to the problem we study.
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CHAPTER 4 : Conclusion
Technology and its use in marketing scenarios have been an important issue in modern
marketing practices. This dissertation approaches this important topic by examining two
use cases of technology in marketing: social media platforms and shopping platforms. In
conjunction with some empirical evidence, we build theoretical models to generate several
unintended or understudied results about the use of technology in platforms.
First, for social media platforms, our analysis has articulated the marketing roles that
content moderation plays in achieving a platform’s profit objectives. It also prescribes
the normative strategies that a platform can use in content moderation: what content
to moderate for what purpose and what strategic adjustments to make regarding revenue
models and technology. In particular, we find that a platform’s optimal content moderation
strategy should be dependent on its revenue model. An advertising-based platform is more
likely to moderate its content than a subscription-based one, but moderates less aggressively
when doing so than the latter. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that unlike subscriptionbased ones, advertising-based social media platforms may lack the incentive to develop a
better technology.
Second, for technology-enabled shopping (TES) platforms, we break the functionalities of
such platforms into two: (1) adding convenience to ordering procedure (OC) and (2) providing support for decision-making (DS). We find that different technology functionalities will
benefit consumers in a different way: consumers’ stronger brand preferences are negatively
correlated with the benefit they get from DS functionality, whereas no such relationship
was detected for OC functionality. Such differences in consumer reactions induce different
distribution strategies: TES platforms featuring OC will induce uniformity in distribution,
whereas those featuring DS will induce specialization in distribution. The key insight is
that firms can make use of consumers’ heterogeneity to the new technology channel to price
discriminate and thus gain a higher profit, given the fact that consumers’ channel preference
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is correlated with the strength of their brand preferences. We also show that in some cases,
in order to mitigate downstream retailer competition and thus to increase its own profit,
the technology provider may prefer to limit the OC functionality to consumers.
In sum, through the two chapters above, we address the use of technology in different
business settings. Interestingly, both chapters of this dissertation point to the possibility
that technology providers may not prefer offering a better technology, even if technology
development per se is costless. That means, technology development not only lifts efficiency,
but also brings in different strategic behavior of the stakeholders.
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APPENDIX
A. Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1. Proof for the Optimality of Threshold Strategy
Proof for the optimality of threshold strategy under perfect technology
Lemma A.1. When the content moderation technology is perfect, under both advertising
and subscription revenues, any content moderation strategy which removes content with
extremeness indices in X ⊂ [0, 1], is (weakly) dominated by a “threshold” strategy which
removes content with extremeness indices greater than y.

Proof of Lemma A.1. To prove Lemma A.1, we start with an arbitrary content moderation
strategy, denoted as CX , which removes content with extremeness indices in X ⊂ [0, 1]. We
will show that there exists a threshold strategy that dominates CX . We first consider the
case when the platform is earning revenue from advertising.
First, notice that for the individuals who participate in the platform, the utility from
participation is increasing in their extremeness index, x. To see this, consider two users with
extremeness indices x1 , x2 whose content is not removed, where without loss of generality,
x1 < x2 . Let X be the users who participate in the platform. We can express the difference
in the utility of these consumers as
Z

Z

U (x1 ) − U (x2 ) =αx1 −

x̃dx̃ − (αx2 −
x̃∈X ,x̃>x1

x̃dx̃)
x̃∈X ,x̃>x2

Z
=α(x1 − x2 ) −

x̃dx̃
x̃∈X ,x1 <x̃≤x2

<0,

which implies that U (x) is increasing in x. Then, if a user at x participates in the platform
(has a non-negative utility from participating), then all other users with extremeness index
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greater than x should also participate, as long as the platform does not remove their content.
Next, take any content moderation strategy CX which removes all the content with extremeness index x ∈ X ⊂ [0, 1]. We will prove that CX is dominated by a threshold strategy. As
an illustration, the shaded areas in Figure 14 indicate the content that is removed (X) in
this moderation strategy. We intentionally use an example where the set X contains four
disjoint “blocks” to illustrate the steps in the proof. This approach can be generalized to
rule out strategies with fewer or more disjoint blocks.
Let the user with the highest and the lowest extremeness indices among all users participating in the platform under CX be denoted by x and x, respectively, as illustrated in Figure
14. First, notice that by the monotonicity of U (x), (x, 1] ∈ X must hold, since otherwise
these users would have participated as well. Put differently, content in (x, 1] must be in the
removed set. Second, again by the monotonicity of U (x), all users located between x and x
must participate unless their content is removed.
Figure 14: Content Moderation Strategy CX
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Third, CX must be equivalent to (and is weakly dominated by) CX ′ where X ′ = X\[0, x)
and CX ′ is illustrated in Figure 15. This is because, since by definition, users in [0, x) do
not participate, and a strategy removing their content cannot do better.
Figure 15: Content Moderation Strategy CX ′
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We have completed the proof if CX ′ is a threshold strategy. If CX ′ is not a threshold strategy,
then we can still show that a threshold strategy dominates it. To see this, consider the
“block” for removal that is to the left of and the closest to x. Let the right border of this
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block be denoted with x0 and its width be ∆, so that it covers the region [x0 − ∆, x0 ], as
illustrated in Figure 15. If the platform moves this block to the right, its user base X A will
not decrease if we can show that

∂X A
∂x0

≥ 0. So the platform can move the block [x0 − ∆, x0 ]

all the way to the right until x0 = x. That is, strategy CX ′ is dominated by another strategy
CX ′′ where X ′′ = X ′ \[x0 − ∆, x0 ] ∪ [x − ∆, x], as illustrated in Figure 16.
Figure 16: Content Moderation Strategy CX ′′
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In the following, we will show that x is non-increasing in x0 . For ease of expression, we
denote the other blocks for removal in X ′ as X̂, which does not change when the block
[x0 − ∆, x0 ] is moved to the right. Mathematically, X̂ = X ′ \[x0 − ∆, x0 ]. When x > 0
(strictly), by definition, the marginal user at x gets zero utility, i.e.,
Z
0 = U (x) = αx + v −

x̃dx̃

(A1)

x̃∈[x,x]\X ′

Z
= αx + v −

x̃dx̃

(A2)

x̃∈[x,x]\(X̂∪[x0 −∆,x0 ])

Z

Z

= αx + v −

x̃dx̃ +
x̃∈[x,x]
Z x

= αx + v −

Z

x̃dx̃ +
x

x̃dx̃

(A3)

x̃dx̃.

(A4)

x̃∈(X̂∪[x0 −∆,x0 ])
Z x0

x̃dx̃ +
x̃∈X̂

x0 −∆

Taking the derivative of x w.r.t. x0 on both sides of Equation (A4) yields

0=α

∂x
∂x
− (−x
) + x0 − (x0 − ∆),
∂x0
∂x0

which implies
∂x
∆
=−
<0
∂x0
α+x
whenever x > 0 since α ≥ 0 and ∆ > 0. That is, as long as x does not “bump” into zero,
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moving the block [x0 − ∆, x0 ] to the right will increase the user base X A . If at some point,
x bumps into zero and cannot further decrease, it does not hurt to keep moving it to the
right, until x0 = x. Therefore, x is non-increasing in x0 and thus CX ′ is dominated by CX ′′ .
Note that going from strategy CX ′ to strategy CX ′′ implies connecting the blocks [x0 −∆, x0 ]
and [x, 1] together. This can be seen more clearly by comparing Figures 15 and 16.
Let’s redefine x as the highest extremeness index member among the participating users
under strategy CX ′′ , and redefine x0 as the right border of the “block” for removal that is to
the left of and closest to the “new” x, as shown in Figure 17. Note that Figure 17 is identical
to 16 except that we have redefined x and x0 . One can repeat the procedure of moving x0 to
x many times until it reaches a single contiguous threshold strategy. This threshold strategy
dominates CX . In our example, we do this step once to get to the threshold strategy. Thus,
any arbitrary content moderation strategy CX is weakly dominated by a threshold strategy,
and this concludes the proof for the advertising case.
Figure 17: Redefine x and x0 for Induction
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When the platform earns revenue from subscription fees, all above derivations showing that
the threshold strategy maximizes the user base still hold. We need to show that for any
subscription fee p, an arbitrary content moderation strategy CX is dominated by a threshold
strategy.
Again, let the user with the highest extremeness index among all participating users be
denoted by x ≤ 1 under content moderation strategy CX . When p > αx + v, which is the
highest utility that a user can get, then U (x) < 0 for all users and no user will participate in
the platform, so moderation strategy CX is equivalent to the threshold strategy since there
is no revenue anyway.
When p ≤ αx + v, there exist some users whose utility from participating in the platform
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is positive. Note that for any given p, a larger user base means a larger revenue. We can
simply replace “v” in the proof for the advertising case as “v − p” and everything still holds
in that proof. Therefore, CX can also be (weakly) dominated by a threshold strategy due
to the same logic as in the advertising case.

Proof for the optimality of threshold strategy under imperfect technology
Recall that if the content moderation strategy is imperfect, then the platform can choose
any X ⊂ [0, 1] as a “target zone” such that all content with extremeness index x ∈ X is
intended to be removed. Since the technology is imperfect, any content with x ∈ X is
removed with probability
1
2

1
2

+ k and any content with x ∈
/ X is removed with probability

− k, where k ∈ [0, 21 ]. In this case, we can describe the optimal content moderation

strategy in Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.2. If the content moderation technology is imperfect, for both advertising and
subscription revenues, any content moderation strategy targeting the content with extremeness indices in X ⊂ [0, 1] for removal is (weakly) dominated by a threshold strategy targeting
content with extremeness indices greater than y for removal.

Proof of Lemma A.2. To prove the lemma, we start with some arbitrary content moderation
strategy CX which targets content with extremeness indices in X ⊂ [0, 1] for removal. We
will show that a threshold strategy dominates this strategy in five steps.
First, let’s assume that the platform earns revenue from advertising. For any given content
moderation strategy CX and any user at x, let her utility from participating in the platform
be U T (x) if she is in the “target zone” (i.e., x ∈ X) and U N T (x) if she is not (i.e., x ∈
/ X).
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Then we have
1
1
U (x) = αx( − k) − c( + k) + v −
2
2

Z

Z

1
1
U N T (x) = αx( + k) − c( − k) + v −
2
2

Z

Z

T

1
x̃( − k)dx̃ −
2
x̃∈X ,x̃∈X,x̃>x

1
x̃( + k)dx̃,
2
x̃∈X ,x̃∈X,x̃>x
/
(A5)

1
x̃( − k)dx̃ −
2
x̃∈X ,x̃∈X,x̃>x

1
x̃( + k)dx̃.
2
x̃∈X ,x̃∈X,x̃>x
/
(A6)

Since U T (x) − U N T (x) = −2αkx − 2ck ≤ 0,

U T (x) ≤ U N T (x)

(A7)

holds for any x. Moreover, U T (x) and U N T (x) are both increasing in x since for any x1 < x2
Z
1
1
U (x1 ) − U (x2 ) =α(x1 − x2 )( − k) −
x̃( − k)dx̃
2
2
x̃∈X ,x̃∈X,x1 ≤x̃≤x2
Z
1
−
x̃( + k)dx̃
2
x̃∈X ,x̃∈X,x
/
1 ≤x̃≤x2
T

T

<0,

and using a similar derivation

U N T (x1 ) − U N T (x2 ) < 0.

Thus, the utility from participating in the platform is increasing in x within and outside
the target zone. By monotonicity, we claim that there exists a marginal user xT ∈ X such
that any user at x ∈ X will participate if x ≥ xT , and will not do so if x < xT . Similarly,
there exists xN T ∈
/ X such that any user at x ∈
/ X will participate if x ≥ xN T and will not
do so if x < xN T .
We first claim that xN T ≤ xT . This is because otherwise there exists x0 ∈ (xT , xN T )
and thus a user at x0 will participate if she is within the target zone but will not do
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so if she is outside the target zone. That is, U T (x0 ) ≥ 0 and U N T (x0 ) < 0, and thus
U T (x0 ) > U N T (x0 ), which is a contradiction to the inequality given in (A7).
Next, we show that the content moderation strategy CX is dominated by a threshold strategy. As an illustration, the shaded areas in Figure 18 indicate the target zone (X) of this
moderation strategy. We intentionally use an example with four disjoint “blocks” as the
target zone to illustrate the steps of finding the dominant threshold strategy. Note that this
figure is an illustration to help readers understand the procedure for the proof described
later, but the proof holds for any general X. We prove the statement by constructing a
threshold strategy that induces a higher revenue for the platform in five steps.
Figure 18: Content Moderation Strategy CX

0
Step 1.

xN T

xT

1

For any content with x < xN T , there is no need to include them in the target

zone. This is because by definition, no users with x < xN T will participate under strategy
CX and these users will not affect the utility of the participating users since they are more
moderate than them. Therefore, we claim that CX is weakly dominated by CX1 where
X1 ≡ X\[0, xN T ). We illustrate the moderation strategy after Step 1, i.e., CX1 in Figure
19.
Figure 19: Content Moderation Strategy CX1

0

xN T z − ∆ z

z ′ xT

1

Step 2. After Step 1, there is no content pruned to the left of xN T . Now consider the
content in region [xN T , xT ]. We claim that if there is any content intended to be pruned
within region [xN T , xT ], it should be next to xT . For example, in our illustration above in
Figure 19, there is one block [z − ∆, z] within region [xN T , xT ] and z < z ′ , where z ′ is the
left border of the block that contains xT . We will show that it is better for the platform
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to move the block of target zone [z − ∆, z] to the right such that z = z ′ . Without loss of
generality, we will only prove the claim for this “one block” example for ease of articulation.
The same logic can be applied to the case of multiple blocks within the region [xN T , xT ].
In short, pushing the block of target zone [z − ∆, z] to the right next to z ′ will not affect
anyone to the right of z ′ , but will move xN T to the left and thus increase the user base. To
see this, recall that the marginal user outside the target zone xN T is given by
1
1
αxN T ( + k) − c( − k) + v −
2
2

Z

z−∆

xN T

1
x̃( + k)dx̃ −
2

Z
z

z′

1
x̃( + k)dx̃ − A = 0,
2

(A8)

where A is all the negative utility that a user at xN T suffers from reading content with
extremeness index > xT , and thus A is independent of z. Taking the first-order derivative
w.r.t. z on both sides of Equation (A8) yields

 

∂xN T
1
∂xN T
1
1
NT 1
− (z − ∆)( + k) − x ( + k)
− −z( + k) = 0,
α( + k)
2
∂z
2
2
∂z
2
which implies
∂xN T
∆
=−
< 0,
∂z
α + xN T
so xN T is decreasing as z, i.e., xN T is indeed moved to the left as [z − ∆, z] is pushed to
the right.
Note that it is possible that at some point xN T can be exactly 0, then further moving the
target region [z − ∆, z] to the right may not increase the user base, but it will not do any
harm either, so we can continue to move [z − ∆, z] to the right anyway until z = z ′ so that
the “blocks” of target zones merge together and a new larger target zone “block” containing
xT is obtained. Denote now the left border of this new block as y1 , the right border of this
block as y2 , and the left border of the target zone block next to this block as w. We also
denote the improved content moderation strategy as CX2 , as illustrated in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Content Moderation Strategy CX2
y2

0

Step 3.

xN T

y1

xT

w

1

So far we have shown that any content moderation strategy CX is weakly dom-

inated by a strategy CX2 where X2 has the following structure: ∃y1 ∈ [xN T , xT ] such that
[y1 , xT ] ⊂ X2 and [0, y1 ) ̸⊂ X2 . In fact, y1 is a free parameter that the platform can choose
for this content moderation strategy CX2 . By definition, users within region [xN T , y1 ) incur
a lower probability of being removed and choose to participate in the platform, while users
within region [y1 , xT ] incur a higher probability of being removed and choose not to participate. Thus, all else being equal, choosing a y1 closer to xT , although preserving more
extreme users next to xT , will also increase the negative utility that moderate users incur
and thus push xN T rightward. This is similar to the tradeoff of the platform that we have
seen in Proposition 1. In this step, we shall show the following claim: all else being equal,
the platform will optimally choose y1 such that either one of the following conditions is
satisfied: (a) y1 = xT or (b) y1 = y1 where y1 is chosen such that xN T = 0.
First, it is easy to see that the platform has no incentive to choose any y1 greater than
xT or less than y1 . This is because choosing a y1 greater than xT does not preserve more
extreme users compared to setting y1 right at xT , but only increases the negative utility
that moderate users incur. Similarly, choosing a y1 less than y1 will only make the user
base smaller compared to setting y1 at y1 .
Consider any y1 ∈ [y1 , xT ]. By definition, we have
1
1
αxN T ( + k) − c( − k) + v −
2
2

Z

y1

xN T

1
( + k)x̃dx̃ − A = 0,
2

(A9)

where A is all the negative utility that a user at xN T suffers from reading content with
extremeness index > xT , and thus A is independent of y1 . Equation (A9) can be reduced
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to
1
(xN T )2
+ αxN T − y12 + B = 0,
2
2
where B =

−c( 12 −k)+v−A
,
1
+k
2

(A10)

independent of y1 . Solving for xN T , we get

xN T = −α +

q
α2 + y12 − 2B.

(A11)

Note that y1 ∈ [y1 , xT ] ensures that users at xN T always get a non-positive utility. Thus,
the left hand side of Equation (A10) is non-positive when xN T = 0, which implies that
B ≤ 12 y12 . Thus, the term within the square root is always non-negative.
The user base, which is the objective function of the platform, is X A = y1 − xN T + 1 − xT ,
so
∂xN T
∂X A
=1−
∂y1
∂y1
∂(−α +

p
α2 + y12 − 2B)
∂y1

=1−
p
α2 + y12 − 2B − y1
.
= p
α2 + y12 − 2B
Thus,

sign

∂X A
∂y1




q
2
2
α + y1 − 2B − y1
= sign
q

2
2
2
2
= sign ( α + y1 − 2B) − y1
= sign(α2 − 2B),

which is independent of y1 . Therefore, the sign of

∂X A
∂y1

does not depend on y1 , i.e., X A is

monotonic in y1 when y1 ∈ [y1 , xT ], and thus the optimal y1 must be at the corner – either
xT or y1 .
Step 3 actually proves that CX is dominated by either one of the following strategies illus-
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trated in Figure 21, denoted as CX3a (y1 = xT ) and CX3b (y1 = y1 ), respectively.
Figure 21: Content Moderation Strategies CX3a and CX3b
y2 w

0

xN T

y2 w

y1

1 xN T = 0

y1 = xT

xT

1

(b) CX3a (y1 = y1 s.t. xN T = 0)

(a) CX3a (y1 = xT )

In this step, we will prove that for both CX3a and CX3b , ceteris paribus, it is better

Step 4.

for the platform to move y2 to the right such that y2 = w and thus the two target zone
blocks are connected. That is, we want to show

∂X A
∂y2

is non-negative when y2 ≤ w. In the

following, we prove this separately for CX3a and CX3b .
(a) For CX3a :
By definition, the utility of xT and xN T from participation is zero:
1
1
αx ( − k) − c( + k) + v −
2
2
T

Z

y2

xT

1
( − k)x̃dx̃ −
2

Z

w

y2

1
( + k)x̃dx̃ − D = 0,
2

(A12)

and
1
1
αxN T ( +k)−c( −k)+v−
2
2

Z

xT

1
( +k)x̃dx̃−
2
N
T
x

Z

y2

xT

1
( −k)x̃dx̃−
2

Z

w

y2

1
( +k)x̃dx̃−D = 0, (A13)
2

where D is the negative utility that a user at xT or xN T suffers from reading content with
extremeness index > w, and thus D is independent of y2 .
Taking the first-order derivative w.r.t. y2 on both sides of Equations (A12) and (A13) yields
1
∂xT
1
∂xT
1
α( − k)
− ( − k)(y2 − xT
) + ( + k)y2 = 0
2
∂y2
2
∂y2
2
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and
1
∂xN T
1
1
1
∂xN T
∂xT
∂xT
− ( + k)(xT
− xN T
) − ( − k)(y2 − xT
) + ( + k)y2 = 0,
α( + k)
2
∂y2
2
∂y2
∂y2
2
∂y2
2
which, since k < 1/2 imply
4ky2
∂xT
=−
< 0,
∂y2
(1 − 2k)(α + xT )
and

4ky

T

2
4k(y2 + xT (1−2k)(α+x
4k(y2 − xT ∂x
T))
∂xN T
∂y2 )
=−
=
−
< 0.
N
T
N
T
∂y2
(1 + 2k)(α + x )
(1 + 2k)(α + x )

The user base, which is the objective function of the platform, is X A = 1 − xT + xT − xN T =
1 − xN T , so
∂X A
∂xN T
=−
> 0.
∂y2
∂y2
Therefore, moving y2 to the right can increase the user base if xN T is interior (xN T > 0).
It is possible that at some point xN T can be exactly 0, then further moving y2 to the right
NT

may not increase the user base, but it will not do any harm either ( ∂X
∂y2 = 0), so we can
move y2 to the right until y2 = w and get a strategy dominating CX3a .
(b) For CX3b :
By definition of xT and y1 ,
1
1
αxT ( − k) − c( + k) + v −
2
2

Z

y2

1
( − k)x̃dx̃ −
2

xT

Z

w

y2

1
( + k)x̃dx̃ − D = 0,
2

(A14)

and
1
−c( − k) + v −
2

Z
0

y1

1
( + k)x̃dx̃ −
2

Z

y2

xT

1
( − k)x̃dx̃ −
2
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Z

w

y2

1
( + k)x̃dx̃ − D = 0,
2

(A15)

where D is the negative utility that a user at xT or xN T suffers from reading content with
extremeness index > w, and thus D is independent of y2 .
Taking the first-order derivative w.r.t. y2 on both sides of Equations (A14) and (A15) yields
1
1
∂xT
∂xT
1
− ( − k)(y2 − xT
) + ( + k)y2 = 0
α( − k)
2
∂y2
2
∂y2
2
and
∂y1
1
1
1
∂xT
− ( − k)(y2 − xT
) + ( + k)y2 = 0,
−( + k)y1
2
∂y2
2
∂y2
2
which imply
∂xT
4ky2
< 0,
=−
∂y2
(1 − 2k)(α + xT )
and

T

4ky2 + (1 − 2k)xT ∂x
∂y1
4ky2 α
∂y2
> 0.
=
=
∂y2
(1 + 2k)y1
(1 + 2k)y1 (α + xT )
The user base, which is the objective function of the platform, is X A = 1 − xT + y1 , so
∂y1
∂X A
∂xN T
=−
+
> 0.
∂y2
∂y2
∂y2
Therefore, moving y2 to the right can increase y1 and decrease xT , and thus increase the
user base if y1 < xT . It is possible that at some point y1 and xT “bump” into each other,
then all users in [0, 1] participate in the platform and thus further moving y2 to the right
may not increase the user base, but it will not do any harm either. Therefore, we can move
y2 to the right until y2 = w and get a strategy dominating CX3b .
In summary, for either CX3a or CX3b , we can move y2 to the right until y2 = w so that the
“blocks” of target zones merge together and a new larger target zone “block” containing
xT is obtained. Denote now the right border of this new block as a “new” y2 (shown as y2′
in the figures below). The improved moderation strategies after Step 4 are illustrated in
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Figure 22.
Figure 22: Content Moderation Strategies after Step 4
y2′

0

xN T

y1 = xT

y2′

1 xN T = 0

xT

1

(b) y1 = y1 s.t. xN T = 0

(a) y1 = xT

Step 5.

y1

Repeat Step 4 until we “merge” all blocks together on the right and get a threshold

strategy (i.e., y2 = 1). This threshold strategy dominates CX in terms of the platform’s
revenue. In our illustrating example, we only need to repeat this once and get the threshold
strategy as shown in either Figure 23a or 23b.
Figure 23: Content Moderation Strategies after Step 5 (Becoming Threshold Strategies)

0 xN T

y1 = xT

1 xN T = 0

y1

xT

1

(b) y1 = y1 s.t. xN T = 0

(a) y1 = xT

Thus far, we have found the threshold strategy that dominates CX under advertising. The
whole argument also works for a subscription-based platform, based on the same logic as
we show in the perfect technology case: When the subscription fee p is given, the only thing
that a platform cares about is the user base, so the procedure above for the advertising
revenue case still applies. Therefore, for any given subscription fee p, any arbitrary content
moderation strategy is dominated by a threshold strategy. In particular, when the optimal
subscription fee is also chosen optimally, the optimal content moderation strategy should
still be a threshold one.
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A.2. Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions in Main Text
Proof of Lemma 1. When x > y, since c > v by assumption, U (x) = −c + v < 0 holds
and users with x > y do not participate in the platform.
For users x ≤ y, consider two users x1 , x2 such that x1 < x2 ≤ y. Then
Z

Z
x̃dx̃ − (αx2 −

U (x1 ) − U (x2 ) =αx1 −

x̃dx̃)
x̃∈X̂ ,x2 <x̃≤y

x̃∈X̂ ,x1 <x̃≤y

Z
=α(x1 − x2 ) −

x̃dx̃
x̃∈X̂ ,x1 <x̃≤x2

<0,

implying first that, if x1 participates then all users in the range [x1 , y] participate, and
second that the utility of participating users is increasing in x. The former also implies that
there exists xA ≥ 0 such that the user base is [xA , y].

Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that the platform’s profit maximization problem is maxy
π A = ζ(y − xA (y)), where

A

x (y) =


p


−α + α2 + y 2 − 2v

if y ≥



0

if y <

√
√

2v,
2v,

from Equation (2.3).
When y <
√
y ∗ = 2v.
When y ≥

√

√

2v, xA (y) = 0 and the profit of the platform is ζy, which is maximized when

2v, the profit becomes ζ(y + α −

A

dπ A
dy

= ζ(1 − √ 2 y 2
).
y +α −2v
√
> 0, which holds iff α > 2v. Therefore,

p
α2 + y 2 − 2v) and

Notice that the profit is increasing in y when dπ
dy
√
when α ≥ 2v, profit maximizing moderation strategy is y A∗ = 1. On the other hand, when
√
√
A
A∗ =
α < 2v, dπ
≤
0
and
the
profit
maximizing
content
moderation
strategy
is
y
2v.
dy
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In other words, we find αA ≡

√

2v such that y A∗ =

√

2v when α < αA while y A∗ = 1 when

α ≥ αA .

Proof of Proposition 2. Under subscription, the profit maximization problem of the
platform is maxy,p π S = p(y − xS (y, p)), where

xS (y, p) =


p


−α + α2 + y 2 − 2(v − p)

if y ≥

p
2(v − p),



0

if y <

p
2(v − p).

from Equation (2.5).
• If y ≤

p
2(v − p), then p ≤ v − y 2 /2 holds. Thus
y2
2v
π = py ≤ (v − )y ≤
2
3

r

S

πS

2v
3

q

2v
.
3

(A16)

2v
3 ,

when both inequalities in Equation
q
2v
(A16) are equality, i.e., p = v − 2 and (v − 2 )y = 2v
3
3 . These two conditions
q
2v
2v
give the optimal price p = 3 and content moderation policy y =
3 when y ≤
p
2(v − p).
Therefore,

takes the maximum value of
y2

y2

• If y ≥

p
p
2(v − p), then π S = p(y + α − α2 + y 2 − 2(v − p)). First fix p as given.


S
y
√
=
p
1−
.
Taking the first order partial derivative w.r.t. y, we have ∂π
∂y
2
2


y +α −2(v−p)

S
√ 2 2y
> p 1− √ y
If α2 −2(v −p) > 0, i.e., p > v −α2 /2, ∂π
=
∂y = p 1−

0. Therefore, π S is increasing in y for any given p
of y is 1. If α2 − 2(v − p) ≤ 0, i.e., p ≤ v − α2 /2,

y +α −2(v−p)
> v − α2 /2,

y 2 +0

or the optimal level

∂π S

≤ 0, which means that π S is
p
decreasing in y, or the optimal y for any given p ≤ v − α2 /2 is 2(v − p).

So the optimal level of moderation is either y =
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∂y

p
p
2(v − p) or y = 1. When y = 2(v − p),

q
2v
we have seen that the optimal level of p and y should be p = 2v
and
y
=
3
3 , which
q
2v
S∗ should maximize
induces π S = 2v
3
3 . When y = 1, the optimal subscription fee p̂
πˆS (p) = p(1 − xS (1, p)) = p(1 + α −

p

α2 + 1 − 2(v − p)).

Solving the first order condition (FOC) w.r.t. p gives

p̂S∗ =

i
p
1h
(1 + α) 2(2 − 3v + 2α2 + α) − 2(1 − 3v + α2 − α) .
9

The second order condition (SOC) is clearly satisfied since
−2(α2 + 1) − 3p + 4v
∂ 2 πˆS (p)
−2 + 4v
=
< 2
< 0.
2
3/2
2
∂p
(α + 2p − 2v + 1)
(α + 2p − 2v + 1)3/2

Therefore, π S∗ = max{ 2v
3

q

2v ˆS S∗
3 , π (p̂ )}.

By the envelope theorem, we know that

∂ πˆS (p̂S∗ )
∂ πˆS (p)
α
=
| S∗ = p̂S∗ (1 − p
).
2
∂α
∂α p=p̂
α + 1 − 2(v − p̂S∗ )
Since 1 ≥ xS (1, p) = −α +

p
α2 + 1 − 2(v − p), we know that 1 − √

α
α2 +1−2(v−p)

≥ 0 for

ˆS (p̂S∗ )
≥ 0, i.e., πˆS (p̂S∗ ) is increasing in α.
any p, and specifically for p = p̂S∗ . Thus, ∂ π ∂α
q
2v
2v
S
A
3
3 is independent of α. Therefore, proving that there exists α ∈ (0, α ) such that
q
q
2v
2v
S∗ =
S
π S∗ = 2v
(with
the
optimal
content
moderation
strategy
y
3
3
3 ) when α < α

and π S∗ = πˆS (p̂S∗ ) (with the optimal content moderation strategy y S∗ = 1) when α > αS
q
q
2v
ˆS (p̂S∗ ) > 2v 2v when α = √2v ≡ αA for any
requires πˆS (p̂S∗ ) < 2v
when
α
=
0
and
π
3
3
3
3
v ∈ (0, 21 ). To check this, we denote
2v
H(v) = (πˆS (p̂S∗ ) −
3

r

2v
)|α=0
3

and
2v
J(v) = (πˆS (p̂ ) −
3
S∗
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r

2v
)| √
3 α= 2v

and we want to show H(v) < 0 and J(v) > 0 for any v ∈ (0, 12 ).
Since H(v) = (πˆS (p̂S∗ ) −

2v
3

q

2v
3 )|α=0 ,

plugging in the expression of πˆS (p̂S∗ ) and α = 0

obtains
√
√
1
2v
H(v) = (2 − 4 − 6v)(6v + 4 − 6v − 2) −
27
3

r

2v
,
3

√
√
1
H ′ (v) = (2 − 6v − 4 − 6v)
3
and
H ′′ (v) = √

1
1
−√ .
4 − 6v
6v

Note that H ′′ (v) ≶ 0 if v ≶ 13 , so H ′ (v) is first decreasing and then increasing on (0, 12 ).
√
Therefore, H ′ (v) < max{H ′ (0), H ′ ( 12 )} = max{0, 13 (1 − 3)} = 0, so H(v) is decreasing in
v. Thus,
H(v) < H(0) = 0.

Since J(v) = (πˆS (p̂S∗ ) − 2v
3

q

2v
√
3 )|α= 2v ,

√
plugging in the expression of πˆS (p̂S∗ ) and α = 2v

obtains

J(v) =

q
q
√
√
√
√
√
1 √
(2 2v − 2(v + 2v + 2) + 2)(2v + 2 2v + (2 v + 2) v + 2v + 2 − 2),
27

q
p
√
√
√
√
√
√
( 2 − 3 6)v + v + 2v + 2 + v( 2(v + 2v + 2) + 2) − 2
√
J ′ (v) =
.
9 v
Denote the numerator of J ′ (v) as J1 (v), then
p
√
√
√
√
√
4
2v
+
8
v
+
4
v + 2v + 2 + 5 2 √
′
J1 (v) =
+ 2 − 3 6.
√
√ p
4 v v + 2v + 2
J1′ (v) = 0 has a unique solution v = v0 where v0 ≈ 0.2187 < 12 . Furthermore, J1′ (v) ≷ 0
when v ≶ v0 . Therefore, J1 (v) > min{J1 (0), J1 ( 21 )} = min{0,
J ′ (v) > 0 and then
J(v) > J(0) = 0.
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√

√
√
2−3 6+2 14
}
2

= 0. So,

q
2v
Thus, by the fact that πˆS (p̂S∗ ) is increasing in α while 2v
3 is independent of α, we claim
q 3
q
2v
2v
S∗ =
S
that there exists αS ∈ (0, αA ) such that π S∗ = 2v
(y
3
3
3 ) when α < α , while
π S∗ = πˆS (p̂S∗ ) (y S∗ = 1) when α > αS .

Proof of Proposition 3. We first consider the case where content moderation
is allowed.
q
q
2v
2v
√
3
2v
√ 3 = 2v
√ which is
When α < αS , π A∗ = ζ 2v and π S∗ = 2v
3
3 . Thus, ζ =
2v
3 3
√
ˆS S∗
independent of α. When αS ≤ α < αA , π A∗ = ζ 2v and π S∗ = πˆS (p̂S∗ ). Thus, ζ = π √(p̂2v ) .
We have proved that πˆS (p̂S∗ ) is increasing in α in the proof of Proposition 2, so ζ is also
increasing in α.
If content moderation is not allowed, the expressions for the platform’s profits (denoted as
π0A and π0S ) are the same as those when no moderation is conducted, i.e., π0A = ζ(1 + α −
√
ˆS S∗ )
α2 + 1 − 2v) and π0S = πˆS (p̂S∗ ). Thus, ζ̂ = 1+α−π √(p̂
. Clearly, when αS ≤ α < αA ,
α2 +1−2v
ζ < ζ̂ since π0S = π S∗ but π0A < π A∗ (this is when the optimal strategy for an advertisingbased platform is to conduct moderation but that of a subscription-based one is not to do
so).
We calculate
∂ πˆS (p̂S∗ )
(1
∂α

√

α
α2 + 1 − 2v) − πˆS (p̂S∗ )(1 − √α2 +1−2v
)
√
(1 + α − α2 + 1 − 2v)2

p
p̂S∗
α
√
(1 − p
=
)(1 + α − α2 + 1 − 2v)
(1 + α − α2 + 1 − 2v)2
α2 + 1 − 2(v − p̂S∗ )
q

α
− (1 + α − α2 + 1 − 2(v − p̂S∗ ))(1 − √
) .
α2 + 1 − 2v

∂ ζ̂
=
∂α

+α−
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Denote A =

p

α2 + 1 − 2(v − p̂S∗ ) and B =

sign(

√

α2 + 1 − 2v, then A ≥ B > α.


∂ ζ̂
α
α 
) =sign (1 − )(1 + α − B) − (1 + α − A)(1 − )
∂α
A
B
 (A − B)(AB + (1 − A − B)α + α2 ) 
=sign
AB
=sign(AB + (1 − A − B)α + α2 ).

Note that

AB + (1 − A − B)α + α2 ) =A(B − α) − Bα + α + α2
≥B(B − α) − Bα + α + α2
=(B − α)2 + α
>0.

Therefore,

∂ ζ̂
∂α

> 0, i.e., ζ̂ is increasing in α. When α = αS , it has been shown at the end of

last paragraph that ζ̂ > ζ. When α = 0,
√
√
√ 
1  (3 − ( 4 − 6v + 1))(6v + 4 − 6v − 2)
√
− 6 3v .
ζ̂ − ζ =
27
1 − 1 − 2v
Proving ζ̂ < ζ requires that
√
√
√
√
G(v) = (3 − ( 4 − 6v + 1))(6v + 4 − 6v − 2) − 6 3v(1 − 1 − 2v) < 0

for any v ∈ (0, 12 ). Note that
√
√
√
√
3 3
G (v) = − √
+ 9( 3 − 6v − 4 − 6v) − 6 3 + 18,
1 − 2v
′

√

3
while both − √31−2v
and

√

3 − 6v −

√

4 − 6v are decreasing in v, so G′ (v) is decreasing in v.

Then G′ (v) < G′ (0) = 0 so G(v) is decreasing in v. Thus, G(v) < G(0) = 0. Therefore,
ζ̂ < ζ when α = 0. Thus, by the fact that ζ̂ is increasing in α, we can claim that there is

90

α1 ∈ (0, αS ) such that ζ̂ ≶ ζ when α ≶ α1 and finish the proof.

Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i): We first prove that a platform carries out content
moderation only if the technology is sufficiently accurate, under both advertising and subscription revenues. To this end, we show that there exists ϵ > 0 such that when k < ϵ,
the profit induced by optimal moderation strategy is less than that of no content moderation. Notice that when k = 21 , both under advertising and subscription revenue, a platform
chooses to moderate content, under the assumption α < αS stated on page 26. Since the
platform’s profit
A
πkA = ζ(1 − xA
2,k + y − x1,k (y))

or
πkS = p(1 − xS2,k (p) + y − xS1,k (y, p))
is obviously continuous in k, it suffices to show that the platform’s profit if moderating
content is lower than that if no moderation is conducted, when the technology accuracy is
k = 0.
We start with the analysis of a platform with advertising revenues. Note that when k = 0,
all content has the probability

1
2

of being pruned, regardless of their extremeness index x

and the platform’s choice of y. A user at x = 1 receives utility U (1) ≡ 12 α − 21 c + v ≥ 0 by
the assumption c ≤ α + 2v. Therefore, the user base for the platform will be [x, 1] where
the marginal user x is the solution to U (x) ≡ 21 αx − 12 c + v −

11
2 2 (1

− x2 ) = 0. With some

algebra, we know that the size of the platform’s user base is

1−x=1+α−

p
p
α2 + 1 − 2(2v − c) < 1 + α − α2 + 1 − 2v,

which is the user base size if no moderation is conducted. The inequality comes from the
fact that v < c and thus 2v − c < v. Therefore, the profit with content moderation is also
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less than that without moderation.
The proof when the platform earns revenues from subscription is similar to that under
advertising revenues. With subscription revenues and lowest accuracy (k = 0), one can
show that for any given subscription price p, the user base is smaller when the platform
moderates content than when it does not: If p induces U (1) ≤ 0, there is no user on the
platform so the user base (zero) is trivially smaller when the platform moderates content
than when it does not. If p induces U (1) > 0, the procedure to prove that the user base is
smaller when the platform moderates content than when it does not is exactly the same as
for advertising case, except that we replace the terms v with v − p.
Therefore, we have proved that a platform will conduct content moderation only if technology is sufficiently accurate, for both advertising and subscription.

Part (ii): Next, we prove that if the platform is moderating content, it may prune more
of the moderate content than it does of the extreme content, and moreover, the average
extremeness index of the content on the platform may be lower than when it prunes more
of the extreme content and when it does not moderate content. To prove the existence of
an equilibrium content moderation strategy where these statements hold, it suffices to give
an example.
First, consider a platform under advertising revenue. Based on Figure 5, when the content
moderation policy is y, the amount of the extreme content (i.e., x > y) that is pruned in
equilibrium, denoted as M1,k (y), is
1
M1,k (y) = ( + k)(1 − max{y, x2,k }),
2
and the amount of the moderate content (i.e., x < y) that is pruned in equilibrium, denoted
as M2,k (y), is
1
M2,k (y) = ( − k)(y − x1,k (y)).
2
92

A∗ ≡ M (y A∗ ) unit of extreme content as well
In equilibrium, the platform prunes M1,k
1,k
A∗ ≡ M (y A∗ ) unit of moderate content. Based on the expression of the average
as M2,k
2,k

extremeness index (x̂) on page 29, in equilibrium, the average extremeness index (x̂kA∗ ) is
x̂A∗
k

R
x(1 − q(x))dx
= RX
(1 − q(x))dx
X A∗
R
R yk

x( 1 +k)dx+ x1 x( 12 −k)dx


2,k
 x1,k (yA∗ ) 2
if content moderation is conducted in equilibrium,
1
A∗ −x
A∗ ))+( 1 −k)(1−x
(
+k)(y
(y
1,k
2,k )
k
2
2
=

√


 −α+ α2 +1−2v+1 if content moderation is not conducted in equilibrium.
2

A∗ ,
Consider α = 0.05, v = 0.2, c = 0.25. Plug in the numbers into the expressions for M1,k
A∗ , and x̂A∗ , we can plot out a figure with k as x-axis while M A∗ , M A∗ , and x̂A∗ as y-axis,
M2,k
k
2,k
1,k
k

to find out whether there can be cases such that the following two claims hold:
(1) the platform prunes more of the moderate content than it does of the extreme content,
A∗ < M A∗ , and
i.e., there exists k0 ∈ [0, 12 ] such that M1,k
2,k0
0

(2) the average extremeness index of the content on the platform is lower than when it
prunes more of the extreme content and when it does not moderate content, i.e., there
A∗ < M A∗ , M A∗ > M A∗ , but x̂A∗ > x̂A∗ .
exists k1 , k2 ∈ [0, 21 ] such that M1,k
2,k1
1,k2
2,k2
k1
k2
1
A∗ , M A∗ , or x̂A∗ .
Figure 24 illustrates the relationship between k and M1,k
2,k
k
A∗ < M A∗ , so claim
From Figure 24, we see that for k greater than around 0.15, we have M1,k
2,k0
0
A∗ < M A∗ ,
(1) holds. Also, consider k1 = 0.1 and k2 = 0.3, we see from the figure that M1,k
2,k1
1
A∗ > M A∗ , but x̂A∗ > x̂A∗ , so claim (2) holds.
M1,k
2,k2
k1
k2
2

For a platform under subscription revenues, since the full solution including optimal pricing
is analytically challenging (see Section A.3.2), we use numerical simulations which exhaust
the parameter space of α ∈ [0, 1], v ∈ [0, 21 ], and c ∈ [v, α + 2v] with a grid of 0.05. The
details of how to generate the equilibrium outcomes are in Appendix A.4 (especially Section
A.4.2). Based on the outcomes stored in Dataframe S (described on page 112), we cannot
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A∗ , M A∗ , or x̂A∗ and Technology Accuracy k (v = 0.2, α = 0.05, c = 0.25)
Figure 24: M1,k
2,k
k

find any examples where the platform prunes extreme content more than it does moderate
content, and we find that the average extremeness index is lower when a platform conducts
content moderation than that when it does not.

Proof of Proposition 5. First, consider a platform with advertising revenues. When
k > k, no users with x > y will participate in the platform. Based on Lemma A.2,
the only two candidates for the optimal content moderation ykA∗ are either ykA∗ = 1 or
q
ykA∗ = 4v−(1−2k)2c
.
1+2k
Let the profit of the platform when it chooses y = 1 and y =
π2 , respectively. When k =

1
2

q

4v−(1−2k)2c
1+2k

be π1 and

(i.e., perfect technology), conducting content moderation is

more profitable than not doing so, based on the assumption that α < αS < αA . Therefore,
π1 < π2 when k = 21 . Since the platform’s profit, πkA or πkS , is continuous in k, there exists a
k̂ > k such that π1 < π2 for any k ∈ [k̂, 12 ]. That is, the optimal content moderation strategy
q
4v−(1−2k)2c
∂(
)
8(c−v)
1+2k
A∗ is
is ykA∗ = 4v−(1−2k)2c
for any k ∈ [k̂, 21 ]. Note that
= (1+2k)
2 > 0, so yk
1+2k
∂k
increasing in k, i.e., the platform adopts a more relaxed standard for content moderation
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as technology further improves. The average extremeness index is x̂A∗
k =
R ykA∗
0

x( 12 +k)dx
1
( 2 +k)ykA∗

=

ykA∗
2

R
x(1−q(x))dx
RX
X (1−q(x))dx

=

is increasing in k since ykA∗ is increasing in k.

The solutions under subscription revenues are proven numerically since characterizing the
equilibrium as a closed form solutions is analytically not tractable. We show the monotonicity between k and ykS∗ or x̂ numerically by exhausting the parameter space of α ∈ [0, 1],
v ∈ [0, 21 ], and c ∈ [v, α + 2v] with a grid of 0.05. The details of how to generate the
equilibrium outcomes are in Appendix A.4 (especially Section A.4.2). Using the outcomes
stored in Dataframe S (described on page 112), we can show the relationship between k and
the optimal moderation strategy ykS∗ , as well as the relationship between k and the average
R ykS∗

extremeness index x̂S∗
k =

R
x(1−q(x))dx
RX
X (1−q(x))dx

=

R
x( 12 +k)dx+ x1S∗ x( 12 −k)dx
xS∗
2,k
1,k
1
)+(
−k)(1−xS∗
( 12 +k)(ykS∗ −xS∗
1,k
2,k )
2

numerically.29 Figure

25 below is an example when α = 0, v = 0.25, and c = 0.5.

Figure 25: Content Moderation Policy (ykS∗ ) and Avg. Extremeness Index (x̂S∗
k ) vs. Technology Accuracy (k) (v = 0.25, α = 0, c = 0.5)

30 The same pattern is
We can see that when k is large, ykS∗ and x̂S∗
k are increasing in k.

repeated for all other (α, v, c) combinations.
xS (1,p∗ )+1

29

1
When no content moderation is conducted, the average extremeness index x̂S∗
= x̂S
0 =
k
2
when the expressions of xS (y, p) and p∗1 are given by Equation (2.5) and the last sentence of Proposition 2,
respectively.
30
In the left subfigure of Figure 25, there is no value of ykS∗ for small k, which means no content moderation
is conducted in equilibrium when k is small.
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Proof of Proposition 6. For the advertising case, although Section A.3.1 provides the
equilibrium for the imperfect technology case, expressions for the solution are too complicated to analytically derive comparative statics. Therefore, we exhaust the parameter space
of α ∈ [0, 1], v ∈ [0, 21 ], and c ∈ [v, α + 2v], using a grid of 0.05, and for any combination
of (α, v, c), we find out the maximum profit across different k. Details of the numerical
solution are provided in Section A.4.1 of Appendix A.4.
Then we compare the maximum profit (maxk πkA∗ ) with the profit when k =

1
2

(i.e., perfect

A∗ ). The numerical results confirm that for any α and v, if c is small,
technology, πk=
1
2

A∗ ; otherwise, max π A∗ = π A∗ . Therefore, when c is small,
we have maxk πkA∗ > πk=
1
k k
k= 1
2

imperfect technology with k <

2

1
2

is optimal for a platform under advertising. Figure 26

below illustrates the relationship between k and πkA∗ when α = 0.2, v = 0.25. Specifically,
Figure 26a corresponds to the case when c is small while Figure 26b corresponds to the case
when c is large. We see that the optimal technology is less than
exactly

1
2

1
2

when c is small, but is

when c is large. Similar results can be seen for all other combinations of (α, v, c).

Figure 26: Platform Profit πkA∗ and Technology Accuracy k (v = 0.25, α = 0.2)

(a) c = 0.3 (small)

(b) c = 0.5 (large)

For the subscription case, since the full solution including optimal pricing is analytically
challenging (see Section A.3.2), we show for any k ∈ [0, 12 ], the optimal profit πkS∗ is weakly
increasing in k numerically by exhaustive simulation. Details are provided in Appendix
96

A.4, especially Section A.4.2. Figure 27 below illustrates the relationship between k and
πkS∗ when α = 0.2, v = 0.25, and c = 0.3. A similar pattern can be seen for all other
combinations of (α, v, c).
Figure 27: Platform Profit πkS∗ and Technology Accuracy k (v = 0.25, α = 0.2, c = 0.3)

Proof of Proposition 7. First, notice that xP (y) = xA (y) since the users’ behavior is the
same as the advertising case. Moreover, based on Equations (2.3) and (2.11), the social
welfare W (y) is given by

W (y) =



R


 0y αx + v − 12 (y 2 − x2 ) dx

if y <

R y



if y ≥

−α+

√

y 2 +α2 −2v


αx + v − 21 (y 2 − x2 ) dx

√
2v,
√

2v.

√
If y < 2v, then the FOC with respect to y is dWdy(y) = αy + v − y 2 = 0, which yields y ∗ =
√
√
2
1
∗
2 ). Notice that SOC is satisfied since d W (y) |
∗ = α−2y = −
(α+
4v
+
α
4v + α2 ≤ 0.
y=y
2
2
dy
√
√
√
p
The condition y < 2v requires 12 (α + 4v + α2 ) < 2v, which is equivalent to α < v2 .
√
p
In other words, if α ≥ v2 , W (y) is increasing in y on [0, 2v].
If y ≥

√

p

dW (y)
=y
α2 −
dy
 √
2
y− α2 −2v+y 2
d2 W (y)
√
Note that dy2 =
α2 −2v+y 2
√
∗
∗
is then either y = 1 or y = 2v.

2v, W (y) is increasing in y if

equivalent to y ≥

v
α.

The optimal solution

97


2v + y 2 − y + v ≥ 0, which is
≥ 0, i.e., W (y) is convex in y.

When α ≥

pv

2,

we have

v
α

≤

√

2v, so W (y) is increasing in y on [0, 1], and thus y P ∗ = 1.

√
2v, so W (y) is first increasing in y until y = 21 (α+ 4v + α2 )
√
when reaching the local optimum W ( 12 (α + 4v + α2 )), then decreasing until y = αv , and
√
then again increasing in y. So the optimal social welfare is either W ( 21 (α + 4v + α2 ))

When α <

pv

2,

we have

v
α

>

√

or W (1), depending on which one is higher. Content moderation is only conducted when
√
pv
W ( 12 (α + 4v + α2 )) > W (1). To prove the existence of αP <
2 such that content
√
moderation is only conducted when α < αP , we define ∆W ≡ W ( 12 (α + 4v + α2 )) − W (1)
and prove the following: (1) ∆W is decreasing in α, (2) ∆W > 0 when α = 0, and (3)
p
∆W < 0 when α = v2 .
(1) ∆W is decreasing in α because


p
p
1 
∂∆W
=
α 5α + α2 + 4v − 4 α2 − 2v + 1 − 2v < 0.
∂α
4

(2) When α = 0,
√
∆W |α=0 =W ( v) − W (1)
Z √v
Z 1
1
1
2
=
(v − (v − x ))dx − √
(v − (1 − x2 ))dx
2
2
0
1−2v


√
√

1
= 2v 3/2 + 2 1 − 2v − 3 v − 1 − 2v + 1 .
3
Taking derivative w.r.t. v yields
√
∂(∆W |α=0 ) √
= v + 1 − 2v − 1,
∂v
and setting it to zero gives that v = 0 or v = 49 . Therefore, ∆W |α=0 is increasing in v on
v ∈ (0, 94 ) and decreasing in v on v ∈ ( 49 , 12 ). Thus, for any v ∈ (0, 12 )
1 3
1
∆W |α=0 > min{∆W |α=0,v=0 , ∆W |α=0,v= 1 } = min{0, ( + √ )} = 0.
2
3 2
2
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(3) When α =

pv

2,

√
∆W |α=√ v =W ( 2v) − W (1)
2
r
Z √2v r
Z 1
v
v
1
1
2
(
=
x + v − (2v − x ))dx − √
x + v − (1 − x2 ))dx
√ (
2−3v−
v
2
2
2
2
√
0
2


√
√
√

1
=
5 2v 3/2 + 3 4 − 6v − 4 v − 2 4 − 6v + 4 .
12
Taking derivative w.r.t. v yields
∂(∆W |α=√ v )
2

=

and setting it to zero gives that v =

49
338

∂v

on v ∈ (0,

49
338 )


√
1 √
5 2v + 3 4 − 6v − 8 ,
8
or v = 12 . Therefore, ∆W |α=√ v is decreasing in v
2

and increasing in v on v ∈

49 1
( 338
, 2 ).

Thus, for any v ∈ (0, 12 )

∆W |α=√ v < max{∆W |α=√ v ,v=0 , ∆W |α=√ v ,v= 1 } = max{0, 0} = 0.
2

2

Therefore, we claim that there exists αP <

2

pv
2

2

√
such that y P ∗ = 21 (α + 4v + α2 ) if α < αP

while no content moderation is conducted (y P ∗ = 1) otherwise.
Since αP , αS , and αA are all single-variable functions of v, one can easily check their
relative sizes. Using Mathematica’s FindInstance function, we show that when v ∈ (0, 21 )
p
and α ∈ (0, v2 ), the intersection set of α < αP and α ≥ αS is empty. This means αP < αS
for all v ∈ (0, 21 ). We already know that αS < αA , so we have αP < αS < αA .
When the social planner moderates content (α < αP ), we have

y

S∗

p
p
√
1
1
= 2v/3 < v < y P ∗ = (α + 4v + α2 ) < (
2
2

where the last inequality comes from α < αP <

pv

2.

r

v
+
2

s

r
4v + (

√
v 2
) ) = 2v = y A∗ ,
2

This completes the proof.

A final check about the claim that “the social planner only prunes users with a negative
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utility contribution to the society” (on page 35) is as follows. Consider the interior solution
√
y P ∗ = 12 (α + 4v + α2 ), the net utility contribution of a user at y P ∗ is αy P ∗ + v − 21 (y P ∗ )2
where the last term is the total negative utility this user imposes to all other users on
√
the platform. Substituting y P ∗ with 12 (α + 4v + α2 ), one can find that this net utility
contribution is exactly zero.

Proof of Proposition 8. We show that for any k ∈ [0, 12 ], the optimal social welfare Wk∗
is weakly increasing in k numerically by exhausting the parameter space of α ∈ [0, 1],
v ∈ [0, 21 ], and c ∈ [v, α + 2v] with an increment of 0.05. Details are provided in Appendix
A.4, especially Section A.4.2.
Figure 28 below illustrates the relationship between k and Wk∗ when α = 0.2, v = 0.25, and
c = 0.3. A similar pattern can be seen for all other combinations of (α, v, c).
Figure 28: Optimal Social Welfare Wk∗ and Technology Accuracy k (v = 0.25, α = 0.2,
c = 0.3)
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A.3. Equilibrium with Imperfect Technology
A.3.1. Advertising Revenue Model
Lemma A.1 characterizes the user equilibrium under advertising, given a content moderation
policy y.
Lemma A.1. For an ad-supported platform, when k ∈ [0, 12 ] and the platform does content
A
moderation, there exists xA
2,k ∈ [0, 1] such that all users in range [x2,k , 1] participate in the

platform. In particular,

r
xA
2,k

= min{1,

α2

q


 α2 + 1 +

2c(1 + 2k) − 4v
+1+
− α} ≡

1 − 2k

1

2c(1+2k)−4v
1−2k

−α

if k < k;
if k ≥ k,
(A17)

where k =

α+2v−c
2(α+c) .

A
For any y ∈ [0, 1], there exists xA
1,k (y) ∈ [0, y] such that if y < x2,k ,

A is [xA (y), 1]. In
A
A
the user set of the platform X A is [xA
1,k
1,k (y), y] ∪ [x2,k , 1]; if y ≥ x2,k , X

particular,
r
A 2



 α2 + max 0, y 2 + min{2αy, (1−2k)(2c+1−(x2,k ) )−4v } − α
1+2k
xA
q
1,k (y) =



 α2 + max 0, y 2 + min{2αy, (1−2k)(2c+1−y2 )−4v } − α
1+2k

if y < xA
2,k ;
if y ≥ xA
2,k .
(A18)

A
Furthermore, xA
2,k is increasing in k and x1,k (y) is decreasing in k.

Proof of Lemma A.1. Based on Equations (2.7) and (2.8), we have

U (x) =


R
R

αx( 1 + k) − c( 1 − k) + v −
x̃( 21 + k)dx̃ − x̃∈X̂ ,x̃>y x̃( 21 − k)dx̃
2
2
x̃∈X̂ ,x<x̃≤y

if x ≤ y;


αx( 1 − k) − c( 1 + k) + v −
2
2

if x > y.

R
x̃∈X̂ ,x̃>x

x̃( 12 − k)dx̃

(A19)

Note that there is a discontinuity at x = y: U (y − ) > U (y + ) as long as k > 0. Also,
similar to what is shown in the proof of Lemma 1, U (x) is increasing in x on [0, y] and also
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increasing in x on (y, 1]. Therefore, there can be possibly two segments of participating
A
users with U (x) > 0: the moderate users [xA
1,k , y] and the extreme users [x2,k , 1].

First consider the extreme users in (y, 1]. If U (1) < 0, no users in (y, 1] participate in the
platform since U (x) is increasing in x. U (1) = α( 12 − k) − c( 12 + k) + v < 0 is equivalent

xA
2,k
xA
2,k

α+2v−c
2(α+c)

= k. Otherwise, when k ≤ k, all users in [xA
2,k , 1] participate, where
R
1
1
A 1
solves U (xA
x̃( 21 − k)dx̃ = 0, which gives
2,k ) = αx2,k ( 2 − k) − c( 2 + k) + v − xA
2,k
q
= α2 + 1 + 2c(1+2k)−4v
− α. Therefore, Equation (A17) holds.
1−2k

to k >

A
For the moderate users in [0, y], xA
1,k can be given by the condition U (x1,k ) = 0 if the

˜
A
solution to this condition is interior (0 < xA
1,k < y). Denote the interior solution as x1,k .
˜
A
A
Depending on whether y < xA
2,k or y ≥ x2,k , the condition U (x1,k ) = 0 is given by


Ry
R1

˜ 1
1
1
1

αxA
˜ x̃( 2 + k)dx̃ − xA x̃( 2 − k)dx̃ = 0
1,k ( 2 + k) − c( 2 − k) + v −
A

if y < xA
2,k ;

Ry
R1 1


˜ 1
1
1

αxA
˜ x̃( 2 + k)dx̃ − y x̃( 2 − k)dx̃ = 0
1,k ( 2 + k) − c( 2 − k) + v − xA

if y ≥ xA
2,k .

x1,k

2,k

1,k

(A20)
Solving Equation (A20), we have

˜
xA
1,k =

r


 α2 + y 2 +

2
(1−2k)(2c+1−(xA
2,k ) )−4v
1+2k

q


 α2 + y 2 +

(1−2k)(2c+1−y 2 )−4v
1+2k

−α

−α

if y < xA
2,k ;
if y ≥

(A21)

xA
2,k .

˜
˜
˜
˜
A
A
A
A
If 0 < xA
1,k < y, x1,k = x1,k . If x1,k ≤ 0 or x1,k ≥ y, corner solutions apply. I.e.,

xA
1,k (y) =





0





˜
if xA
1,k ≤ 0;

˜
xA
1,k






y

˜
if 0 < xA
1,k < y;

(A22)

˜
if xA
1,k ≥ y.

Rewriting Equations (A21) and (A22) in a dense format obtains Equation (A18).
A
With Equations (A17) and (A18), we see immediately that xA
2,k is increasing in k and x1,k (y)
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is decreasing in k, since (1 − 2k) is decreasing in k and (1 + 2k) is increasing in k.

The following lemma further investigates the platform’s optimal content moderation strategy given users’ response.
Lemma A.2. Let yˆkA ≡

r
max{0,

2
4v−(1−2k)(2c+1−(xA
2,k ) )
}.
1+2k

The optimal level of content

moderation under advertising revenues (ykA∗ ) can be characterized by the following:
ˆA
A
A∗
A
Case 1. If k ≥ k, then xA
2,k = 1, and yk is (a) 1 if k < k1 , and (b) yk if k ≥ k1 .
A
A
A∗
A
Case 2. If k < k and yˆkA < xA
2,k , then x2,k < 1, and yk is (a) x2,k if k < k2 , and (b)

yˆkA if k ≥ k2A .
A∗
Case 3. If k < k and yˆkA ≥ xA
2,k , then the market can be fully covered with any yk ∈

ˆA
[xA
2,k , yk ],
where k1A , k2A are constant.
In Case 3, there are multiple maximizers. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that the
platform will choose the lowest ykA∗ = xA
2,k (the most strict policy) to make the platform as
moderate as possible.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Since Case 1 (xA
2,k = 1) is just a special case of Case 2, we only
ˆA
A∗
A
A∗
need to show the following: When yˆkA < xA
2,k , yk = x2,k if k < k0 and yk = yk if k > k0 ,
ˆA
A∗
A
where k0 is a constant; when yˆkA ≥ xA
2,k , any yk ∈ [x2,k , yk ] can make the market fully
covered (X A∗ = 1).
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If y > xA
2,k , then
r
xA
1,k =
=

(1 − 2k)(2c + 1 − y 2 ) − 4v
}} − α
1 + 2k
(2c + 1)(1 − 2k) + 4ky 2 − 4v
α2 + max{0, min{y(y + 2α),
}} − α
1 + 2k

α2 + max{0, y 2 + min{2αy,
r

A
is increasing in y, and thus the user base 1 − xA
1,k is decreasing in y, so any y > x2,k cannot

be an optimal choice.
˜
ˆA
ˆA
A
If y < xA
2,k , note that x1,k ≥ 0 is equivalent to y ≥ yk where yk =

r

2
4v−(1−2k)(2c+1−(xA
2,k ) )
1+2k

˜
is determined through solving for y from xA
1,k = 0 (which is also equivalent to U (0) = 0, by
˜ 31 Any y < yˆA also cannot be an optimal choice because if y < yˆA then
definition of xA
k
k
1,k ).
A
xA
1,k = 0 so the user base is just y + 1 − x2,k which is increasing in y.

Therefore, we only consider y ∈ [yˆkA , xA
2,k ]. In this case,

y
y
r
=: ζ(1 − L(k)
), where
A 2
α2 +y 2 +

(1−2k)(2c+1−(x

2,k

∂πkA
∂y

=

A
∂ζ(y−xA
1,k (y)+1−x2,k )
∂y


= ζ 1−

) )−4v

1+2k

s
L(k) ≡

α2 + y 2 +

2
(1 − 2k)(2c + 1 − (xA
2,k ) ) − 4v

1 + 2k

.
∂π A

k
Note that xA
2,k is increasing in k and thus L(k) is decreasing in k. Therefore, ∂y is
p
∂π A
decreasing in k. Furthermore, ∂yk |k= 1 < 0 because L( 12 ) = y 2 + α2 − 2v < y since
2
√
∂πkA
S
A
α < α < α = 2v. ∂y |k=0 > 0 because

q
2
y 2 + α2 + 2c + 1 − 4v − (xA
2,k=0 )
q
p
= y 2 + α2 + 1 + 2c − 4v − ( α2 + 1 + 2c − 4v − α)2
q
p
> y 2 + α2 + 1 + 2c − 4v − ( α2 + 1 + 2c − 4v)2

L(0) =

= y.
31

If there is no real number solution to this equation, we set yˆkA = 0 without loss of generality.
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So there exists k0 such that

∂πkA
∂y

> 0 when k < k0 and

∂πkA
∂y

< 0 when k > k0 . Since

A∗ = xA when k < k and y A∗ = yˆA when
y ∈ [yˆkA , xA
0
2,k ], we know that the optimal yk
2,k
k
k

k > k0 .
Note that if yˆkA > xA
2,k , it simply means that the market can be fully covered by choosing
ˆA
ˆA
any ykA∗ ∈ [xA
2,k , yk ]. This is because every user with x ≤ y participates when y ≤ yk , and
every user with x ≥ xA
2,k participates regardless of the choice of y.

Lemma A.2 indicates that unless the market is fully covered, there are generally two potential levels of content moderation that the platform can choose. As the technology becomes
more accurate, the platform tends to choose the higher level of content moderation (a
smaller y).32 Meanwhile, it points out the possibility that the market is fully covered when
the technology is imperfect, and thus the possibility that an imperfect technology may
enlarge the market for the platform.
A.3.2. Subscription Revenue Model
Similar to the advertising case, Lemma A.3 gives the full characterization of the user equilibrium under advertising, given a content moderation policy y and subscription fee p.
Lemma A.3. Suppose the subscription fee p is given. For a subscription-supported platform, when k ∈ [0, 12 ] and the platform does content moderation, there exists xS2,k (p) ∈ (0, 1]
such that all users in [xS2,k (p), 1] participate in the platform. In particular,
r
xS2,k (p)

= min{1,

α2 + 1 +

2c(1 + 2k) − 4(v − p)
− α}.
1 − 2k

(A23)

Furthermore, for any y ∈ [0, 1], there exists xS1,k (y, p) ∈ [0, y] such that if y < xS2,k (p), the
user set of the platform X S is [xS1,k (y, p), y] ∪ [xS2,k (p), 1]; if y ≥ xS2,k (p), X S is [xS1,k (y, p), 1].
32

y

A∗

Note that this statement is about the choice between two levels for a given k and that it does not mean
is decreasing in k.
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In particular,
q
S
2


 α2 + max 0, y 2 + min{2αy, (1−2k)(2c+1−(x2,k (p)) )−4(v−p) } − α
1+2k
S
x1,k (y, p) = q

 α2 + max 0, y 2 + min{2αy, (1−2k)(2c+1−y2 )−4(v−p) } − α
1+2k

if y < xS2,k (p);
if y ≥ xS2,k (p).
(A24)

Proof of Lemma A.3. The proof of Lemma A.3 is the same as that of Lemma A.1 except
that we change v to v − p.
Given the response of users, we next derive the optimal content moderation policy y S∗ and
pricing pS∗ .
The following lemma describes the optimal level of content moderation, y S∗ (p), for any
given p.
Lemma A.4. Let yˆkS (p) ≡

r
max{0,

2
4(v−p)−(1−2k)(2c+1−(xS
2,k (p)) )
}.
1+2k

The optimal level of

content moderation under subscription revenues (ykS∗ (p)) can be characterized by the following:
Case 1. If p > p1,k , then xS2,k (p) = 1, and ykS∗ (p) is (a) 1 if k < k1S , and (b) yˆkS (p) if
k ≥ k1S .
Case 2. If p2,k < p ≤ p1,k , then xS2,k (p) < 1, and ykS∗ (p) is (a) xS2,k (p) if k < k2S , and (b)
yˆkS (p) if k ≥ k2S .
Case 3. If p ≤ p2,k , then the market can be fully covered with any ykS∗ (p) ∈ [xS2,k (p), yˆkS (p)].
where k1S , k2S are constants, and p1,k , p2,k are constants when k is given.
Proof of Lemma A.4. The proof can be built on that of Lemma A.2. The only difference
here is that p is another decision variable of the platform, so whether xS2,k (p) < 1 depends
not only on the technology accuracy k but also on the pricing of the platform. Therefore,
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only the condition for each of the three cases will change.
If xS2,k (p) = 1, which is equivalent to

q
α2 + 1 +

2c(1+2k)−4(v−p)
1−2k

− α > 1 ⇔ p > v + α( 12 −

k) − c( 12 + k), no users with x > y participate in the platform. Let
1
1
p1,k ≡ v + α( − k) − c( + k),
2
2

(A25)

and we have found the condition for Case 1.
If xS2,k (p) < 1, let yˆkS (p) be the content moderation strategy such that U (0) − p = 0.
r
2
4(v−p)−(1−2k)(2c+1−(xS
2,k (p)) ) 33
ˆ
S
Solving it, we have y (p) =
. We then only need to check
k

1+2k

whether yˆkS (p) < xS2,k (p). If so, it corresponds to Case 2; otherwise, it corresponds to Case
3. By Equation (A23), we know that when xS2,k (p) < 1,
2/(1−2k)
>
xS
2,k (p)+α
dyˆS (p)

sign(

k

dp

dxS
2,k (p)
dp

=

2/(1−2k)
q

α2 +1+

2c(1+2k)−4(v−p)
1−2k

=

0 so xS2,k (p) is increasing in p. Furthermore,

) = sign(

2
d[4(v−p)−(1−2k)(2c+1−(xS
2,k (p)) )]
)
dp

xS
2,k (p)

sign(−4 + 4 xS

2,k (p)+α

= sign(−4 + (1 − 2k)2xS2,k (p)

dxS
2,k (p)
)
dp

=

) < 0, so yˆkS (p) is decreasing in p. Therefore, the condition yˆkS (p) ≶

xS2,k (p) is equivalent to p ≷ p2,k , which gives the conditions for Cases 2 and 3. Solving for
p2,k by setting yˆkS (p2,k ) = xS2,k (p2,k ), we have

p2,k

p

2α(1 − 2k)k 8ck(2k + 1) + α2 (1 − 2k)2
1 c 12k 2 + 1
+
=v − −
4
2(2k + 1)
(2k + 1)2



8k
1
.
+ k 1 − 4α2 1 −
2
(2k + 1)2

(A26)

We can see from Lemma A.4 that similar to the advertising model case, there are two
potential levels of content moderation and the one with more moderation (smaller y) is
more preferred as k increases. Also, we can see that when price is too high, there are no
users more extreme than y who participate in the platform. Denote the associated profits in
33

If there is no real number solution to this equation, we set yˆkS (p) = 0 without loss of generality.
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Cases 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 2(b), and 3 as πk1a (p), πk1b (p), πk2a (p), πk2b (p), and πk3 (p), respectively.
It is clear that

πkS∗ = max{ max πk1a (p), max πk1b (p),
p>p1,k

p>p1,k

max

p2,k <p≤p1,k

πk2a (p),

max

p2,k <p≤p1,k

πk2b (p), max πk3 (p)}.
p≤p2,k

(A27)

A.4. Numerically Solving for Equilibrium in Imperfect Technology Case
Lemmas A.1 to A.4 in Appendix A.3 give the analytical characterization of the equilibrium
in the imperfect technology case. However, to fully solve the equilibrium (especially for
the subscription case) and to carry out any further analysis based on the equilibrium are
analytically challenging, since the expressions are so complicated that only implicit functions
can be provided for equilibrium characterization. Note that the range of each exogenous
variable in our model is bounded (α ∈ [0, 1], v ∈ [0, 21 ], and c ∈ [v, α + 2v] ⊂ [0, 2]), so
we can numerically compute the results exhaustively. For each variable, we discretize the
range with a grid of 0.05, and enumerate all possible values within the given range. In
other words, for α and v, we have values of 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, ..., 0.95, and 1; for c, we
have 0, 0.05, ..., 1.95, and 2. For each combination of the parameters, which is denoted
as a tuple (α, v, c), we further check whether the following two conditions are satisfied: (1)
q
S
v ≤ c ≤ α + 2v and (2) α ≤ α , which is equivalent to πS (y = 2v
3 ) ≥ πS (y = 1). We only
proceed if both of them are satisfied.
Then, for any given tuple (α, v, c), we can find out the optimal y A∗ (in the advertising
case) or y S∗ and p∗ (in the subscription case) as a function of k. For k, we also enumerate
all possible values between [0, 21 ], with a grid of 0.01. To make the search algorithm more
efficient, we leverage the analytical results in Appendix A.3.
A.4.1. Advertising
For the advertising case, given any (α, v, c) and k, we can directly get the optimal ykA∗ based
on the analytical solution provided by Lemma A.2. Based on Lemma A.2, we know that
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the optimal content moderation policy ykA∗ is either
r
ykA∗

=

xA
2,k

≡ min{1,

or

s
ykA∗ = yˆkA ≡

max{0,

α2 + 1 +

2c(1 + 2k) − 4v
− α},
1 − 2k

2
4v − (1 − 2k)(2c + 1 − (xA
2,k ) )

1 + 2k

},

whichever gives the largest user base. The user base is calculated as X A∗ ≡ 1 − xA
2,k +
A∗
A
34 We thus
y A∗ − xA
1,k (y ), where the expression for x1,k (y) is given by Equation (A18).
A
also determine the equilibrium user configuration (i.e., xA
1,k and x2,k ) and the equilibrium

profit (user base) of the platform when it conducts content moderation. Note that we also
need to compare this optimal user base (XkA∗ ) when conducting content moderation with
the user base when no moderation is conducted at all (denoted as X0A ), to see whether the
equilibrium strategy is ykA∗ or simply no content moderation. The technology accuracy does
not matter when no content moderation is conducted, so the user base

X0A = 1 + α −

p

α2 + 1 − 2v,

which is given in Proposition 1.
So far, we have solved the imperfect technology equilibrium for a platform under advertising,
and also calculated the equilibrium quantities.
A.4.2. Subscription
For the subscription case, given any (α, v, c) and k, solving for the equilibrium needs more
work. Lemma A.4 only provides a partial equilibrium for any given subscription fee p. To
find out the optimal p∗k as well as the associated ykS∗ , we do the following numerical analysis.
There are 5 subcases in Lemma A.4 (Cases 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 2(b), and 3). We numerically
34

In Case 3 of Lemma A.2, there are multiple maximizers. Based on the tie-breaking rule, we know that
A∗
A
ˆA
ˆA
if xA
2,k and yk induce the same profit for the platform, it chooses yk = min{x2,k , yk }.

109

solve a constrained maximization problem over p for each subcase. Let πk1a (p), πk1b (p),
πk2a (p), πk2b (p), and πk3 (p) denote the associated profits in Cases 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), 2(b), and
3, respectively. Based Lemma A.4, we can write out the expressions for the profit (objective
function) as well as the constraints in each subcase:
• Case 1(a):
– Objective function: πk1a (p) = p(1 − xS1,k (1, p)).
– Constraints: p > p1,k , p > 0.
• Case 1(b):
– Objective function:

πk1b (p)

= pyˆkS (p) = p

q
max{0, 4(v−p)−(1−2k)2c
}.
1+2k

– Constraints: p > p1,k , p > 0.
• Case 2(a):
– Objective function: πk2a (p) = p(1 − xS1,k (xS2,k , p)).
– Constraints: p ≤ p1,k , p > p2,k , p > 0.
• Case 2(b):
– Objective function: πk2b (p) = p(yˆkS (p) + 1 − xS2,k (p))
r
= p( max{0,

2
4(v−p)−(1−2k)(2c+1−(xS
2,k (p)) )
}
1+2k

– Constraints: p ≤ p1,k , p > p2,k , p > 0.
• Case 3:
– Objective function: πk3 (p) = p.
– Constraints: p ≤ p2,k , p > 0.
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+ 1 − xS2,k (p)).

where the expressions for xS2,k (p), xS1,k (y, p), p1,k and p2,k are given by Equations (A23),
(A24), (A25) and (A26), respectively. Each optimization problem is solved by a direct
search algorithm, which is implemented by the NMaximize function in Mathematica.35
Then we find the maximum across all the subcases (see Equation (A27)), which gives the
optimal y S∗ and p∗ , as well as the optimal profit when the platform conducts content moderation. Again, we compare this profit with the profit when no moderation is conducted.
If the latter is larger, no content moderation is conducted in equilibrium. Based on Proposition 2, we know that the optimal profit when no content moderation is conducted, π0S , is
given by
π0S = p∗1 (1 + α −
where p∗1 ≡

1
9

h

q
α2 + 1 − 2(v − p∗1 )),

i
p
(1 + α) 2(2 − 3v + 2α2 + α) − 2(1 − 3v + α2 − α) .

A.4.3. Social Planner
For the social planner’s case, users’ response to a given content moderation y is the same
as that for a platform under advertising, so all the results in Lemma A.1 hold for the social
A
P
planner. In other words, the marginal users xP2,k ≡ xA
2,k and x1,k (y) ≡ x1,k (y), where the

expressions are given in Equations (A17) and (A18). The only difference for a social planner
is the objective function, which is no longer the size of user base, but the total welfare of
the users, which we denote as Wk (y). As an extension of Equation (2.11) to the imperfect
technology case, we have
Z y
 1

1
1
1
1
1

2

( + k)αx − ( − k)c + v − ( + k) (y 2 − x2 ) − ( − k) (1 − (xP

2,k ) ) dx


2
2
2
2
2
2
xP

1,k (y)

Z 1 



1
1
1
1



+
( − k)αx − ( + k)c + v − ( − k) (1 − x2 ) dx
if y < xP
2,k ,

P
2
2
2
2
x2,k
Wk (y) = Z y
 1

1
1
1 2
1
1

2
2


(
+
k)αx
−
(
−
k)c
+
v
−
(
+
k)
(y
−
x
)
−
(
−
k)
(1
−
y
)
dx

 xP (y) 2
2
2
2
2
2

1,k

Z 1




1
1
1
1

2

+
(
−
k)αx
−
(
+
k)c
+
v
−
(
−
k)
(1
−
x
)
dx
if y ≥ xP

2,k .
2
2
2
2
y
35

NMaximize function in Mathematica uses one of the four direct search algorithms (Nelder-Mead, differential evolution, simulated annealing, and random search), then fine-tunes the solution by using a combination
of KKT solution, the interior point, and a penalty method. Source: https://reference.wolfram.com/la
nguage/tutorial/ConstrainedOptimizationComparison.html.
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The optimal moderation strategy under imperfect technology ykP ∗ ∈ [0, 1] maximizes Wk (y).
Given any (α, v, c) and k, the optimization problem is solve by a direct search algorithm,
which is implemented by the NMaximize function in Mathematica.
Note that we also need to compare this optimal optimal social welfare when conducting
content moderation with the social welfare when no moderation is conducted at all (denoted
as W0 ), to see whether the equilibrium strategy is ykP ∗ or simply no content moderation.
The social welfare without content moderation is given by
1




1
2
v−
1 − x + αx dx
W0 = √
2
α2 −2v+1−α
 p



p
1  p 2
= α2
α − 2v + 1 − α + α2 − 2v + 1 + v 3α − 2 α2 − 2v + 1 + 3 − 1 ,
3
Z

which comes from Equation (2.11) by plugging in y = 1.

So far, under each revenue model or the social planner’s problem, we have now developed a
dataframe where each row corresponds to a combination of α, v, c, and k. The columns in
this dataframe document the equilibrium content moderation strategy yk∗ , the equilibrium
profit πk∗ (or social welfare Wk∗ ), and the equilibrium user configuration (the marginal users
x∗1,k and x∗2,k ). In other words, we obtain three dataframes with the following attributes:
A∗
• Dataframe A (advertising): α, v, c, k, ykA∗ , πkA∗ , xA∗
1,k , and x2,k ;
S∗
• Dataframe S (subscription): α, v, c, k, ykS∗ , πkS∗ , xS∗
1,k , and x2,k ;

• Dataframe P (social planner): α, v, c, k, ykP ∗ , Wk∗ , xP1,k∗ , and xP2,k∗ .
With these tables, we can numerically show all the claims in the Propositions in our main
text.
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A.5. Preliminary Empirical Evidence
In this appendix, we provide some preliminary empirical evidence for the results generated
from our theoretical analysis. Since content moderation is an increasingly important topic
getting attention from users, managers, and policy makers, content moderation policies of
social media platforms are ever-evolving and dynamic. Therefore, it is difficult to collect
a data set that is comprehensive of all platforms. In this analysis, we rely on a list of 103
social media platforms composed by Influencer Marketing Hub.36
For each social media platform, we collected the texts of their content moderation policy
and also information about their major revenue models. The former was copied from a
platform’s community guidelines or terms of use. The latter was found by searching “[name
of platform] business model” or “how does [name of platform] make money” on Google
and referring to the relevant search results. Among the 103 platforms, we focus on those
that are published in English language and precluded instant messaging platforms such as
WhatsApp since they do not fit our modeling context. We also excluded platforms whose
content moderation policy information could not be found and/or revenue models are not
reported or ambiguous. This reduced the number of social media platforms we analyze to
67.
We hired independent graders from Mechanical Turk to read and decode the text of content
moderation policy of each platform. Specifically, each grader was asked to give answers to a
set of yes/no questions (given in Table 4) after reading the entire text of a platform’s content
moderation policy. The first question (Q1) asks whether a platform moderates content at
all. Questions Q2-Q10 ask if the platform moderates particular types of content potentially
offensive to some users37 .
At least five graders were assigned to each platform’s content moderation policy. An
36
“101+ Social Media Sites You Need to Know in 2021.” https://influencermarketinghub.com/socia
l-media-sites/.
37
These categories were summarized by the researchers after reading the content moderation policies of
around 30 platforms.
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Table 4: Questions for Graders

Moderation or not:
Content categories:

Does [name of platform]...
Q1: ... remove any content posted by users?
Q2: ... remove sexual/adult content such as nudity?
Q3: ... remove illegal content such as terrorism, drug, arm selling,
and etc.?
Q4: ... remove hate content toward a group (based on race,
gender, sexual orientation, and etc.)?
Q5: ... remove content related to harassment/bullying/threats?
Q6: ... remove content related to violence/blood/injury?
Q7: ... remove spam or repeated content?
Q8: ... remove content that violates others’ privacy?
Q9: ... remove promotional or self-promotional content?
Q10: ... remove misleading information such as fake pictures,
news, and etc.?

attention-check question saying “regardless of the true answer, check ‘No’ for this question”
was also included in the survey. We precluded the responses which missed this attentioncheck question. To incentivize graders to give quality answers, we also gave bonus to graders
if at least 80% of their responses were consistent with the rest of the graders.
In Propositions 1 and 2, we claimed that a platform under advertising is more likely to
conduct content moderation and when conducting content moderation, a platform under
subscription does so more aggressively. We show some preliminary evidence of these results
based on our data.
Among the 67 platforms, only two platforms do not conduct content moderation (based on
the majority response to Q1) and they both adopt subscription as revenue models. For the
remaining 65 platforms, we count how many of the 9 categories of content each platform
moderates by aggregating the graders’ responses. We use two different ways of aggregating
questions Q2-Q10:
1. Percentage (PER): the score a platform gets for Qi (i = 2, 3, ..., 10) is the share of
graders who respond “yes” to this question.
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2. Majority rule (MR): the score a platform gets for Qi (i = 2, 3, ..., 10) is 1 if at least
50% of the graders respond “yes” to this question, and 0 otherwise.
Then we sum up all the scores a platform gets across questions Q2-Q10, which gives
the number of content categories each platform moderates, denoted as categoriesP ER or
categoriesM R . A higher categoriesP ER or categoriesM R indicates a stricter content moderation policy. We also define a dummy variable AD for each platform which takes the
value 1 if the platform’s major revenue source is advertising, and 0 if subscription.
We run the following regressions across the 65 platforms which conducts content moderation:

categoriesP ER = β0 + β1 AD + ϵ,

(A28)

categoriesM R = β0′ + β1′ AD + ϵ′ .

(A29)

Based on our theoretical results, a platform under subscription moderates content more
aggressively than one under advertising given that it moderates content, so we expect the
signs of β1 and β1′ to be negative. The regression results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Regression Results
Dependent variable:
categoriesP ER

categoriesM R

(1)

(2)

AD

−0.235
(0.294)

−0.751∗∗
(0.365)

Constant

7.365∗∗
(0.213)

8.516∗∗
(0.264)

65
0.010

65
0.063

Observations
R2

∗∗ p<0.05

Note:

We see that the directions of estimated β1 and β1′ are as expected, which provides pre-
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liminary support for our theoretical predictions. The estimate based on the majority rule
aggregation is significant and the one based on percentage aggregation is in the same direction but less precisely estimated. We anticipate the categoriesP ER measure to be noisier
than categoriesM R since the latter focuses on the response on which the graders reach a
consensus and the former does not require that. This would explain categoriesP ER measure
is less precisely estimated.

B. Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 9. We derive the equilibrium via backward induction. We first
examine the last stage pricing subgame, after the brands’ adoption decisions are given,
assuming a technology level ξ. We abstract away from the adoption fee for now and include
them in the first stage of the game.
Consider the subgame where both brands adopt the new channel in the previous stage. We
have the following observations about the equilibrium configuration:
1. If there are any consumers who shop in the technology channel for a brand (without
loss of generality, say Brand A), they must have a continuous mass. This is because
the difference in the utility from shopping in one brand’s technology channel and its
traditional channel is single-peaked in x: VA1 (x) − VA0 (x) = ξ − |x − 21 | − p1A + p0A .
2. If VA1 (x1 ) > VB0 (x1 ) and x1 > x2 , then VA1 (x2 ) > VB0 (x2 ) because
1
VA1 (x) − VB0 (x) =(V − tx − p1A + ξ − |x − |) − (V − t(1 − x) − p0B )
2
1
= − 2tx − |x − | − p1A + p0B + ξ
2
1
= − (2t ± 1)x ± − p1A + p0B + ξ
2
is decreasing in x (since t > 21 , 2t ± 1 > 0). So if a consumer at x0 prefers buying
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in A’s technology channel over buying in B’s traditional channel, then any consumer
located to the left of this consumer (i.e., ∀x < x0 ) should have the same preference
order on A’s technology channel and B’s traditional channel.
3. There cannot be an equilibrium where one brand serves all the consumers who have
access to the technology channel. If, for instance, Brand B does not sell to any
consumers who have access to the technology channels, it would have an incentive to
simply deviate to a price same as that of A in the new channel, because by doing so it
can steal some consumers who shop in Brand A’s technology channel and do strictly
better.
Based on the three statements above, the only feasible equilibrium configurations are the
two shown in Figure 29.
Figure 29: Possible Equilibrium Configurations
(a) Configuration 1

x̃1A x̃11 x̃12
α

x̃1B
B1

A1
A0

1−α
0

B0
1

x̃0
(b) Configuration 2

x̃1A
α

A1

B1

A0

1−α

x̃1B

x̃1

B0

0

x̃0

1

In Configuration 1 (Figure 29(a)), there exists a consumer indifferent between buying in
A’s traditional channel and in B’s technology channel (x̃11 ). The marginal consumers, x̃1A ,
x̃0 , x̃11 , x̃12 , x̃1B , are subject to the constraint that 0 ≤ x̃1A ≤ x̃0 ≤ x̃11 ≤ x̃12 ≤ x̃1B and are
respectively defined by the following equations:
V − tx̃1A − p0A = V − tx̃1A − p1A + ξ − ( 21 − x̃1A );
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V − tx̃0 − p0A = V − t(1 − x̃0 ) − p0B ;
V − tx̃11 − p1A + ξ − ( 21 − x̃11 ) = V − t(1 − x̃11 ) − p0B ;
V − t(1 − x̃12 ) − p0B = V − t(1 − x̃12 ) − p1B + ξ − ( 12 − x̃12 );
V − t(1 − x̃1B ) − p0B = V − t(1 − x̃1B ) − p1B + ξ − (x̃1B − 12 ).
The optimization problems of Brand A and Brand B become:


max p0A x̃1A + (1 − α)(x̃0 − x̃1A ) + p1A α(x̃11 − x̃1A ), and

p0A ,p1A




max p0B α 1 − x̃1B + x̃12 − x̃11 + (1 − α)(1 − x̃0 ) + p1B α x̃1B − x̃12 .

p0B ,p1B

In solving these problems, we take advantage of the fact that the constraint x̃11 ≤ x̃12 always
binds. This is because if we assume x̃11 < x̃12 and solve the FOC’s, we will get x̃11 =
3(1−α)(1−2ξ)+24t2 −2t(3−α)(3−2ξ)
12(2t−1)(α+2t−1)

and x̃12 =

1−ξ
2 ,

so x̃12 − x̃11 =

−3(1−α)(2t−1)−4ξt(2α+6t−3)
12(2t−1)(α+2t−1)

< 0,

which is a contradiction. Thus, it must be x̃11 = x̃12 in the equilibrium, expressed by the
consumer indifferent between VA1 and VB1 . This implies that there exists no consumers
indifferent between buying in A’s traditional channel and in B’s technology channel (x̃11 ),
or, Configuration 1 is infeasible.
In Configuration 2 (Figure 29(b)), given a set of prices (p0A , p1A , p0B , p1B ), the equilibrium configuration is pinned down by indifferent consumers x̃1A , x̃1 , x̃1B and x̃0 . In this configuration,
0 ≤ x̃1A ≤ x̃0 ≤ x̃1B ≤ 1 and x̃1A ≤ x̃1 ≤ x̃1B .
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Since both brands have adopted a technology channel featuring DS, by definition, we have
V − tx̃0 − p0A = V − t(1 − x̃0 ) − p0B

⇒

V − tx̃1 − p1A + ∆(x̃1 ) = V − t(1 − x̃1 ) − p1B + ∆(x̃1 )

⇒

1
V − tx̃1A − p0A = V − tx̃1A − p1A + ξ − ( − x̃1A )
2
1
V − t(1 − x̃1B ) − p0B = V − t(1 − x̃1B ) − p1B + ξ − (x̃1B − )
2

p0B − p0A + t
,
2t
p1 − p1A + t
,
x̃1 = B
2t
1
x̃1A = − (p0A − p1A + ξ),
2
1
x̃1B = + (p0B − p1B + ξ).
2

x̃0 =

⇒
⇒

We can thus find the demand for A and B and reformulate the brands’ maximization
problems:

max p0A x̃1A + (1 − α)(x̃0 − x̃1A ) + p1A α(x̃1 − x̃1A ).

p0A ,p1A

max p0B

p0B ,p1B




1 − x̃1B + (1 − α)(x̃1B − x̃0 ) + p1B α x̃1B − x̃1 .

Solving the FOC’s w.r.t. prices for the equilibrium prices yields:
0,(DS,DS)

pA

1,(DS,DS)

pA

1,(DS,DS)

= pB


α(1 − 2ξ) 
,
=t 1+
1 − α + 4t

(1 − α)(1 − 2ξ) 
.
=t 1−
1 − α + 4t

0,(DS,DS)

= pB

Plugging these prices back to get x̃0 , x̃1 , x̃1A , and x̃1B , we obtain:
1
x̃0,(DS,DS) = x̃1 = ,
2
(1
−
2ξ)(1
− α + 2t)
1,(DS,DS)
x̃A
=
,
2(1 − α + 4t)
(1 − 2ξ)(1 − α + 2t)
1,(DS,DS)
x̃B
=1−
.
2(1 − α + 4t)

1,(DS,DS)

To make sure that the equilibrium is feasible, we check whether 0 < x̃A
x̃1,(DS,DS) =

1
2)

1,(DS,DS)

< x̃B

1,(DS,DS)

< 1 holds. Note that x̃A

1,(DS,DS)

matically satisfied under our parameter space. x̃A

simultaneously satisfied due to the assumption that ξ < 21 .
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<

1
2

< x̃0,(DS,DS) (=

1,(DS,DS)

< x̃B

1,(DS,DS)

> 0 and x̃B

is auto< 1 are

We can now calculate the total profit of the two brands:
(DS,DS)

πA

(DS,DS)

= πB

=

t
α(1 − 2ξ)2 (1 − α + 2t) 
.
1+
2
(1 − α + 4t)2

(DS,DS)

From these expressions, it is easy to see that πA

(T,T )

− πA

tα(1−2ξ)2 (1−α+2t)
2(1−α+4t)2

=

> 0.

Suppose now that only Brand A adopts the new channel. Based on the same three observations stated at the very beginning of the proof and the assumption that t > 21 , the only
possible equilibrium configuration is shown in Figure 30.
Figure 30: Possible Equilibrium Configuration
x̃1A2

x̃1A1
α

A1
A0

1−α
0

B0
1

x̃0

Consumers in the shaded region buy Brand A in the technology channel. Consumers in the
unshaded region to the left of x̃0 buy Brand A in the traditional channel, while consumers
in the unshaded region to the right of x̃0 buy Brand B in the traditional channel. In this
equilibrium, x̃0 , x̃1A1 and x̃1A2 are determined by the following indifference conditions:
V − tx̃0 − p0A = V − t(1 − x̃0 ) − p0B
1
V − tx̃1A1 − p0A = V − tx̃1A1 − p1A + ξ − ( − x̃1A1 )
2
1
V − t(1 − x̃1A2 ) − p0B = V − tx̃1A2 − p1A + ξ − (x̃1A2 − )
2

p0B − p0A + t
,
2t
1
= − (p0A − p1A + ξ),
2
p0 − p1A + ξ + t + 12
= B
.
2t + 1

⇒

x̃0 =

⇒

x̃1A1

⇒

x̃1A2

The brands solve the following profit maximization problems:


max p0A x̃1A1 + (1 − α)(x̃0 − x̃1A1 ) + p1A α(x̃1A2 − x̃1A1 ).

p0A ,p1A

max p0B
p0B



1 − x̃1A2 + (1 − α)(x̃1A2 − x̃0 ) .
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Solving the F.O.C’s with respect to the equilibrium prices yields:
0,(DS,T )
pA
1,(DS,T )

pA

0,(DS,T )

pB



α t(9 − 2ξ) + 2(1 − α)(3 − ξ) 
=t 1+
,
6(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)
t
ξ
0,(DS,T )
,
= pA
+ −
2 4(1 − α + t)
t(6t − 2αξ + 3)
=
.
3(1 − α + 2t)

We then plug the equilibrium prices back into the expressions for x̃0 , x̃1A1 , and x̃1A2 . To make
sure that the equilibrium is feasible, we check that the conditions 0 < x̃1A1 < x̃0 < x̃1A2 < 1
and x̃1A1 < 1/2 < x̃1A2 hold, which gives us the following equilibrium existence condition:
7ξ + 10ξt + 3t 1
−
0 < α < min{
8ξ
8

s
(1 − 2t)2 +

3t(4ξt + 6ξ + 3t)
, 1}
ξ2

When t > 1/2, the inequality above is automatically satisfied.
Plugging in the above indifferent consumer locations and prices, the profit of the two brands
become:
(DS,T )

πB

(DS,T )

πA

t(3 − 2αξ + 6t)2
,
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t)
α(2ξ(1 − α + t) + 3t)(6ξ(1 − α + t) + t)
(DS,T )
(DS,T )
= πB
+
> πB
.
24(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)
=

Now, we can solve for the equilibrium for the adoption and pricing subgame, by comparing
the profit when both brands adopt the technology channel and when only brand A adopts.
t(3 − 2αξ + 6t)2
t
α(1 − 2ξ)2 (1 − α + 2t) 
−
1+
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t) 2
(1 − α + 4t)2
h


t
4α (1 − α)2 ξ((α − 9)ξ + 6) − 6 12ξ 2 + 4ξ − 9 t3
=
2
18(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)(1 − α + 4t)


 i
+ t2 2α 44ξ 2 − 12ξ − 9 − 108ξ 2 + 12ξ + 45 − (α − 1)t (26α − 54)ξ 2 − 12(α − 2)ξ + 9
.
(DS,T )

πB

(DS,DS)

− πB

=
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Denote the term inside the square brackets as h(t). Then one can easily calculate


h′ (t) = 4α (α − 1) (54 − 26α)ξ 2 + 12(α − 2)ξ − 9 − 18(4ξ(3ξ + 1) − 9)t2

+2t(2α(4ξ(11ξ − 3) − 9) + 12ξ(1 − 9ξ) + 45) ,
h′′ (t) = 4α(2(2α(4ξ(11ξ − 3) − 9) + 12ξ(1 − 9ξ) + 45) − 36(4ξ(3ξ + 1) − 9)t).

Note that h′′ (t) is a linear function of t, and the slope is −144α(4ξ(3ξ + 1) − 9) > 0 when
0 < ξ < 1/2, so h′′ (t) is increasing in t. Therefore, h′′ (t) > h′′ (0) = 8α(2α(4ξ(11ξ − 3) −
9) + 12ξ(1 − 9ξ) + 45). Also note that 2α(4ξ(11ξ − 3) − 9) + 12ξ(1 − 9ξ) + 45 is between
12ξ(1−9ξ)+45 and 2(4ξ(11ξ −3)−9)+12ξ(1−9ξ)+45 and both are positive when 0 < ξ <
1/2. Thus we have h′′ (t) > h′′ (0) > 0, i.e. h′ (t) is increasing in t. Therefore h′ (t) > h′ (0) =

4α((α − 1) (54 − 26α)ξ 2 + 12(α − 2)ξ − 9 ) which can be shown similarly to be positive.
(DS,T )

Following a similar procedure, one can show h(t) > 0, and thus πB
(DS,T )

This inequality, together with πA
(DS,T )

πA

(T,T )

− πA

(DS,T )

> πB

(T,T )

and πA

(DS,DS)

< πA

(DS,DS)

− πB

(DS,DS)

= πB

> 0.

, implies

> 0.

We have now found the equilibrium profit for each adoption strategy profile. See Table 6
for a summary of the equilibrium quantities in the three subgames. One interesting finding
(DS,T )

is πB

(DS,DS)

> πB

, this means that even if f is set as zero such that both brands can

freely adopt the technology, Brand B will not adopt it given that A adopts it. That is, there
is an asymmetry in adoption between the two brands, even if adoption is free.
Now, we solve for the first layer of the game, where the technology provider sets the fee and
technology level optimally. To finish proving the proposition, we first show the following
(DS,T )

claim: πA

(DS,T )

is increasing and πB

is decreasing in ξ. In words, when the DS technology

offers higher quality, the profit of the adopting brand increases and the profit of the other
brand decreases.
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Table 6: DS Case: Prices and Profits under Different Adoption Decisions
Only A adopts
TES channel


α t(9−2ξ)+2(1−α)(3−ξ)
 6(1−α+t)(1−α+2t)

α(3−2ξ)
t 1 + 3(1−α+2t)
t
p0A + 2ξ − 4(1−α+t)


t 1+

p0A
p0B
p1A
p1B

Both adopt
TES channel


t 1 + α(1−2ξ)
1−α+4t


α(1−2ξ)
t 1 + 1−α+4t


t 1 − (1−α)(1−2ξ)
1−α+4t


(1−α)(1−2ξ)
t 1 − 1−α+4t


α(1−2ξ)2 (1−α+2t)
t
1
+
2
(1−α+4t)2


α(1−2ξ)2 (1−α+2t)
t
1
+
2
(1−α+4t)2

>
>
>

NA

πA

πB +

πB

α(2ξ(1−α+t)+3t)(6ξ(1−α+t)+t)
24(1−α+t)(1−α+2t)
t(3−2αξ+6t)2
18(1+2t)(1−α+2t)

>
>

No TES
channel
>

t

>

t
NA
NA

>

t
2

>

t
2

To see this, recall
(DS,T )

πA

=

α(2ξ(1 − α + t) + 3t)(6ξ(1 − α + t) + t)
t(3 − 2αξ + 6t)2
+
.
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t)
24(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)

Taking the first derivative w.r.t. ξ yields:
(DS,T )

∂πA
∂ξ

=

8αξ(9(1 − α) + t(14(1 − α) + 18t + 13)) + 12αt(2t + 1)
.
72(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)
(DS,T )

It is clear that this expression is positive, so
(DS,T )

Similarly, it is easy to see that πB

=

∂πA
∂ξ

(DS,T )

> 0, i.e., πA

t(3−2αξ+6t)2
18(1+2t)(1−α+2t)

is increasing in ξ.

is decreasing in ξ.

If the technology channel features DS, for any given ξ and f , the profits of the firms are
determined by their adoption decisions:
(T,T )

• If neither of them adopts, their profits are both πA

(DS,DS)

• If both of them adopt, their profits are both πA
(DS,T )

• If only Brand A adopts, A’s profit is πA
(DS,T )

Since πB

(DS,DS)

> πB

(DS,DS)

= πA

(DS,DS)

> πA

= 2t .
− f.
(DS,T )

− f , and B’s profit is πB

.

− f , both firms adopting cannot be an

equilibrium. Whether one or no brand adopts depends on f . Specifically, the equilibrium
123

in the adoption game should be characterized as follows:
(DS,T )

If f ≤ πA

(T,T )

− πA

, one brand adopts the technology channel, and the technology

provider earns f ; otherwise, no brand adopts the technology channel, and the technology
provider earns 0.
(DS,T )

Therefore, for any fixed ξ the optimal f is πA
(DS,T )

By the claim above, we know that πA

−

t
2

(T,T )

− πA

(DS,T )

= πA

− 2t .

is also increasing in ξ. Thus, the optimal

level of ξ should reach the best possible (ξ ∗ = ξ), and the optimal fee is
(DS,T )

f DS∗ = πA

t
|ξ=ξ − .
2

Proof of Proposition 10. The equilibrium will be found by backward induction. We first
examine the last-stage subgame for pricing when the brands’ adoption decisions are given,
and the technology level is η. We ignore the adoption fee for now and discuss it when
solving for the first stage of the game.
First, in the subgame when both brands adopt the new channel, it is immediate that
(OC,OC)

p0A = p0B = p1A = p1B = t and πA

(OC,OC)

= πB

=

t
2

because the additional value from

the new channel is cancelled out when determining the indifferent consumer.
We then solve the other subgame when only one brand (say A) adopts the new channel,
with the equilibrium configuration shown in Figure 31, where the indifferent consumers are
p0B − p0A + t
,
2t
p0 − p1A + η + t
x̃1 = B
.
2t
x̃0 =

The fact that the new channel provides the same additional utility to every consumer ensure
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that this is the only possible equilibrium configuration.
Figure 31: OC Case; Only A Adopts the Technology Channel
x̃1
α

A1
A0

1−α

B0

0

x̃0

1

The maximization problem for the two brands becomes:

max p0A (1 − α)x̃0 + p1A αx̃1 ,

p0A ,p1A


maxp0B (1 − α)(1 − x̃0 ) + α(1 − x̃1 ) .
p0B

Solving for the first order conditions with respect to prices yields:
0,(OC,T )

pA

1,(OC,T )

pA

0,(OC,T )

pB

αη
,
6
(3 − α)η
, and
=t+
6
αη
.
=t−
3

=t−

The equilibrium profits are
(OC,T )

πA

=

1
(9 − 5α)αη 2 
t
36t + 24αη +
>
72
t
2

and
(OC,T )

πB

=

(3t − αη)2
t
< .
18t
2
(OC,T )

Comparing Equilibrium (OC, OC), (OC, T ), and (T, T ) yields that πB
(OC,OC)

πB

(T,T )

< πB

=

. Thus, both brands adopting the new channel is a subgame perfect equilibrium,

but only one brand adopting is not an equilibrium because B has the incentive to deviate to
adopting OC in the adoption stage. See Table 7 for a summary of the equilibrium quantities
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in the three subgames.
Table 7: OC Case: Prices and Profits under Different Adoption Decisions
One Brand (A)
Adopts TES channel
p0A

αη
6
αη
t− 3
+ (3−α)η
6

t−

p0B
p1A
p1B
πA

Both Brands channel
Adopt TES channel

t

<

t

=

t

<

t

=

t

>

t

=

(t)

t

=

(t)

t
2
t
2

=

t
2
t
2

NA
1
72



36t + 24αη +

(9−5α)αη 2
t



(3t−αη)2
18t

πB

Neither Brand
Adopts TES channel

>
<

=

Next, we solve for the first-stage equilibrium where the technology provider optimally
chooses the technology level and the adoption fee. If the technology channel features OC,
for any given η and f , the profits of the firms are determined by their adoption decisions:
(T,T )

• If neither of them adopts, each brand’s profit is πA

(OC,OC)

• If both of them adopt, their profits are both πA
(OC,T )

• If only Brand A adopts, A’s profit is πA

= 2t .
− f.
(OC,T )

− f , and B’s profit is πB

.

Whether one or two brands adopt depends on f . Specifically, if
(OC,OC)

f = f ≡ πA

(T,OC)

− πA

(OC,OC)

= πB

(OC,T )

− πB

=

αη 
αη 
1−
,
3
6t

both brands adopt the technology channel, and the provider earns 2f . If
(OC,T )

f = f ≡ πA

(T,T )

− πA

=

αη 
(9 − 5α)η 
1+
3
24t

(which is clearly greater than f ), both brands adopt the new channel, and the provider
earns f .
Since 2f − f =

αη(8t−(3+α)η)
24t

>

αη(8× 12 −(3+1) 12 )
24t

> 0, it is optimal for the provider to charge
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f and induce both brands to adopt the new channel, and it earns a profit of 2f .
It is easy to see that 2f is increasing in η when η ∈ [0, η]. Thus, the optimal η ∗ = η, which
represents the best possible technology. The optimal fee is thus

f OC∗ = f |η=η =

αη 
αη 
1−
|η=η .
3
6t

Proof of Proposition 11. The proposition compares ΠDS∗ and ΠOC∗ . From the proofs
of Propositions 9 and 10, if the technology provider provides DS, it will set the fee as f DS∗
and only one brand adopts the technology channel; if the technology provider provides OC,
it will set the fee as f OC∗ and both brands adopt the technology channel. Thus,

Π

DS∗

=f

DS∗


α 9(1 − α)2 + 120t3 + 4(45 − 29α)t2 + 2(1 − α)(39 − 7α)t
.
=
72(2t + 1)(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)
ΠOC∗ = 2f OC∗ =

α
α
(1 −
).
3
12t

With some algebra, we can calculate

Π

DS∗

−Π

OC∗

1
= α
72




9t
28t
2α
2
+
+
+
− 17 ,
1 − α + t 1 − α + 2t
t
1 + 2t

which can be positive or negative, depending on the values of α and t. In fact, ΠDS∗ −
√
ΠOC∗ > 0 can only hold when t < 12 ( 6 + 1) ≡ t α < α(t), which is because
d(ΠDS∗ − ΠOC∗ )
9t
28t
2
=
+
+ > 0,
2
2
dα
(1 − α + t)
(1 − α + 2t)
t
i.e., ΠDS∗ − ΠOC∗ is increasing in α. Note that

DS∗

(Π

−Π

OC∗

)|α=1


2 6t2 + 6t + 1
=
>0
t(2t + 1)
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and
(ΠDS∗ − ΠOC∗ )|α=0


3 4t2 − 4t − 5
,
=
(t + 1)(2t + 1)

√
which can be only less than zero if t < 12 ( 6 + 1) ≈ 1.72. Plotting out the regions where
ΠDS∗ − ΠOC∗ is positive or negative, we get Figure 12.

Proof of Proposition 12. We first abstract away from the adoption fee and analyze the
subgames where (1) both brands adopt and (2) only one brand adopts, separately.
Both brands adopt the new channel. Let the consumer who is indifferent between
Brands A and B be x0 in the traditional channel and x1 in the new channel, and let the
consumer of Brand A (B) who has access to the new channel and is indifferent between
purchasing from the traditional and new channels be x1A (x1B ).
Note that the physical constraint for this equilibrium is x1A ≥

1
2

− ξ and x1B ≤

1
2

+ ξ (see

Figure 13). Otherwise, according to the shape of ∆DS+OC , all the consumers who have
access to the new channel will purchase from that channel.
The expressions for the indifferent consumers are
p0B − p0A + t
,
2t
p1 − p1A + t
x1 = B
,
2t
1
x1A = − (p0A − p1A + ξ + η),
2
1
1
xB = + (p0B − p1B + ξ + η),
2
x0 =

128

and the brands’ problems are

max p0A ((1 − α)x0 + αx1A ) + p1A α(x1 − x1A ),

p0A ,p1A

max p0B ((1 − α)(1 − x0 ) + α(1 − x1B )) + p1B α(x1B − x1 ).

p0B ,p1B

Solving the equilibrium using FOC’s, we get
0,(In,In)

= pB

1,(In,In)

= pB

pA
pA

1,(In,In)

In equilibrium, xA
x1B ≤

1
2

=

0,(In,In)

1,(In,In)

tα(1 − 2(ξ + η))
,
1 − α + 4t
t(1 − α)(1 − 2(ξ + η))
=t−
,
1 − α + 4t

=t+

(1−α+2t)(1−2(ξ+η))
.
2(1−α+4t)
1,(In,In)

+ ξ can be reduced to only xA

By symmetry, constraints x1A ≥

≥

1
2

1
2

− ξ and

− ξ. Plugging in the equilibrium prices,

t(1−2ξ)
we know that it is equivalent to η ≤ − 1−α+2t
≤ 0, which is not allowed by our assumptions

on η, ξ. Therefore, this equilibrium cannot be supported and thus all users who have access
to the new channel buy from it. So in equilibrium, it can only be
0,(In,In)

pA

0,(In,In)

= pB

1,(In,In)

= pA

1,(In,In)

= pB

=t

and
(In,In)

πA

(In,In)

= πB

t
= .
2

(B1)

One can check neither of the two brands has the incentive to deviate. In other words, if both
brands adopt the new technology channel, they compete out the benefit the new channel
provides.
Only one brand (A) adopts the new channel There are two possible configurations in
equilibrium, depending on the location of the consumer who is indifferent between purchasing Brand A from the new channel and Brand B from the traditional channel (denoted as
x1A2 ). In the first configuration,

1
2

< x1A2 ≤ 12 +ξ, which means that the indifferent consumer

x1A2 is on the “slope” in Figure 13. In the second configuration, x1A2 >
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1
2

+ ξ, which means

that the indifferent consumer x1A2 is on the “flat part” in Figure 13. One can check there is no
equilibrium if x1A2 < 21 : If there is such an equilibrium, then x1A2 =
for the FOC’s gives p0A =
and p0B =

t(−2α(η+ξ)+6t−3)
.
3(α+2t−1)

t(α(−2η−2ξ+3)+12t−6)
,
6(α+2t−1)

p1A =

This further gives x1A2 =

η+ξ−p1A +p0B +t− 21
2t−1

. Solving

3(α−1)(2η+2ξ−1)+24t2 −2(α−3)t(2η+2ξ−3)
12(α+2t−1)

,

3(α−1)(2η+2ξ−1)+24t2 −2(α−3)t(2η+2ξ−3)
.
12(2t−1)(α+2t−1)

Using Methematica’s Reduce function, we show that x1A2 <

1
2

reduces to an empty set under

our model assumptions (t > 21 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ η ≤ 12 , and 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 21 ).
ˆ
ˆ will be given shortly, there
In addition, if we restrict ξ ≥ ξ(η),
where the expression for ξ(·)
is only an equilibrium with the first configuration.
First consider the equilibrium where there is a consumer who is indifferent between purchasing Brand A from the new channel and traditional channel, denoted as x1A1 . The expressions
for the indifferent consumers x1A1 and x1A2 are
1
− (p0A − p1A + ξ + η),
2
1 p0 − p1A + ξ + η
= + B
.
2
2t + 1

x1A1 =
x1A2

The brands’ problems are


max p0A (1 − α)x0 + αx1A1 + p1A α(x1A2 − x1A1 ),

p0A ,p1A



maxp0B (1 − α)(1 − x0 ) + α(1 − x1A2 ) .
p0B

Solving the equilibrium using FOC’s, we get
0,(In,Out)
pA
1,(In,Out)

pA

0,(In,Out)

pB



α t(9 − 2ξ − 2η) + 2(1 − α)(3 − ξ − η) 
=t 1+
,
6(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)
ξ+η
t
0,(In,Out)
−
,
= pA
+
2
4(1 − α + t)
t(6t − 2α(ξ + η) + 3)
=
.
3(1 − α + 2t)
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and thus
(In,Out)

πA

(In,Out)

πB

α(2(ξ + η)(1 − α + t) + 3t)(6(ξ + η)(1 − α + t) + t)
,
24(1 − α + t)(1 − α + 2t)
t(3 − 2α(ξ + η) + 6t)2
.
=
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t)
(In,Out)

= πB

+

Note that in equilibrium, the constraint x1A1 ≥
the other constraint x1A2 ≤

1
2

1
2

− ξ is reduced to η ≤ ξ −

+ ξ is reduced to η ≤ η2 where η2 > ξ −

t
2(1−α+t)

t
2(1−α+t)

binding. Therefore, the constraint that makes this equilibrium holds is η ≤ ξ −
ξ≥η+

and

so it is not
t
2(1−α+t)

or

t
2(1−α+t) .

If ξ < η +

t
2(1−α+t) ,

the constraint x1A1 ≥

1
2

− ξ is violated, and by the shape of ∆DS+OC ,

all users to the left of x1A2 buy A from the new channel in equilibrium. Therefore, the
maximization problem of A becomes


max p0A (1 − α)x0 + p1A α(x1A2 ),

p0A ,p1A

and the equilibrium prices are
0,(In,Out)

pA

1,(In,Out)

pA

0,(In,Out)

pB

t(3 + 6t − 2α(2η − ξ))
,
3(1 − α + 2t)
t(3 + 6t − 2α(2η − ξ))
+ η,
=
3(1 − α + 2t)
t(6t − 2α(ξ + η) + 3)
=
,
3(1 − α + 2t)
=

and profits are
(In,Out)

πA

(In,Out)

πB

α(3(1 − α)η(2ξ + 1) + 8t(η + ξ))
,
6(1 − α + 2t)
t(3 − 2α(ξ + η) + 6t)2
=
.
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t)
(In,Out)

= πB

+

To ensure that what we derived is an equilibrium, there is an additional requirement (“no off-
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configuration deviation”) that needs to be satisfied: both brands do not have an incentive
to deviate from the current configuration with x1A2 ≤

1
2

+ ξ. That is, given Brand B’s

equilibrium price fixed, Brand A does not want to charge so low a price such that x1A2 > 12 +ξ;
given Brand A’s equilibrium prices fixed, Brand B does not want to charge so high a price
such that x1A2 >

1
2

+ ξ. Based on our calculation, Brand B does not have an incentive to

deviate. However, for Brand A, such deviation can be profitable:
Consider Brand A’s following maximization problem:
0,(In,Out)

max πA (p0A , p1A , pB

p0A ,p1A

) s.t. x1A2 >

1
+ ξ.
2

Solving this problem gives the optimal off-configuration deviation with
0,(In,Out)

p0,dev
A

=

pB

2

+t

0,(In,Out)

, p0,dev
A

=

pB

2

+t+η

,

and
h


dev
πA
= 9(1 − α)2 αη 2 + t2 α2 (2ξ + 3)2 − 20η 2 − 16η(ξ + 6) + 12α(η(3η + 10) − 2ξ − 3) + 36
i 

+24t3 (α(4η − 2ξ − 3) + 6) + 144t4 + 6(1 − α)αηt(6(η + 1) − α(2η + 2ξ + 3)) / 72t(1 − α + 2t)2 .
(In,Out)

dev − π
ˆ
Let ξ = ξ(η)
solves πA
A

= 0. Since


dev
α 3(1 − α)αη + 12t2 + t(6 + α(4η − 2ξ − 3))
∂πA
=−
<0
∂ξ
18(1 − α + 2t)2
and
(In,Out)

∂πA
∂ξ


α 9(1 − α)η + 12t2 + 2t((9 − 7α)η + 2αξ + 3)
=
> 0,
9(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)
(In,Out)

dev − π
we know that πA
A

is decreasing in ξ. Thus, when
ˆ
ξ ≥ ξ(η)
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(In,Out)

dev ≤ π
we have πA
A

ˆ
. That is, when ξ ≥ ξ(η),
Brand A does not have a profitable

off-configuration deviation, and thus we have an equilibrium with x1A2 ≤

1
2

+ ξ. The region

ˆ
where ξ ≥ ξ(η)
is illustrated in Figure 32 below.
ˆ
Figure 32: Region (Shaded) with ξ ≥ ξ(η)
(α = 0.1, t = 0.55)

ˆ
In sum, with the restriction that ξ ≥ ξ(η),
when only A adopts the new channel, we have

(In,Out)
πA

=




π (In,Out) +

α(2(ξ+η)(1−α+t)+3t)(6(ξ+η)(1−α+t)+t)
24(1−α+t)(1−α+2t)

if ξ ≥ η +



π (In,Out) +
B

α(3(1−α)η(2ξ+1)+8t(η+ξ))
6(1−α+2t)

ˆ ≤ξ<η+
if ξ(η)

B

t
2(1−α+t) ,
t
2(1−α+t) .

(B2)
and
(In,Out)

πB

=

t(3 − 2α(ξ + η) + 6t)2
.
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t)

(B3)

Next, we analyze the optimal adoption fee that the technology provider should charge.
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Optimal adoption fee charged by technology provider

Clearly if both brands do

not adopt the new channel,
(Out,Out)

πA

(Out,Out)

= πB

t
= .
2

(B4)

Suppose the technology provider sets an adoption fee f . Then it can either charge
(In,Out)

f = πA

(Out,Out)

− πA

to induce only one brand to adopt and earn profit f , or charge
(In,In)

f = πA

(Out,In)

− πA

(In,In)

= πB

(In,Out)

− πB

(In,Out)

to induce both brands to adopt and earn profit 2f , where the expressions for πA
(Out,Out)

πA

(In,In)

, πB

(In,Out)

, and πB

,

are given by Equations (B1)-(B4).

The optimal fee is thus determined by whether 2f > f or not. Consider
(In,Out)

f − 2f = (πA

(Out,Out)

− πA

(In,In)

) − 2(πB

(In,Out)

− πB

)

t
t
(In,Out)
)
− ) − 2( − πB
2
2
3t
(In,Out)
(In,Out)
= πA
+ 2πB
− .
2
(In,Out)

= (πA

(In,Out)

To pin down the sign of f − 2f , we first analyze the monotonicity of πA

(In,Out)

and πB

in η and ξ:
Note that if ξ ≥ η +
(In,Out)

∂πA
∂η

t
2(1−α+t) ,

(In,Out)

∂πA
=
∂ξ


α 18(1 − α)(η + ξ) + 6t2 (6(η + ξ) + 1) + t((54 − 28α)(η + ξ) + 3)
=
> 0;
18(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)
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ˆ ≤ξ<η+
if ξ(η)
(In,Out)

∂πA
∂η

(In,Out)

∂πA
∂ξ

t
2(1−α+t) ,


α 9(1 − α)(2ξ + 1) + 24t2 + 8αtη + (30 − 18α)t + (36 − 28α)tξ
=
> 0,
18(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)

α 9(1 − α)η + 12t2 + 2t((9 − 7α)η + 2αξ + 3)
=
> 0.
9(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)

(In,Out)

Thus, ∂πA

(In,Out)

is increasing in ξ, η. Clearly, ∂πB

=

t(3−2α(ξ+η)+6t)2
18(1+2t)(1−α+2t)

is decreasing in

ξ, η. Therefore,
3t
2
1
3t
1
(In,Out)
(In,Out)
≥ πA
(0, 0) + 2πB
( , )−
2 2
2
t(6t + 3)2
t(6t + 3 − 2α)2
3t
≥
+2
−
18(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)
18(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)
2
αt(8α + 6t + 3)
=
18(2t + 1)(1 − α + 2t)
(In,Out)

f − 2f = πA

(In,Out)

(η, ξ) + 2πB

(η, ξ) −

≥ 0.

ˆ
Therefore, for any given η and ξ that satisfy the restriction ξ ≥ ξ(η),
we have f ≥ 2f so
the technology provider should charge charge f ∗ = f to induce only one brand to adopt.
Optimal technology provision

Let the technology provider optimally choose η and ξ
(In,Out)

given that η ≤ η and ξ ≤ ξ. Since the provider’s profit Π = f = πA

−

t
2

is increasing

in ξ and η, the technology provider always has the incentive to push the technology to its
frontier, i.e., η ∗ = η and ξ ∗ = ξ.

Proof of Proposition 13. Since this proposition speaks to existence, some part of the
proof involves numerical analysis.
We focus on the other type of configuration with x1A2 >

135

1
2

+ ξ. In such an equilibrium,

the consumer who is indifferent between buying A from the new channel and B from the
traditional channel gets additional utility ∆DS+OC = η from the new channel. Therefore,
the equilibrium configuration should be the same as the subgame when only A adopting in
the OC-only case (discussed in the proof of Proposition 10) where
0,(In,Out)

pA

1,(In,Out)

pA

0,(In,Out)

pB

αη
,
6
(3 − α)η
=t+
,
6
αη
,
=t−
3
=t−

and
(In,Out)

πA

(In,Out)

πB

1
(9 − 5α)αη 2 
36t + 24αη +
,
72
t
(3t − αη)2
.
=
18t
=

Similar to what we did in the proof of Proposition 12 solving for the equilibrium with the
other configuration, to ensure that what we derived here is an equilibrium, there is a “no
off-configuration deviation” deviation that needs to be satisfied: both brands do not have
an incentive to deviate from the current configuration with x1A2 >

1
2

+ ξ. Following a similar

procedure as what we did for the other configuration, we find that Brand B always does not
˜
˜ < ξ(η)
ˆ
want to deviate, and that when ξ ≤ ξ(η)
(where ξ(η)
as shown in Figure 33 below),
(In,Out)

dev ≤ π
Brand A also does not want to deviate (πA
A

).

˜
When ξ ≤ ξ(η),
the technology provider can either charge
(In,Out)

f = πA

(Out,Out)

− πA

=

1
(9 − 5α)αη 2 
24αη +
72
t

to induce only one brand to adopt and earn profit f , or charge
(In,In)

f = πA

(Out,In)

− πA

(In,In)

= πB
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(In,Out)

− πB

=

αη(6t − αη)
18t

˜ < ξ(η)
ˆ
Figure 33: Parameter Region (Shaded) where ξ(η)
(α = 0.1, t = 0.55)

to induce both brands to adopt and earn profit 2f . The optimal fee is thus determined by
whether 2f > f or not. Since
αη(6t − αη)
1
(9 − 5α)αη 2 
−
24αη +
18t
72
t
αη(8t − (α + 3)η)
> 0,
=
24t

2f − f = 2

the technology provider should charge f to induce both brands to adopt and earn

Π = 2f =

αη(6t − αη)
.
9t

Next, we analyze the optimal technology choice of the third-party provider. We only focus
ˆ
on the case when the technology frontier (η and ξ) satisfies ξ < ξ(η).
In this case, if the
technology provider chooses the best possible technology η and ξ, its profit is given by
Π(η, ξ) =

αη(6t−αη)
.
9t

137

Now consider that the technology provider chooses the best possible DS technology (ξ) but
ˆ 0 ). By doing so, the
NOT the best possible OC technology (some η0 < η) such that ξ ≥ ξ(η
technology provider can induce an equilibrium with a configuration with x1A2 ≤

1
2

+ ξ which

we discussed in Proposition 12, and the profit is given by

Π(η0 , ξ) =

t(3 − 2α(ξ + η0 ) + 6t)2 α(3(1 − α)η0 (2ξ + 1) + 8t(η0 + ξ))
t
+
− .
18(1 + 2t)(1 − α + 2t)
6(1 − α + 2t)
2

We use numerical analysis to explore the possibility of Π(η0 , ξ) > Π(η, ξ). We do find a
parameter region for (η, ξ) such that Π(η0 , ξ) > Π(η, ξ) holds, as illustrated in Figure 34.
Figure 34: Parameter Region (Shaded) where Technology Is Not Pushed to Frontier (α =
0.1, t = 0.55)
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B.2. Experiment Scripts
B.2.1. Study 1
Q1.1 Which headphone brand do you prefer?
a. Sony
b. Bose
c. I don’t have a preference
Skip Q1.2 and Q1.3 If choosing “I don’t have a preference”
Skip To: Q1.2 If choosing “Sony”; To Q1.3 If choosing “Bose”
Q1.2 How strong is your preference for Sony over Bose?
a. My preference is strong
b. My preference is weak
Q1.3 How strong is your preference for Bose over Sony?
a. My preference is strong
b. My preference is weak
DS block (Q2.1-2.4) and OC block (Q3.1-3.4) below are both shown to subjects, but the order
is randomized:
[DS Block]
Q2.1 Consider a new technology-assisted shopping device which you can use to order products. This device aims to provide shopping support by, for example, providing product
information, and telling you how well a certain product fits you.
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Q2.2 (attention check). This is an attention check question: Which of the functions below
does the shopping device described above have?
a. It provides shopping support by, for example, providing product information, and telling
you how well a certain product fits you
b. It provides convenient ordering experience by, for example, enabling voice interactions,
“one-click” ordering, and quick payment.
c. Both of the first two choices
d. Neither of the first two choices
Q2.3 Assume you are about to buy a Sony or Bose brand headphone. Compared to buying
the headphone from a retail store, how much less/more benefit would ordering the headphone using the above-described shopping device provide to you? (Assume you will pay the
same prices in store or when you order through the device.)
a. A lot less benefit than buying in store
b. Somewhat less benefit than buying in store
c. Same as buying in store
d. Somewhat more benefit than buying in store
e. A lot more benefit than buying in store
Q2.4 In a few words, describe why you think the shopping device provides less or more
benefit than buying in store.
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[OC Block]
Q3.1 Consider a new technology-assisted shopping device which you can use to order products. This device aims to provide convenient ordering experience by, for example, enabling
voice interactions, “one-click” ordering, and quick payment.
Q3.2 (attention check). This is an attention check question: Which of the functions below
does the shopping device described above have?
a. It provides shopping support by, for example, providing product information, and telling
you how well a certain product fits you
b. It provides convenient ordering experience by, for example, enabling voice interactions,
“one-click” ordering, and quick payment.
c. Both of the first two choices
d. Neither of the first two choices
Q3.3 Assume you are about to buy a Sony or Bose brand headphone. Compared to buying
the headphone from a retail store, how much less/more benefit would ordering the headphone using the above-described shopping device provide to you? (Assume you will pay the
same prices in store or when you order through the device.)
a. A lot less benefit than buying in store
b. Somewhat less benefit than buying in store
c. Same as buying in store
d. Somewhat more benefit than buying in store
e. A lot more benefit than buying in store
Q3.4 In a few words, describe why you think the shopping device provides less or more
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benefit than buying in store.

B.2.2. Study 2
Only randomly show either Q1.1 or Q1.2
Q1.1 Consider a scenario where you are about to buy a product. There are two options in
the market, Brand A or Brand B. You strongly prefer Brand A over Brand B.
Q1.2 Consider a scenario where you are about to buy a product. There are two options in
the market, Brand A or Brand B. You weakly prefer Brand A over Brand B.
Only randomly show either Q2.1-2.2 or Q3.1-Q3.2
Q2.1 Consider a new technology-assisted shopping device which you can use to order products. This device aims to provide shopping support by, for example, providing product
information, and telling you how well a certain product fits you.
Q2.2 Based on consumer research, it is reported that using the device for shopping has the
following advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages

Disadvantages

Helping identify a product that fits your

Lack of salesperson assistance / physical

expectations

inspection about the good

Reducing decision-making effort

Having to learn to use the device

Time savings from not going to the store

Occasional failure to find a product that fits

Q3.1 Consider a new technology-assisted shopping device which you can use to order products. This device aims to provide convenient ordering experience by, for example, enabling
voice interactions, “one-click” ordering, and quick payment.
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Q3.2 Based on consumer research, it is reported that using the device for shopping has the
following advantages and disadvantages:
Advantages

Disadvantages

Fast voice-activated ordering

Lack of salesperson assistance / physical
inspection about the good

Reduce the steps to order a product

Having to learn to use the device

Time savings from not going to the store

Occasional issues in voice recognition

Q4 Compared to buying Brand A from a retail store, how much less/more benefit would
ordering it using the above-described shopping device provide to you? (Assume you will
pay the same prices in store or when you order through the device.)
A lot less benefit
-5

-4

-3

Same benefit
-2

-1

0

A lot more benefit
1

2

3

4

5

Q5 (attention check). Recent research on decision making shows that choices are affected
by the context in which they are made. Differences in how people feel, in their previous
knowledge, experience, and in their environment can influence the choices they make. To
help us understand how people make decisions, we are interested in information about you.
Specifically, whether you actually take the time to read the instructions. If you don’t, some
results may fail to tell us very much about the decision making in the real word. To help
us confirm that you have read these instructions, please ignore the question about how you
are feeling. Instead, only check the “none of the above” option. Thank you very much.

Interested

Hostile

Nervous

Distressed

Enthusiastic

Determined

Excited

Proud

Attentive

Upset

Irritable

Jittery

Strong

Alert

Active

Scared

Inspired

None of the above
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(Demographics)
Q6.1 What is your year of birth?

Q6.2 What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
c. Others
d. Prefer not to answer
Q6.3 What is the highest degree you have received?
a. Less than high school degree
b. High school degree
c. Bachelor’s degree
d. Master’s degree
e. Doctoral degree
Q6.4 What is your annual income (in USD)?
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